Daily Report

Central Eurasia

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CONTENTS

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CHECHEN AFFAIRS

Terrorist Activity

Dagestan Delegation Leaves for Talks With Chechen Fighters *[Moscow RTV]* 1
Chechnya: No Ransom Demanded for Captured Power Workers *[ITAR-TASS]* 1
Chechen Militants Offer To Exchange Hostages for Fighters *[Moscow NTV]* 1
Russia: Negotiations Continue on Release of Chechen Hostages *[Moscow ORT]* 2
Russia: Forty-Six Hostages Return to Kizlyar *[ITAR-TASS]* 2
Chechnya: Raduyev Pledges To Release Novosibirsk Policemen *[TRUD-7 26 Jan-1 Feb]* 2
Russia: Bodies of Killed Gunmen Handed Over to Chechens *[Moscow RTV]* 2
Chechnya: Elders Hand Basayev's Ultimatum to Volga-Based Unit *[INTERFAX]* 3

Military Activity

Chechen Militants Attack Motor Convoy Near Alkhan-Kala *[ITAR-TASS]* 3
Over 1,000 Chechen Militants Reported at Dagestan Border *[INTERFAX]* 3
Russian Unit 'Out of Action' After Dagestan Hostage Crisis *[INTERFAX]* 3
No Charges To Be Filed Against Russian Troops Over Dagestan *[INTERFAX]* 4
Chechen Field Commander Cited on Pervomayskoye Operation *[OBSHCHAYA GAZETA 25-31 Jan]* 4

Political Reaction

Yeltsin, Dagestan Leader Magomedali Discuss Situation *[ITAR-TASS]* 5
Chechen President Holds News Conference in Moscow *[Radio Rossii]* 6
Russia: Chechen Premier Confident Peace Close *[Moscow NTV]* 6
Russia: Chechnya Restoration Money Getting Into Gunmen's Hands *[IZVESTIYA 26 Jan]* 7
Zavgayev Says Russian Forces Withdrawing From Chechnya *[Moscow Radio]* 8
Chechen Head Rejects Likelihood of Fresh Wave of Terrorism *[ITAR-TASS]* 8
Dudayevites Call Talks With Chechen Authorities 'Senseless' *[ITAR-TASS]* 8
Chechnya: Aslan Maskhadov Refuses To See Doku Zavgayev *[ITAR-TASS]* 8
Duma's Abdulatipov on Moscow's Handling of Chechen Crisis *[MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI 21-28 Jan]* 9
Russia: European Parliament Resolution on Kizlyar 'Surprising' *[ITAR-TASS]* 10
Ferry Incident Not Seen 'Detrimental' to Russia-Turkey Ties *[Istanbul TV]* 10

INTERREGIONAL AFFAIRS

CIS Leaders' Moscow Summit Positions Compared *[MOLOD UKRAYINY 23 Jan]* 12
CIS: ITAR-TASS Carries Press Review for 26 Jan 12

RUSSIA INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

Yeltsin Hails Russia's Admission to Council of Europe *[ITAR-TASS]* 14
Russia: Council of Europe Vote: 164 For, 35 Against *[ITAR-TASS]* 14
Russia To Be Admitted to Council of Europe *[ITAR-TASS]* 14
Duma Speaker on Russia Joining Council of Europe *[ITAR-TASS]* 14

Russian MPs Welcome CE Admission as 'Triumph of Commonsense' *[INTERFAX]* 15
Yeltsin Aide Praises Admission to Council of Europe *[INTERFAX]* 15
Moscow Hails Admittance to Council of Europe *[INTERFAX]* 16
Russia: Medvedev: CE Admission is 'Major Stride' *[ITAR-TASS]* 16
Kovalev: Russia Not Yet Deserving of CE Membership *[NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA 25 Jan]* . 16
Zyuganov: New Europe 'Impossible' Without Russia *[INTERFAX]* 17
Russia: Zhirinovskiy Calls Council of Europe 'Slime Pond' *[INTERFAX]* 17
Russia: Zhirinovskiy Addresses CE Assembly *[INTERFAX]* 18
Moscow Supports European Proposal 'To Normalize' Cuban Ties *[INTERFAX]* 18
Russia: Remaining IFOR Paratroopers Leave for Bosnia *[ITAR-TASS]* 18
Russia: Norwegian Spokesman on U.S. Presence, NATO Maneuvers *[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA 26 Jan]* 19
Russia: Foreign Ministry Denies Reports on KAL-007 Survivors *[ITAR-TASS]* 19
Russian Fishing Authorities Seek Rights in U.S. Economic Zone *[INTERFAX]* 19
Russia: Christopher Wants To Meet Primakov in Helsinki or Geneva *[ITAR-TASS]* 20
Russia: Importance of Primakov's Visit to Kiev, Minsk Stressed *[ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA 26 Jan]* 20
Russia: Foreign Minister Primakov Meets European Ambassadors *[ITAR-TASS]* 21
Russia: Article Warns of Primakov's 'Empire' Policy *[MOLOD UKRAYINY 23 Jan]* 21
Russia: Polish Diplomat: Oleksy Affair Will Not Harm Relations *[INTERFAX]* 22
Russia: SVR: Oleksy Affair Deemed 'Political Provocation' *[INTERFAX]* 23
Yeltsin Approves Legal Cooperation With Poland *[ITAR-TASS]* 23
Russia: Panov: Talks With PRC on Border Forces Moving Closer *[ITAR-TASS]* 23
Russia: No Georgian-Abkhazian Talks if Peacekeepers' Role Changed *[INTERFAX]* 23
Russia: General Wants Army in Moldova To Be Peacekeepers *[ITAR-TASS]* 24

RUSSIA NATIONAL AFFAIRS

Political Issues

Yeltsin: Reforms To Continue Under Kadannikov *[ITAR-TASS]* 25
New Russian Deputy Premier Kadannikov Interviewed *[Moscow ORT]* 25
Russia: Soskovets Promises To Cooperate With Kadannikov *[ITAR-TASS]* 25
Livshits: Kadannikov Appointment 'Fits' Yeltsin's Campaign *[Moscow RTV]* 25
Yeltsin: All 'Major' Personnel Changes Finished *[Moscow RTV]* 26
Yeltsin, Heads of Republics Discuss Economy, Chechnya *[ITAR-TASS]* 27
Yeltsin Gives Address at Moscow University *[Moscow RTV]* 27
Yeltsin's Stock 'Devalued' by Permomayskoye *[NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA 24 Jan]* 30
PRAVDA Denies Yeltsin Shift Towards Communism *[25 Jan]* 34
Metallurgists Nominate Yeltsin for Second Term *[ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI 26 Jan]* 35
Yeltsin Mailbag Offers Campaign Advice *[ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI 26 Jan]* 35
Headquarters Set Up To Help Yeltsin Guard Constitution *[ITAR-TASS]* 37
Movement Urges Yeltsin To Amend Security Policy *[INTERFAX]* 37
Russia: Commentary Assesses Primakov Appointment *[NOVOYE VREMYA Jan]* 38
Kazakov Not Likely To Change Russia's Economic Course *[IZVESTIYA 26 Jan]* 41
Russia: Kovalev Hopes To Set Up Civil Rights Structures *[OBSHCHAYA GAZETA 25-31 Jan]* 42
Latsis Backs Yeltsin Reelection Despite Resigning *[Moscow ORT]* 42
Russia: Cabinet Discusses Oil Industry, Federal Programs *[ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA 26 Jan]* . 43

Media Issues

Russian TV Producer Murdered in Moscow *[ITAR-TASS]* 44

Military Issues

Yeltsin Names Kokoshin Defense Secretary of State *[ITAR-TASS]* 44

Federal Assembly

Russian Duma Chairman Seleznev Profiled *[ARGUMENTY I FAKTY 4, Jan]* 45

Two More Appointed to Russian Federation Council 'Working Group' *[ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA 25 Jan]* 45
Russia: Communists in No Hurry To Back Yabloko Group *[ITAR-TASS]* 45
Leftists Dominate Russian Duma, Key Economic Committees *[KOMMERSANT-DAILY 25 Jan]* 46
Russia: DVR Leader Rues Democratic Split in State Duma *[NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA 25 Jan]* 47
Russia: Change to Deputies' Pension Law Rejected *[ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI 26 Jan]* 47

Economic Issues

Russia: Chernomyrdin-Gore Commission To Speed Up Land Reform *[INTERFAX]* 47
Russia: News Conference on RD-180 Engine Sale to U.S. Reported *[KOMMERSANT-DAILY 25 Jan]* 48
Russia: Yeltsin Aide: 'Too Early' To Know Kadannikov's Policy *[ITAR-TASS]* 49
Russia: Wage, Pension Increase Seen as Election Ploy *[IZVESTIYA 25 Jan]* 49
Russia: Government Issues Decree To Support Exporters *[SEGODNYA 26 Jan]* 50
Russia: Edict Allows Deferred Payment of Back Taxes *[ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA 25 Jan]* 51
Russia: Kaliningrad Shipyard Produces Carrier for Estonia *[Moscow RTV]* 51

UKRAINE

International Affairs

OSCE Official Calls For International Aid for Ukraine *[ITAR-TASS]* 53
Udovenko: Visit to Belgrade 'Opportune' *[INTERFAX]* 53
Belgrade Backs Kiev's Wish To Take Part in Restoration Work *[INTERFAX]* 53
German, Ukrainian Nationalists To Sign 'Friendly Accord' *[INTERFAX]* 54
Ukraine: Kharkov To Manufacture Turbines for Iranian Nuclear Plant *[INTELNEWS]* 54

National Affairs

Kuchma Visits Zaporizhya, Predicts Economic Improvement *[Kiev International]* 54
Ukraine: Zaporizhya AES Seen Not Safe *[KIYEVSKIYE VEDOMOSTI 5 Jan]* 54
Ukraine Approves Stock Market Regulatory Guidelines *[INTERFAX]* 56
Ukraine Prosecutor General Calls Crimea Situation 'Dismal' *[INTELNEWS]* 57
Ukrainian, Tatar Nationalists Train Militants in Crimea *[VSEUKRAINSKIYE VEDOMOSTI 19 Jan]* 57

Economic Issues

Kuchma's Speech at Privatization Conference *[Kiev International]* 58

WESTERN REGION

Belarus

Belarus Foreign Minister Briefs Press on Upcoming Primakov Visit *[Moscow Radio]* 62
Lukashenka's Moscow Visit To Amend Bilateral Relations *[INTERFAX]* 62
Syanko: Russia Lukewarm on Enhancing Economic Relations *[INTERFAX]* 62
Belarus Opposition Opposes Oil Sector Cooperation With Russia *[BELAPAN]* 63
Diplomatic Ties With Iraq Deemed 'Objectively Necessary' *[BELORUSSKAYA DELOVAYA GAZETA 18 Jan]* 63
Belarus: IMF To Extend $97 Million Stand-By Credit *[Minsk Radio]* 64

Moldova

Snegur Views Economic, Language Issues With Romania *[Bucharest VOCEA ROMANIEI 17 Jan]* 64
Moldovan Spokesman Discusses Dniester, CIS Issues *[BASAPRESS]* 66

Snegur's Advisers Promise Transdniester Special Status *[INTERFAX]* 66
Moldova: 14th Army Equipment Leaves Dniester *[Moscow NTV]* 67
Chisinau, Tiraspol Leaders Debate Financial Issues *[INFOTAG]* 68

CENTRAL ASIA

Kazakhstan

Nazarbayev, Russia's Grachev Discuss Military Cooperation *[Almaty TV]* 69
Nazarabayev, Russia's Grachev Hold Talks *[INTERFAX]* 69

CAUCASUS

Azerbaijan

Aliyev Denies Supplying Arms to Chechnya *[Baku Radio]* 70
Aliyev Meets Deputy Director of Russian Border Service *[ITAR-TASS]* 70
Azerbaijan: 'Defenders of the Caucasus' Blame East, West *[PRAVDA 25 Jan]* 70
Russia Owes Baku $18 Million for Gabalinskaya Radar Station *[INTERFAX]* 71
Azerbaijan's Gasanov Confers With Iranian Ambassador *[Tehran IRNA]* 71

Georgia

Shevardnadze, Kinkel Highly Assess CIS Summit Decisions *[ITAR-TASS]* 71
Georgia: Agreement Reached on Caspian Oil Transport Revenues *[IBERIA]* 72
Georgian Nationalists Blame Shevardnadze for Hardships *[Tbilisi Radio]* 72

BALTIC STATES

Estonia

Estonian Foreign Minister on Relations With Russia *[ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA 25 Jan]* 73
Kallas Stresses Importance of Border Amendment *[Tallinn Radio]* 74
Estonia To Vote Against Russian Accession to CE *[BNS]* 74

Lithuania

Brazauskas Receives Ukrainian Parliamentary Delegation *[Vilnius Radio]* 75
Slezevicius: Lithuania To Sign Accord With IMF *[INTERFAX]* 75
Brazauskas: Premier's Resignation To Be Resolved by 29 Jan *[Vilnius Radio]* 75
Lithuania: Criminal Proceedings Initiated Against Prime Minister *[BNS]* 76

Terrorist Activity

Dagestan Delegation Leaves for Talks With Chechen Fighters

LD2601102796 Moscow Russian Television Network in Russian 0800 GMT 26 Jan 96

[From the "Vesti" newscast]

[FBIS Translated Text] On Thursday [25 January] the Dagestani delegation went to Chechnya again to have talks with the armed fighters. It is headed by Akhmed Adiyev, head of the town department of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Khasavyurt.

The main round of talks on the return of the hostages taken from the Novosibirsk Special Purpose Militia Detachment [OMON] is scheduled to be held today. In Adiyev's opinion, at the present moment the armed fighters are holding 14 people. True, Dudayev's men are mentioning a slightly different figure — 12. The armed fighters' demands regarding the exchange of the OMON members — the handing over and burial of all the 42 terrorists killed in the fighting at Pervomayskoye — remain the same as before. The main stumbling block in resolving this problem is the identification of the bodies. The trouble is that with every passing day it becomes increasingly difficult to identify the bodies, and the armed fighters will not agree to the exchange unless complete identification has been made.

Today it is 10 days since Dudayev's men seized 29 workers at the Groznyy thermal electric power station. Unfortunately, the failure and delays in obtaining the return of the power engineers has forced the administration of Grozenergo [Groznyy power] to rely on their own efforts in seeking their members of staff. Those kidnapped have been found. They are all alive and well and are being kept in one of the villages not far from Groznyy. The armed fighters' demands with regard to the exchange of the power engineers are the same as before. It is proposed that one hostage should be exchanged for two fighters. Besides that, Dudayev's men are insisting on a meeting with Oleg Lobov, the authorized representative of the Russian president, and an obligatory condition is that media correspondents must be there.

Chechnya: No Ransom Demanded for Captured Power Workers

LD2501183796 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 1146 GMT 25 Jan 96

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Sharip Asuyev]

[FBIS Translated Text] Groznyy, 25 Jan (ITAR-TASS) — The fate of the 29 power workers seized in Groznyy remains unclear. In an interview to the VAYNAKH PRESS today, Shepa Shabazov, deputy general director of the TETs-2 [heat and power station], denied the reports that some people had demanded a ransom for the imprisoned power workers and that, allegedly, their colleagues were collecting the sum demanded. He emphasized that no one had demanded a ransom since no armed grouping in Chechnya had yet acknowledged responsibility for the seizure of the TETs workers.

The workers at the TETs-2 cast doubt on the statement by Salman Raduyev that he knows where the hostages are. The colleagues of the power workers who were seized in Groznyy consider that very many people are trying to make political capital out of this tragedy.

At the same time, according to information that our Moscow correspondent Igor Ivantsov obtained in the Russian joint-stock company, Russia's United Power System (RAO YeES Rossii), the freeing of the 29 power workers seized in Groznyy is being postponed because the people holding them are insisting on a meeting with official Russian representatives. This is one of the additional conditions that they put forward during unofficial talks on the question of freeing the power workers. Their main condition is that the power workers should be exchanged for an equal number of imprisoned militants. According to existing data, the power workers are in a mountain village not far from Groznyy; they are all alive and at present have been dispersed among Chechen families.

Chechen Militants Offer To Exchange Hostages for Fighters

LD2501203796 Moscow NTV in Russian 1900 GMT 25 Jan 96

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] According to RIA-NOVOSTI reports, the fighters who seized 29 power engineering workers in Groznyy on 16 January have put forward conditions for freeing the hostages. They insist on exchanging the hostages for the terrorists in the hands of the Chechen authorities, at a ratio of one for two. The fighters who seized the power engineers are also demanding a meeting with Oleg Lobov, the Russian president's authorized representative in Chechnya, in the presence of journalists. The possibility of holding such a meeting is being discussed. [passage omitted]

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Russia: Negotiations Continue on Release of Chechen Hostages

LD2501232896 Moscow Russian Public Television First Channel Network in Russian 2108 GMT 25 Jan 96

[From the "Novosti" newscast]

[FBIS Translated Text] On Thursday there was a chance that a second group of hostages seized by Salman Raduyev's terrorists in Kizlyar and Pervomayskoye might have been freed. Official representatives of Dagestan held talks on this. According to Mr. (Adiyev), chief of police in Khasavyurt, at least 14 policemen are being held in Novogroznenskiy. The Dudayevites, however, will only admit to holding 12 Novosibirsk policemen. The handover of the Siberian policemen is held up at the moment by the Dudayevites' demand for the burial of all 42 fighters who died in Pervomayskoye. However, these bodies still have to be identified.

Meanwhile Doku Zavgayev, the leader of Chechnya, is prepared personally to hold talks with the Dudayevites on a compromise. The commission on rehabilitation of members of illegal armed formations is currently studying applications from hundreds of fighters. Most of them will probably be pardoned, whereupon they will be able to return to civilian life. Zavgayev is convinced there will be no return to the use of force in the republic.

Meanwhile, the 'ARGUMENTY I FAKTY-NOVOSTI' news agency reports that weapon emplacements are being set up around highway police posts in the Stavropol, Kuban and Don regions. The defensive perimeter on the roads is moving steadily northwards. All vehicles, particularly long ones, are being checked.

Russia: Forty-Six Hostages Return to Kizlyar

LD2401205296 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 2029 GMT 24 Jan 96

[By Oleg Artyushin]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] KIZLYAR, January 24 (ITAR-TASS) — Forty six hostages, who were seized by Chechen gunmen led by Salman Raduyev and freed in the Chechen village of Novogroznenskiy, returned to Kizlyar at about 22:00 on Wednesday.

Kizlyar military commandant Colonel Viktor Loban told ITAR-TASS that among the freed hostages there are 38 civilians, five local policemen and three policemen from Makhachkala.

According to Yuriy Avanesov, first deputy head of the city administration, the fate of 19 other hostages, also residents of Kizlyar, remains unknown. They went on missing during Raduyev's raid on the city earlier this month.

Chechnya: Raduyev Pledges To Release Novosibirsk Policemen

MM2601114196 Moscow TRUD-7 in Russian 26 Jan-1 Feb 96 p 1

[Report by GROZNENSKIY RABOCHIY Editor Musa Muradov under "Hot News" rubric: "Chechens Want To Reach Agreement"]

[FBIS Translated Text] An attempt has been made in Groznyy to take a step toward the peaceful resolution of the armed confrontation. A "roundtable" of Chechnya's public and political movements, whose members include supporters of the present power and representatives of the opposition, met this week. At the session Gersolt Elmurzayev, deputy chairman of the National Accord Committee, proposed setting up an organizing committee which will prepare to convene the Chechnya Coalition Council.

It is proposed that the organizing committee will include not only supporters of Doku Zavgayev but also the gunmen's field commanders. The initiators of this idea believe that the council, functioning with the rights of a public organ, can open up the way to a dialogue among all Chechens. At a news conference the same day G. Elmurzayev told journalists that preliminary consultations have already been held with the Dudayevites' field commanders, and they advocated convening the Coalition Council. As yet there has been no reaction from Chechnya's official authorities or representatives of the Federal Command to this proposal.

Hostages among the peaceful residents seized by gunmen in Dagestan were released Wednesday evening. Some of the Novosibirsk policemen are still being held, but Salman Raduyev promises to hand them over to the Russian side after the bodies of the gunmen who died at Pervomayskoye have been buried in Khasavyurt.

Russia: Bodies of Killed Gunmen Handed Over to Chechens

LD2501153596 Moscow Russian Television Network in Russian 1400 GMT 25 Jan 96

[From the "Vesti" newscast]

[FBIS Translated Text] At 1400 today a convoy of motor vehicles carrying the bodies of fighters from the Salman Raduyev group who were killed in Pervomayskoye and Kizlyar passed through the Chechen border village of Gerzel. The Dagestani side handed over 42 bodies to the Chechen fighters, the POSTFACTUM

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agency reports. The fighters are still keeping 17 militiamen from Novosibirsk. The Chechen side is prepared to exchange the captured militiamen for Salman Raduyev's fighters on an "all for all" basis. The Federal authorities are not taking part in the negotiations.

Chechnya: Elders Hand Basayev's Ultimatum to Volga-Based Unit

LD2401154896 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1433 GMT 24 Jan 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] SAMARA, Jan 24 (INTERFAX-EURASIA) — Elders of one of the villages in Chechnya's Vedeno canyon handed over an ultimatum from prominent Chechen field commander Shamil Basayev to the command of the 506th guard motor rifle regiment.

Shamil Basayev led the Chechen attack on the southern Russian town of Budennovsk in June 1995.

The press center of the Volga military district, where the company is permanently stationed, told INTERFAX-Eurasia Wednesday that in his ultimatum, Basayev urged the company to leave its positions and free the pass to the canyon. If these conditions are accepted, the ultimatum says, then the federal forces will receive written guarantees that "there will be not a single shot against the regiment over a period of two months." Basayev promised to start active combat operations if he receives a negative answer.

According to the press center, Colonel Aleksandr Kukharchuk, commander of this regiment, told the Elders that "military men are not going to react to this ultimatum" and if combat operations are started, then "the whole responsibility for people's lives will be placed on Basayev himself."

The 506th guard motor rifle regiment is assigned to the 27th motor rifle division of the Volga military district. The regiment has carried out combat tasks on the territory of the Chechen republic from January 1995, and has suffered 95 casualties over this period of time.

Military Activity

Chechen Militants Attack Motor Convoy Near Alkhan-Kala

LD2601070496 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 0555 GMT 26 Jan 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] MOSCOW January 26 (ITAR-TASS) — Over the past 24 hours, Dudayev militants have opened fire on Federal troops 22 times, including 15 times in Groznyy. Five servicemen have been wounded, a spokesman at the Press Service of the Command of Federal troops in Chechnya has told ITAR-TASS.

The situation in Groznyy and other areas of Chechnya remains complex. Individual groups remain active at meetings which have been provoked by Dudayev emissaries. Small groups of those prevent at meetings in Argun and Shali demand a withdrawal of Federal troops from Chechnya.

Dudayev militants attacked a military convoy of Interior Ministry troops near Alkhan-Kala, trying to seize military equipment. The attackers set two vehicle on fire but withdrew upon encountering stout resistance. There are casualties among the servicemen escorting the convoy. Militants lost up to 20 men killed in the attack.

Over 1,000 Chechen Militants Reported at Dagestan Border

LD2501175496 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1408 GMT 25 Jan 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] MAKHACHKALA, Jan 25 (INTERFAX) — More than 1,000 Chechen militants have gathered near the villages of Dubovskaya, Kharkovskaya and Grebenskaya in Chechnya's Shelkovskaya district bordering on Dagestan, a reliable source in the Dagestan office of the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) has said.

The source said that a large and heavily armed group of militants was still present near the mountain village of Botlikh in Dagestan.

The source did not rule out the militants might try to stage terrorist attacks in Dagestan.

A group of militants led by Salman Raduyev penetrated into Chechnya in the middle of this month and held several dozen hostages in Dagestan's town of Kizlyar for two days. The hostages were then moved to the village of Pervomayskoye, where federal troops attacked them.

Raduyev and another Chechen field commander, Shamil Basayev, told a news conference in the Novogroznensky, eastern Chechnya, on Tuesday [23 January] they were ready for more terrorist attacks in Russia.

Russian Unit 'Out of Action' After Dagestan Hostage Crisis

LD2501165196 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1408 GMT 25 Jan 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] MOSCOW, Jan 25 (INTERFAX) — The Moscow region's rapid reaction unit is practically out of action after the operation to free hostages in Pervomayskoye, Dagestan, department chief

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Aleksandr Kulikov said at a briefing at the Moscow police force.

One member of the unit was killed and many others injured or affected by cold, Kulikov said. The police unit needed rest, he added, and the Moscow region's special police force OMON would be used as a substitute for the time being.

Kulikov also said that the Chechen crisis kept the regional police force on the alert. He said no day had passed without phone calls threatening terrorist attacks or hostage-taking. These statements, pronounced primarily with a "Caucasus accent" forced the OMON special police to be kept in reserve and did not let them be used for routine operations.

Kulikov said that the police were unable to guard all targets the Chechen militants might attack in the region, but its mobile groups were capable of arriving at the site of an incident on time. "If there is such a problem in reality, I shall issue the order to wipe out the bandits personally, whatever others may say afterwards," Kulikov warned.

No Charges To Be Filed Against Russian Troops Over Dagestan

LD2501194796 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1408 GMT 25 Jan 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] MOSCOW, Jan 25 (INTERFAX) — Russia's Main military prosecutor's office did not institute criminal proceedings against Russian servicemen due to the events in Kizlyar and Pervomayskoye (Dagestan), a top-ranking official of the prosecutor's office told INTERFAX Thursday in Moscow.

He said military men "have not committed any criminally punishable actions" repulsing attacks of Chechen gunmen against the airdrome and several other sites in Kizlyar and while freeing hostages in Pervomayskoye, according to available information.

Speaking about responsibility of separate military men, primarily from the command staff who permitted an unimpeded passing of gunmen to Dagestan and then a breakthrough of part of the gunmen headed by Salman Raduyev through a triple ring of federal forces around Pervomayskoye and their withdrawal to Chechnya, the source said that an investigation on these issues is already underway. The military prosecutor's office will start examining the case as soon as criminal elements are found in actions of servicemen.

Chechen Field Commander Cited on Pervomayskoye Operation

MK2601080796 Moscow OBSHCHAYA GAZETA in Russian No. 3, 25-31 Jan 96 p 1 (Signed to press 24 Jan) p 1

[Interview with Colonel Khunkar Israpilov, Chechen field commander, by Nadezhda Chaykova; place and date not given: "People in Masks Have Started Talking. Gunmen in Pervomayskoye Were Commanded Not by Raduyev, But by Khunkar Israpilov" — first paragraph is introduction]

[FBIS Translated Text] Khunkar Israpilov assumed command after Salman Raduyev's unsuccessful actions in Kizlyar. He organized the defense of the village of Pervomayskoye and the evacuation of gunmen and hostages to Chechnya. At present the wounded colonel is recuperating in a mountain village, where he was interviewed by OBSHCHAYA GAZETA's correspondent.

[Chaykova] Did you have an order to carry out the operation in Kizlyar, and how was its planned?

[Israpilov] This operation was led by Colonel Raduyev. I received no orders. But subunits which I directly commanded were also engaged in the operation, and so I thought it necessary to take part in it personally. We were assigned the task of destroying a helicopter base and an aircraft plant. I cannot say that the operation in Kizlyar was carried out successfully. The main reason, I think, is the fact that Raduyev lacks the necessary experience: This is my personal opinion. I believe that he was not in a position to command a unit under such extreme conditions. He has never acted under encirclement and this is the fourth time for me....

[Chaykova] When your group was moving to Kizlyar, was it planned beforehand to take hostages?

[Israpilov] I expected that we would be able to leave Kizlyar without taking hostages. But when we left our basing area, it was reported on all Russian military radio transceivers that our group was headed for Dagestan. I understood that escape routes would be sealed off and decided to take hostages.

[Chaykova] How did you get into Dagestan in the first place if the federal forces knew about your intentions?

[Israpilov] We arrived at Kizlyar in a convoy of vehicles fully loaded with ammunition and weapons. All [Russian] checkpoints were advised that we were moving in the direction of Kizlyar in order to commit a terrorist act in Russia. They even knew my name and the number of fighters in my detachment. At times our

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path was blocked, but we did not meet with any serious obstacles.

[Chaykova] Raduyev said that Russian special services were possibly luring the group of gunmen to the territory of Dagestan in order to subsequently eliminate it.

[Israpilov] I also think so. The only thing the federal forces did not expect were our swift and coordinated actions.

[Chaykova] How did you organize the defense of the village of Pervomayskoye?

[Israpilov] I wanted to accept an engagement in Pervomayskoye so that people could see which methods federal forces used in securing the release of the hostages. I did not see anything essentially new in Pervomayskoye. Only what has already been used in Chechnya.

[Chaykova] How many direct assaults on Pervomayskoye were there?

[Israpilov] Twenty-two, and we repulsed them all. The engagement lasted, with breaks, for 82 hours.

[Chaykova] What units participated on the Russian side?

[Israpilov] All elite Russian detachments — Alfa, the Special Rapid Reaction Force [SOBR], and the Special Purpose Police Force [OMON]. All in all, 15,000 men, approximately 100 guns, two tank brigades, and also the Dagestani police. On our side there were only 250 men. In order to replenish ammunition I allowed some federal forces to enter Pervomayskoye. Then they were destroyed.

[Chaykova] What, in your opinion, were the losses on the Russian side?

[Israpilov] According to our data, 800 men. But this may be an erroneous figure. We were handicapped by the hostages. They had to be covered when passing through mine fields, under intensive artillery and mortar fire, when we were retreating from Pervomayskoye. If it were not for the hostages and captives, we could have withdrawn from the village with minimal losses.

[Chaykova] Did the group of gunmen which attacked federal forces from the rear help you?

[Israpilov] The result of its action was that the federal forces did not know in which direction we were retreating from Pervomayskoye. It was my idea — a breakthrough by gunmen in Sovetskoye. When Russian troops begin combat action, they always become vulnerable in the rear. And we know this.

[Chaykova] How do you think the situation will shape up in the near future?

[Israpilov] I am sure that in the future Russia will continue combat action, bombing built-up areas. I have no hatred toward the Russian people, but I want to warn that then I will also conduct a military operation on Russian territory. Field commanders need no orders. They will start acting on their own. They see that their people are being exterminated and are ready to fight to the end. Recently 81 houses in the village of Verkhneye Suvorovo were destroyed as a result of bombardment by "Grad" multiple rocket launchers. How can we remain indifferent when whole villages are being pulverized?

Political Reaction

Yeltsin, Dagestan Leader Magomedali Discuss Situation

LD2501162696 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1148 GMT 25 Jan 96

[By Andrey Shtorkh]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] MOSCOW January 25 (ITAR-TASS) — President Boris Yeltsin and Daghestani leader Magomedali Magomedov discussed the situation in Daghestan at a meeting on Thursday as well as larger aid to citizens of the republic who became victims of the recent terrorist act by Salman Raduyev's gang.

The two leaders also examined additional measures to do away with consequences of this terrorist act, ITAR-TASS learnt from the Russian president's press secretary Sergei Medvedev.

The press secretary noted that, in compliance with a decree of the president who pays special attention to Daghestan's assistance, the federal government will appropriate 304.9 billion roubles to compensate damages to people who lost their homes as well as expenses to restore infrastructure facilities in the Daghestani city of Kizlyar and villages of the Khasavyurt district which were destroyed as a result of the terrorist act committed by Chechen terrorists.

Besides, 35.5 billion roubles will be allocated to give lump-sum material aid to people who became victims of the terrorist act in Daghestan and to families of the deceased.

Yeltsin and Magomedov also discussed the economic sitatuion in Daghestan, which remains difficult, since land transport routes of the republic are partially blocked due to the conflict in neighbouring Chechnya.

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Chechen President Holds News Conference in Moscow

LD2501130296 Moscow Radio Rossii Network in Russian 1100 GMT 25 Jan 96

[FBIS Translated Text] [Chechen President] Doku Zavgayev, who was aware that the federal authorities intended to allocate up to 16 trillion rubles [R] for the rebuilding of the republic, held a news conference in Moscow. My colleague Andrey Zenkov has the details:

[Zenkov] Elected by 91 percent of those who came to the polls, that is, 460,000 people including less than one percent of the military personnel, Doku Gapurovich Zavgayev acquired a legitimate right, or at least a formal one, to speak on behalf of the Chechen people. As usual, the news conference in Moscow consisted of questions and answers. This is how it went:

[Question] How long do you think the conflict will last?

[Answer] This is a long-neglected problem. We are prepared for peaceful talks with anyone. They are going on, and many fighters are returning to peaceful life.

[Question] How many fighters have come back to their villages?

[Answer] I have no precise information.

[Question] What part of the republic is now under your control?

[Answer] All of Chechnya's territory.

[Question] Where is Dudayev then?

[Answer] On the same territory. We can't keep permanent order in a number of places, you should understand. Fighters are mobile, they come and go as they wish. Pervomayskoye also used to be considered a peaceful village.

[Question] Will you be able to do without the federal troops?

[Answer] This is a complex issue, and one cannot approach it in a one-dimensional way. In principle, we are in favor of step-by-step reduction of the number of federal troops on the territory of the republic.

[Question] A total of R16 trillion and $1 billion have been allocated by Yeltsin's decree for restoring the Chechen economy. How will you stop this money from being siphoned off into commercial activity?

[Answer] We are working on means to do this.

[Question] What is your attitude to Yeltsin's statement on the preparations for an attack on Dudayev's strongholds, many of which are in populated locations?

[Answer] I do not know anything about this statement.

[Question] Do you believe that peace can be reached and normal life restored in Chechnya?

[Answer] I believe in it, Doku Zavgayev answered and all we can do is believe in it together with him, in spite of his splendid diplomatic inaccessibility which probably comes naturally to all politicians of the east.

Russia: Chechen Premier Confident Peace Close

LD2501192096 Moscow NTV in Russian 1600 GMT 25 Jan 96

[Report by correspondent Arkadiy Mamontov on news conference held by Chechen Prime Minister Doku Zavgayev in Moscow on 25 January; from the "Segodnya" newscast; passages contained within quotation marks are recorded]

[FBIS Translated Text] Chechen Prime Minister Doku Zavgayev sees his government's main task to compensate the population for the damage. Zavgayev told journalists in Moscow today he was prepared for negotiations even with Dudayev, as long as peace could be established.

[Mamontov, over video of news conference] At a news conference held at the RIA today, Doku Zavgayev declared that the republic already has a legitimately elected power.

[Zavgayev] "The Chechen Republic is a component part of our country on an equal basis."

[Mamontov] As regards the current situation in Chechnya, Zavgayev thinks the government's main task is to compensate the population for the damage caused by the conflict, create 300,000 new jobs, and bring home 200,000 refugees to the republic. Given this, control must be tightened up over the distribution of funds, totaling 16 trillion rubles and $1 billion, which have been allocated from the federal budget to rehabilitate Chechnya. The problem of the looting of these funds demands an urgent meeting between Doku Zavgayev and Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin on Thursday, and with President Boris Yeltsin on Friday.

As concerns the military-political situation in Chechnya, Doku Gapurovich put forward his arguments for thinking that the republic is moving toward peace.

[Zavgayev] "Whereas two months there were 40-50 cases of shelling, of mutual exchanges of fire — we called them shelling of the federal troops, but the latter were not always silent — this figure has fallen now to between five or six on average."

[Mamontov] Asked whether the head of the republic was aware of the fact that the Russian president announced in the Federation Council that the fighters'

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bases will be destroyed, Zavgayev answered in the negative.

[Zavgayev] "I am not aware the president has made any such decision. I have not seen any such decision. That is the first thing. I can only tell you what I know about."

[Mamontov] Zavgayev said his government was currently in control of the entire territory of Chechnya — with some exceptions, it is true.

[Zavgayev] "There are some settlements where we cannot guarantee that we can ensure stable order. The situation frequently changes in these settlements."

[Mamontov] As regards interaction with the federal troops, Zavgayev said he can influence the federal command's decisions to carry out an operation to destroy the fighters in this or that area. At the same time, Zavgayev admitted that there are people among the federal troops and among the illegal armed formations who exacerbate the situation by provocations. Nevertheless, he thinks there will be no return to actions using force in Chechnya.

Russia: Chechnya Restoration Money Getting Into Gunmen's Hands

MM2501201596 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 26 Jan 96 p 1

[Article by Yuriy Snegirov: "Money for the Restoration of Chechnya Is Finding Its Way Partly Into the Gunmen's Hands"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Groznyy — A total of 6 trillion rubles [R] was allocated last year from the Russian budget for the restoration of Chechnya's socioeconomic sphere. This year Boris Yeltsin intends to channel almost three times as much there — R16.2 trillion. In addition, a currency top-up of about $1 billion is planned. The president has instructed the government to elaborate within two weeks a program for reestablishing Chechnya's economy on the basis of that amount.

Groznyy stopped being the focus of the Russian Army's military operations in Chechnya a whole year ago. There is no fighting in the streets, and gunmen do not have to be dislodged from buildings with the help of concrete-piercing shells and bombs. Many Groznyy inhabitants have ended up not leaving the city after the assault destroyed their apartments. They are living not far from the ruins of their own houses in other ruins and are waiting for the promised compensation. But not a single inhabitant of the city whom I met in the street, or their friends and relatives, have received any compensation. However, they have heard about it and have been coming up and asking questions.

There is some washing hanging out to dry at an angle from the gray hulk of Dudayev's palace (I took a picture of this). Three families have settled in a shed which miraculously remained intact, and are refusing point-blank to consider themselves people of no fixed abode. Everyone simultaneously started showing me their houses, which were turned into ruins a year ago.

Meanwhile there was a dead man in the shed. His mother came out and asked me to come in and have a look at him. On the rusty bed there was a young Russian. He did not die of wounds or in the firing. He had had a stomach ulcer. His neighbors were standing next to him — an Ingush and a Chechen woman with a child. The problem was that it is impossible to get a coffin in Groznyy. They decided to delay the funeral until the neighbor was able to go to a construction site and remove several planks from the fence. They could knock together a coffin themselves. They had a saw and an ax. These three families did not intend to leave town. They would wait for the builders to put their houses back up. And they have given up waiting for any compensation.

"I go to the territorial administration every day as though I were going to work. They are stringing us along," an old woman who had a three-room apartment near the oil institute said. "The devil take them! They have put it all in their own pockets."

They will have to wait for a long time. The cranes have come to a standstill, the construction equipment is working only in the city center, clearing up the ruins of the administrative buildings. The Turkish construction firms involved in rebuilding the center called back their workers as soon as they were paid: It is too dangerous. You can easily blow yourself up on a trip wire set up by a "passerby" even after the sappers have combed the building. There was a huge explosion like that in the central department store building recently. A soldier who went there to check the building over for snipers' positions — they were firing from there at night — was blown up. The sappers found another three trip wires and a mine there. There is another misfortune to add to all the dangers and the daily threat of being taken hostage — for the fifth month running, the majority of Groznyy's construction workers have not seen their wages.

They spend most of their work time either listlessly picketing the local government building with demands for their wages, or bargaining at the market in order to make ends meet somehow. I have not seen any construction materials on construction sites. They have either not arrived from Russia yet, or else they have

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already been removed for the construction of cottages and small mansions for the city's richest inhabitants.

The inhabitants of Chechnya have reacted in different ways to the president's edict on funding. The homeless have simply dismissed the whole thing, saying: We will never see this money. I was amazed by the reaction of the command of the gunmen. Akhmet Zakayev, commander of a Southwestern Front sector, said simply: "If it were not for these authorities, we would have died of hunger a long time ago. Some of this money is falling into our hands. Is it not astonishing that we are fighting the Russian Army with Russian assault rifles in our hands and wearing Russian camouflage, bought from the Russians for Russian money?"

Zavgayev Says Russian Forces Withdrawing From Chechnya

LD2501212596 Moscow Radiostantsiya Ekho Moskvy in Russian 1900 GMT 25 Jan 96

[FBIS Translated Text] The numbers of the federal forces in Chechnya are being reduced. In fact, their withdrawal is already underway, Doku Zavgayev, the head of the republic, told a news conference in Moscow. At the same time, he admitted that among the Russian servicemen there are individuals who are provoking the situation.

Chechen Head Rejects Likelihood of Fresh Wave of Terrorism

LD2601123796 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1230 GMT 26 Jan 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] MOSCOW, January 26 (ITAR-TASS) — Chechen government head Doku Zavgayev does not think there is a real threat of new acts of terror in Dagestan.

Zavgayev said in an interview with ITAR-TASS that recurrence of rebel raids is "unrealistic", although he gave neither confirmation nor denial to the hearsay that some 1,000 rebels had amassed near the administrative border between Chechnya and Dagestan.

Zavgayev still said the build-up of the rebels was unlikely as they are meeting no backing from the population in the cited Chechnya's areas.

He described the situation in Chechnya as complex, adding that "there is a tendency of pulling out of the crisis".

Zavgayev cited as Chechnya's major challenges the continuation of dialogue of different Chechen camps, creation of jobs, restoration of war-battered housing and payment of pensions and compensation to the population.

Dudayevites Call Talks With Chechen Authorities 'Senseless'

LD2601111296 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1030 GMT GMT 26 Jan 96

[By Sharip Asuyev]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] GROZNYY, January 26 (ITAR-TASS) — "Neither Chechen military formations Chief of Staff Aslan Maskhadov nor any of his field commanders have ever met Head of the Chechen Republic Doku Zavgayev or plan to meet him in the future," Chairman of the National Revival Party of Chechnya Ruslan Kutayev told ITAR-TASS today, referring to a statement made by Maskhadov himself. Kutayev is a member of the Organisational Committee, set up in Chechnya in order to call a Coalition Council of all the republic's peace-loving forces.

Kutayev met Maskhadov and other representatives from Dudayev's side last night in a mountain village in the southeastern part of Chechnya in order to discuss with him the coalition idea, advanced by the Roundtable of Socio-Political Movements and Parties of the Republic, which is now working in Groznyy.

He said that Maskhadov had expressed readiness to begin a dialogue with any forces wishing to restore peace in Chechnya. However, according to Kutayev, Maskhadov's meetings and talks with Zavgayev were possible only on private lines, not as with the Head of the Chechen Republic. "Dzhokhar Dudayev's representatives believe that talks with Groznyy officials are senseless, because the armed conflict is not between these two sides, but between the Chechen people and the Russian army," Kutayev said.

Chechnya: Aslan Maskhadov Refuses To See Doku Zavgayev

LD2601083596 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 0749 GMT 26 Jan 96

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Sharip Asuyev]

[FBIS Translated Text] Groznyy, 26 Jan (ITAR-TASS) — Neither Aslan Maskhadov, actual head of the main staff of the Chechen formations, nor any of the field commanders subordinate to him have had a meeting with Doku Zavgayev, head of the Chechen Republic, nor do they intend to. Ruslan Kutayev, chairman of the party for the national revival of Chechnya, who is a member of the action committee for convening a coalition council of all peace-loving forces in Chechnya, informed an ITAR-TASS correspondent of this, quoting Aslan Maskhadov himself.

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Duma's Abdulatipov on Moscow's Handling of Chechen Crisis

MK2501150096 Moscow MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI in Russian
No. 3, 21-28 Jan 96 (Signed to press 22 Jan 96) p 5

[Interview with State Duma Deputy Ramazan Abdulatipov by Sanobar Shermatova under the "Expert Appraisal" rubric: "'Raduyev Got Away With It — This Is a Slap in Dagestan's Face'"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Budennovsk, Kizlyar, Pervomayskoye, the "Avrasya" ferry, hostages in Groznyy — the military conflict in Chechnya has degenerated into political terrorism. What is its nature? Is it possible to stop the terrorists? State Duma Deputy Ramazan Abdulatipov answers questions by MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI observer Sanobar Shermatova.

[Shermatova] You participated in the talks with Raduyev's fighters in Kizlyar. At first sight, the talks were a success, the rebels agreed to leave Kizlyar and to set hostages free on the border with Chechnya. What prevented the initial plan from being executed?

[Abdulatipov] I have been left with the feeling that we were used as players in a game unknown to us: The Dagestani authorities, who started talks in Kizlyar on their own initiative, received some instructions from Moscow — the military got different orders. Why did they not tell us so — deputies and members of the Dagestani Government: "Go away, don't get under our feet, we will stop them and destroy them in Pervomayskoye all the same!"

[Shermatova] What did the Novosibirsk militia officers have to suffer for?

[Abdulatipov] They were ordered not to open fire, because the bus convoy was to go past their checkpoint. I cannot give advice to generals — I am a petty officer in the reserves. But how else can I assess this military operation: The motorcade is stopped at a population center and 37 militia officers and hundreds of civilians are effectively turned over to the rebels. They do not start the operation immediately, but wait for three days until the rebels have fortified their positions and established communications with their headquarters. The result — a bombed village, killed or missing hostages, and on top of that we are told that a group of terrorists broke through. It is a slap in the face of the peoples of Dagestan people if Raduyev got away alive after the losses Dagestan sustained.

[Shermatova] What lessons, if any, were learned from Budennovsk then?

[Abdulatipov] No goals, even the best ones, can justify terrorism, because its cost is human lives. I understand it when the authorities say: Most important is to save the hostages' lives. There are words on the value of human life written in our Constitution. But what do we have in reality? Had the terrorists simply gone away, according to our mountain customs revenge would have found all of those who came to Kizlyar with arms in hand and seized women in childbirth and children. This is a heinous disgrace: According to our customs, men may not see women in childbirth for three months — only the husband has this right. What is to be done now? What was the purpose of starting the operation in Pervomayskoye? What reasons can I, as a deputy, cite to my voters in Dagestan?

[Shermatova] Do you see any linkage between the decision on allocating extra funds to carry out antiterrorist training and the delay in the military operation in Pervomayskoye?

[Abdulatipov] I do not think that a normal military commander would be interested in having his soldiers killed. But this logic has existed for centuries. Why did Yermolov send reports to the tsar about mountain peoples' stiffening their resistance? He brought the strength of Russian soldiers in the Caucasus up from 5,000 to 250,000. He wanted to be a Russian Napoleon, and when this became clear, Yermolov was recalled. But the "Napoleon syndrome" in Caucasus policy still exists.

[Shermatova] What political consequences of the Pervomayskoye goings-on would you predict?

[Abdulatipov] Anti-federal sentiments in Dagestan. When Raduyev's rebels seized Kizlyar, it took the government a considerable effort to dampen anti-Chechen sentiments. But as the events unfolded, they turned into people's disgruntlement with the actions of the federal army and the center. So this is what we have now — an upsurge in anti-Caucasian sentiments in Moscow, on the one hand, and disgruntlement with the center, in Dagestan. We, Caucasians, Dagestanis, are being edged out of Russia. Meanwhile, there was no separatism here; Dagestan did not even adopt a corresponding resolution at a time of universal sovereigntization. But presently security measures are indispensable. I as a deputy will do my utmost to have the border problems resolved. Why do we need border troops in Dagestan's internal areas? The rebels brought two KamAZ-loads of weapons to Kizlyar. No one is protecting the border, but everyone is feeding on it. But it is not only the border troops who push weapons. When I said that they sell weapons to Chechnya, they started hurling reproaches at me.

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[Shermatova] The situation reminds one of an impasse. With whom of the Chechen leaders can one presently negotiate? With Dudayev?

[Abdulatipov] One has to meet with both Dudayev and the field commanders, to hold talks with any authoritative people and the elders of Chechnya. This is not a military conflict, and it should be resolved by political methods. The crux of the goings-on in Chechnya is the crisis of Russian authority. Think for yourself: Chechnya does not manufacture weapons, yet there are whole military depots there; it does not manufacture footwear, yet Chechen rebels are clothed and equipped better than Russian servicemen. According to the press, Dzhokhar Dudayev learns the plans of Russia's top leadership earlier than government members. So whose problem is this — Chechnya's or Moscow's?

Russia: European Parliament Resolution on Kizlyar 'Surprising'

LD2501151796 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1459 GMT 25 Jan 96

[By Vladimir Suprun]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] MOSCOW January 25 (ITAR-TASS) — A resolution on the events in the Dagestani city of Kizlyar and the village of Pervomayskoye denouncing actions by Russian federal forces to release hostages, which was adopted by the European parliament the other day, "cannot help causing surprise and bitterness", Russian Foreign Ministry spokesman Grigoriy Karasin told a briefing here on Thursday [25 January].

The spokesman called as "totally groundless" allegations in the document that Russian authorities did not use all opportunities for a peaceful settlement. Karasin described a call in the resolution to curtail relations between the European Union and Russia as "unacceptable and counterproductive".

It is regretable, Karasin continued, that the European parliament has repeatedly demonstrated ignorance or unwillingness to recognise that Chechnya is a member of the Russian Federation, and the crisis situation in it was caused by the operation of illegal armed detachments which took the dangerous path of achieving their ends.

"We hold dear partnership and cooperation with the E.U.," the diplomat noted. "However, we proceed from a premise that cooperation is equally necessary for both sides, the two major political and economic centres in Europe.

In Karasin's opinion, relations between real partners should preclude a high-brow attitude and hastiness in judgements as well as in conclusions.

"If there is a desire to help Russian reforms in practice, it is necessary to abandon political exhortations and to display a balanced, cautious and goodwill approach," Karasin emphasised.

Ferry Incident Not Seen 'Detrimental' to Russia-Turkey Ties

TA2501143496 Istanbul SHOW Television in Turkish 2030 GMT 23 jan 96

[Satellite interview with Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Albert Chernyshev in Moscow, by correspondents Cenk Baslamis, in Moscow, and Mehmet Ali Birand, in the Istanbul studio — live]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Birand] Welcome to our show, Mr. Chernyshev.

[Chernyshev] I am pleased to be here. How are you?

[Birand] It has been a long time since our last meeting. This time, however, I would like to get to the point because our time is limited. During the ferryboat crisis, Mr. Yeltsin reacted to Turkey's approach to that incident. He claimed that Turkey's approach was very lenient. He even proposed to send commando units and ships. Why did he react so harshly?

[Chernyshev] Of course, this Avrasya incident was not a very good one. It was, however, solved through cooperation.

[Birand] Why did Mr. Yeltsin react so harshly? Why did he accuse Turkey of being too lenient? Why did he urge Turkey to take swift action?

[Chernyshev] We were all rather nervous. I believe that he was not fully informed about the latest developments when he held that news conference. As you know, he is a rather emotional person. That is why we should accept it as it is.

[Baslamis] In other words, he made that statement because of emotional factors as well as because of a lack of information.

[Chernyshev] Yes, that is it. Soon after that, however, we passed on all the information. He then sent a very positive message to Mr. Demirel.

[Birand] Throughout the Chechen crisis and especially during this last crisis, Turkey reacted to the issue. It seems as though Ankara's approach to the Chechen issue is disturbing Russia. Is that the case?

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[Chernyshev] I would like to clearly state that we are pleased with that which relates to Turkey. I believe that despite this negative incident, the results are positive.

[Baslamis] There is such a problem. You, as the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, are pursuing a milder stand. The Russian Secret Service, however, claims that the Chechens are being trained in Turkey and that Turkey is extending aid to the Chechens. Do you have any proof on the issue? For example, are there any Turkish volunteers in Chechnya?

[Chernyshev] There are such cases, yes. It is unfortunate but true. The two sides should, therefore, be very careful because these volunteers are adversely affecting our relations.

[Birand] Are you aware of the number of these volunteers?

[Chernyshev] There are volunteers from Turkey. There are volunteers from us.

[Baslamis] You mean there are Russian volunteers as well.

[Chernyshev] This is very negative.

[Baslamis] How many Turkish volunteers are there?

[Chernyshev] I am not the secret service. One has to look into the issue. We are, however, exchanging information with the Turkish side with regard to such issues.

[Birand] One of the questions most frequently asked in Turkey regards Russia's sympathetic approach to the PKK [Workers Party of Kurdistan] as opposed to Turkey's approach to the Chechen issue. There are many rumors and indications of this new approach on the part of Russia. What is your approach? Are you trying to give the message that the PKK will be supported in retaliation against Turkey's stand on the Chechen issue?

[Chernyshev] Various incidents occur in Russia as well. We have now become more careful. In other words, we are in contact with the Turkish side. I believe that such things will not recur because we are officially opposed to such things.

[Baslamis] What you mean to say is that the PKK's activities in Moscow and in Russia in general will be prevented. Such activities will not be allowed. That is what I understood.

[Chernyshev] Yes, we will be working in that direction.

[Birand] Then, to conclude, I would like to ask the following question. Has this crisis, the Chechen crisis followed by the ferryboat crisis, cooled Turkish-Russian relations? Or is everything continuing as before?

[Chernyshev] The crises have not been detrimental to relations. We are continuing. There are certain problems between the two countries. There are, however, such problems in bilateral relations in the international arena. We should, therefore, solve these problems calmly and in a friendly atmosphere.

[Birand] Are there any pending visits?

[Chernyshev] On the whole, however, we are on a very positive path. There is no need for panic. If there are certain problems that arise, then we will work to solve them. Some of these problems will be solved today and some tomorrow. We should also be aware that certain problems take decades to solve. This should also be clear to us.

[Birand] We thank you a lot, Mr. Chernyshev. We hope to meet again soon.

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CIS Leaders' Moscow Summit Positions Compared

AU2401153096 Kiev MOLOD UKRAYINY in Ukrainian 23 Jan 96 p 1

[Report by Vitaliy Portnykov, MOLOD UKRAYINY special correspondent, from Moscow: "Presidents Give Support to Yeltsin"]

[FBIS Translated Text] "This meeting was marked by the presidential elections in Russia. All the presidents I met spoke about the presidential elections, because the future of the other countries of the Commonwealth [of Independent States] depends on where Russia goes," Leonid Kuchma told a news conference for Ukrainian journalists covering the Moscow summit of CIS leaders. Indeed, it was decided to extend the Yeltsin's power as chairman for another six months, even though, according to the regulations approved by all the heads of CIS states, these powers have long expired. Not to upset the chairman, it was decided not to talk about Chechnya or the tragedy in Pervomayskoye. "Boris Nikolayevich told us the same things as we had heard on the television and we never returned to this question," Kazakhstan's President Nursultan Nazarbayev told his news conference. However, at his own meeting with the press, Yeltsin was more verbose and defended his country's power departments. Yeltsin spoke about integration as a process developing at different rates in different countries. He called Russia, Belarus, and Kazakhstan leaders in this process and Ukraine — an obvious outsider. As has repeatedly happened before, the bilateral meeting between the Russian and Ukrainian president prior to the summit had but disturbed the Kremlin.

Neither is everything all right among the leaders. At the meeting, Nursultan Nazarbayev issued a statement in which he condemned calls for restoration of the Soviet Union as possibly destabilizing the situation and leading to violence, and he proposed that such calls be assessed appropriately. However Belarusian President Alyaksandr Lukashenka, known for his nostalgia for the dead empire, even spoke against discussing this problem or putting it on the agenda. Other leaders did not agree with him. Leonid Kuchma said that the Ukrainian delegation had prepared a statement in support of Nazarbayev's statement, but decided not to issue it lest the situation become further aggravated.

Regarding everything else, the meeting proceeded in accordance with tradition — without breakthroughs. Leonid Kuchma confirmed that, for him, such meetings are proof of the usefulness of bilateral cooperation. Nursultan Nazarbayev stressed that he was absolutely dissatisfied. Boris Yeltsin told journalists that predictions about the demise of the CIS again failed to come true. Incidentally, nobody had made any such predictions because nobody even showed interest in the "state of health" of this queer organization.

CIS: ITAR-TASS Carries Press Review for 26 Jan

LD2601074096 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 0728 GMT 26 Jan 96

["Press Review" — ITAR-TASS headline]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] MOSCOW January 26 (ITAR-TASS) — ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI on readers' letters about the forthcoming Presidential election.

Mikhail Mironov, Head of the Presidential Directorate in charge of responding to citizens' letters, has told the newspaper that more than 170 letters and telegrammes about the future Presidential elections came in to the Directorate last week. Practically two-thirds of them are collective ones.

Mironov believes that readers' characteristic sentiments can be perceived in the mail. The writers of a number of letters have already decided on their future choice — Boris Yeltsin whom they regard as a politician whose Presidential activities "will serve the stabilisation of the situation and improvements in the life of ordinary people".

Some readers express an opinion that Yeltsin's refusal to run "will inevitably raised the question of a collapse of democratic Presidential rule in Russia", while others express hope that under his leadership "the people will overcome all difficulties and Russia will become a still more powerful and prosperous state".

Some letters contain proposals connected with improvements in the functioning of local power bodies in the centre and at the regional level. Many people in Russia feel insulted that local officials simply ignore them.

Readers suggest getting rid of unscrupulous leaders at the local level, who are preoccupied only with their personal enrichment. Some suggest raising the role and extend the rights of Presidential representatives in regions who "should prevent negative phenomena rather than just record them".

IZVESTIYA on funds for the rehabilitation of the socio-economic sector of Chechnya.

The newspaper reports that 6,000,000 million roubles were assigned from Russia's budget for the rehabilitation of the socio-economic sector of Chechnya, whereas this year Boris Yeltsin intends to send almost three times as much — 16,200,000 million roubles and almost 1,000 million U.S. dollars — to Chechnya.

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At the same time, in a dispatch headlined "Economic rehabilitation funds get to the militants, too", the newspaper quotes Ahmet Zakayev, commander of a sector of the South-Western front, as saying that "if it were not for this kind of authorities, we would have long died of starvation. Funds get to us, too. Is it not surprising that we, Russian submachine-guns in hand, and wearing Russian camouflage uniform bought from the Russian on Russian money, are fighting against teh Russian army?"

KRASNAYA ZVEZDA on the release of 46 hostages by Raduyev.

"On Wednesday night (Salma) Raduyev released 46 Daghestani hostages. This was done not without pomp, complete with floodlights and speeches. There is no doubt: the organisers of the show wanted to look decently, despite the ambiguity of the situation. To a certain extent, not without aid from obliging reporters, of course.

"In general, some news media behave rather strangly, paying all attention to the 'great warrior' Raduyev, scrutinising the actions of Federal forces and at the same time passing over in silence the Kizlyar developments. Why such selectivity?".

RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA on the coalminers' protest action.

The coalminers have been picketing the Russian Government House in Moscow for the third day. They have come to the capital from practically all coal-producing regions of the country to protest the lack of attention to their sector.

The newspaper runs an article describing the demands of the coalminers and emphasising that "not a single sector can get out of the crisis by acting alone, still less such sector as the coal industry with its burden of problems thathave been piling up for decades and with its dependence on the will of users. The coal industry needs permanent State support, not one-off support from occasion to occasion or support which is rendered to coincide with elections or some other important dates".

ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA comments on the forthcoming trip by new Russian Foreign Minister Yevgeniy Primakov to Minsk and Kiev.

"The significance of the 'visiting debut' of Primakov should be duly appreciated by the former members of the Soviet Union that are quite sensitive to signs of Russia's respect for their young state sovereignty".

ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI on the confirmation of Russia's property rights to a Cultural Centre in Berlin.

On January 16, the Supreme Court of Berlin Land confirmed Russia's property rights to a major Russian cultural and information centre abroad — the so-called "Berlin House" with an area of 29,000 square metres. Its market price is now estimated at 110 million Deutsche Marks.

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Yeltsin Hails Russia's Admission to Council of Europe

LD2601105796 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 0946 GMT 26 Jan 96

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Andrey Shtorkh]

[FBIS Translated Text] Moscow, 26 Jan (ITAR-TASS) — "We have good news — Russia has been admitted to the Council of Europe," Russian President Boris Yeltsin declared today in a conversation with correspondents just before the start of his meeting with the heads of the republics inside the Russian Federation.

"For two years, a vast amount of work has been performed by everyone — the Foreign Ministry people, parliament, the government, and the president — with each of the leaders of the countries in Europe," Yeltsin pointed out. "It was necessary to speak personally and to try to persuade them that it was essential, and that Russia was also part of Europe. It is like a bridge from Europe to Asia."

The Russian president stressed that "our parliamentary delegation has worked well" at the sitting of the Council of Europe's Parliamentary Assembly in Brussels. It championed Russia's interests patriotically. "The main thing now is that we have been admitted. It now remains only to be formalized," he said. The head of state congratulated everyone who was present on this "great event. We are already in Europe," the Russian president stated and urged that contacts with the world community should be established more boldly.

Russia: Council of Europe Vote: 164 For, 35 Against

LD2501205196 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 1937 GMT 25 Jan 96

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Strasbourg, 25 January (ITAR-TASS) — Russia becomes the 39th member country of the Council of Europe. A majority of the Parliamentary Assembly of the organization, 164 members, voted in favor of Russia's admission. Thirty-five participants of the session held in Strasbourg voted against and 15 abstained. The adopted resolution of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe "recommends to the Committee of ministers to invite Russia to become a member of the Council of Europe." [passage omitted]

Russia To Be Admitted to Council of Europe

LD2501190096 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 1834 GMT 25 Jan 96

[By ITAR-TASS special correspondents Viktor Khrekov and Igor Shchegolev]

[FBIS Translated Text] Strasbourg, 25 Jan (ITAR-TASS) — Russia will become the 39th member country of the Council of Europe. A majority of the parliamentary assembly of the organization has voted to accept Russia.

This political decision does, in effect, mean the success of consideration of the Russian application to join the Council of Europe, submitted in May 1992. The final word has, formally, to be pronounced by the organization's committee of ministers, but ever since 1949, when the Council of Europe was created, the ministers have never rejected countries that have been recommended by the Parliamentary Assembly.

Duma Speaker on Russia Joining Council of Europe

LD2601123396 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1221 GMT 26 Jan 96

[By Pavel Kuznetsov]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] MOSCOW, January 26 (ITAR-TASS) — Russia's entry into the Council of Europe [CE] has got to bring "not only moral satisfaction to our country but also serious material supplementals as well", State Duma Speaker Gennadiy Seleznev told journalists here on Friday in comment on the decision of the session of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE) to admit Russia to the CE.

This will be connected with new arrangements for trade with Europe. Visa formalities for Russian people's travel to European countries will be changing as well, he said.

The admission of Russia to the Council of Europe entails moves gradually to bring Russia's legislation into line with the requirements that exist in PACE member-states, Seleznev said. "When we receive the respective resolution of the PACE session, it will be considered in all Duma committees so that the Deputies could gradually add new norms to our legislation," he pointed out.

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"However, our state has got a unique civilisation. I do not think that we should follow some European standards down to the smallest detail," Seleznev emphasised. "We have got a wealth of intellectual and cultural legacy. The Europeans do have something to learn from Russia," he said.

A Russian parliamentary delegation to the PACE will be represented primarily by the leaders of Duma factions, Seleznev said. It would be advisable for it to include Deputies who have already gained experience in working in other international organisations, he added.

According to the existing traditions, Seleznev is to address a PACE session as a Parliament Speaker of the country which has become a newcomer to the Council of Europe. But, since the present session of the PACE is virtually over, he intends to do that at PACE's next session which is to be held in April this year.

Russian MPs Welcome CE Admission as 'Triumph of Commonsense'

LD2601133596 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1200 GMT 26 Jan 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] STRASBOURG, Jan 26 (INTERFAX) — Members of the Russian parliamentarian delegation to the session of the Council of Europe's [CE] Parliamentary Assembly in Strasbourg, France, highly appreciated the admission of Russia to the council.

Vladimir Lukin, chairman of the State Duma International Affairs Committee, described the admission as a triumph of commonsense over the revolutionary heroic intolerance that was demonstrated by certain people. He emphasized that the State Duma has until the end of February to ratify numerous documents such as the Convention on Human Rights and the Charter of Local Self-Government.

"We will have our hands full but this will be a pleasure because we were not kept out this time," Lukin said. He added that much effort has to be made to integrate into the basic European structures.

Lukin explained that the documents must be passed soon because the European Union's foreign ministers will have to approve the Council of Europe's decision at the end of February. Russia's admission will be final then, and it will become the council's 39th member.

Gennadiy Zyuganov, the leader of the Communist Party of the Russian Federation and its parliamentary group, expressed the hope that the Parliamentary Assembly's decision will contribute to expansion of cooperation between Russia and other European countries in various fields. He told journalists that Russia's participation in the Council of Europe will improve the prospects for a political resolution of the Chechen crisis, while rejection of the Russian application would have encouraged terrorists and extremists.

Irina Khakamada, MP, told INTERFAX that she was very nervous as she was waiting for the vote results because Russia's entry of the Council of Europe is "the last hope to implant Russia into the system of civilized European values."

Aleksandr Dzasokhov said that he did not expect such a strong support in the Council of Europe. He told INTERFAX that a new configuration of the council is emerging and this is an event of historic importance.

Asked what Russia should gain in the short term from joining the Council of Europe, Dzasokhov expressed the hope that fewer loud speeches would be made and more real assistance provided, in particular in making contacts between Russian and European local authorities.

Sergey Glotov, a People's Power MP, believes that this event marks Russia's entry into the European family. Russia will have access to the European rostrum and its citizens to European democratic institutions such as the European Human Rights Court.

"I am sure we will encumber the court with our complaints," he told INTERFAX.

The Council of Europe's secretary general said that the admission of Russia helps to avoid a new split of the continent, and thus has contributed to stability in Europe.

Yeltsin Aide Praises Admission to Council of Europe

LD2601133196 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1200 GMT 26 Jan 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] MOSCOW, Jan 26 (INTERFAX) — Dmitriy Ryurikov, the foreign policy aide to Russian President Boris Yeltsin, has praised Russia's admission to the Council of Europe.

The decision is "the triumph of commonsense and has increased Russia's commitments to the European community," he said.

President Boris Yeltsin had made a very large contribution to making the Strasbourg decision possible, Ryurikov told INTERFAX.

All branches of Russian authority cooperated in working toward this goal, Ryurikov believes. He highly appreciated the efforts made by the MPs and the government towards this goal.

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Ryurikov believes that "all of us will have more work to do once Russia has joined the Council of Europe" as far as human rights, citizen-authority relations and judicial reform are concerned.

"This will be work for Russian democracy, for the benefit of Russians," Ryurikov said.

Moscow Hails Admittance to Council of Europe

LD2601132996 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1200 GMT 26 Jan 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] MOSCOW, Jan 26 (INTERFAX) — Moscow appreciates Thursday's decision by the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, Russian Foreign Ministry spokesman Grigoriy Karasin said. As many as 164 members of the Parliamentary Assembly voted to grant Russia membership of the Council of Europe. Thirty five voted against and fifteen abstained.

In Karasin's view, the CE ballot-casting proves that Russia has done a good job in the field of practical democracy.

"President Yeltsin discussed related issues with a number of national leaders. The Russian Foreign Ministry did not sit idle, either. And it is great that the Russian lawmakers, representative of the whole gamut of Russia's political forces, united their efforts," Karasin said.

Karasin sees these concerted policies as a factor which worked in favor of the positive decision on Russian membership of the Council of Europe.

Both Russia and the Council of Europe as a whole stand to gain from Thursday's decision, Karasin said, because "there is no Europe without Russia."

Russia: Medvedev: CE Admission is 'Major Stride'

LD2601124796 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1234 GMT 26 Jan 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] MOSCOW, January 26 (ITAR-TASS) — The admission of Russia to the Council of Europe [CE] is a major stride towards the creation of the pan-European democratic space, the Russian president's press secretary Sergey Medvedev said in a statement faxed to ITAR-TASS.

The Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe has shown determination for genuine unification of Europe and for prevention of new partition lines, the statement says.

Russia sees this decision as a testimony of support to its drive for radical reforms, the presidential spokesman said.

His statement stresses that the Russian leadership's course towards a law-ruled state, civil society and market economy meets trust.

In its quest for membership of the Council of Europe, Russia had done a lot to move nearer the council's high standards of democracy, pluralism and human rights, the statement continues.

Medvedev quoted President Boris Yeltsin as saying that Russia is coming to the Council of Europe with a great social, scientific, cultural and historical potential and with the hope that this potential will find appreciation and useful applications in Europe.

Kovalev: Russia Not Yet Deserving of CE Membership

MK2601074496 Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA in Russian 25 Jan 96 p 1

[Report by Dmitriy Gornostayev and Ivan Rodin: "Council of Europe Is To Decide Today If Democracy Has Won Out in Russia"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] The question of whether Russia is a democratic country or whether it is not — from Europe's point of view — will once again be considered today. It was answered in the negative on three previous occasions. The Council of Europe's Parliamentary Assembly is to vote today on admitting the Russian Federation to the Council of Europe [CE].

Moscow expects recognition of the democratic character of the policy it has followed since 1992, when Russia applied for CE membership. In terms of foreign policy, a rather broad consensus has developed in Russia: All four factions in the State Duma generally uphold the idea of joining the CE, which can at least be seen in the composition of the Russian Federation delegation at the Council of Europe's Parliamentary Assembly — it is made up of representatives of "Yabloko," the NDR ["Russia Is Our Home"], the CPRF [Communist Party of the Russian Federation], and the LDPR [Liberal Democratic Party of Russia]. This fact will be important in the future should it be decided in Strasbourg today to admit Russia as a CE member, because its parliament will be required to ratify the Council of Europe's status before the end of February.

The general feeling is not shared by Sergey Kovalev, ex-commissioner for human rights, whose view is heeded with utmost respect by members of the Council of Europe's Parliamentary Assembly. Quite possibly, his report passed on to Strasbourg via Vladimir Lukin, chairman of the Duma's International Affairs Committee, will outweigh the arguments for admitting Russia.

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As we all know, the Russian president has announced via his press secretary that "a negative decision with regard to Russia's admission to the Council of Europe would, under the present conditions, signify for a considerable part of the Russian public support, albeit indirect, of the side which is trying to solve the Chechen problem through inhuman, terrorist methods." But Sergey Kovalev does not seem to rank himself among this "considerable part" and has his own distinctive view.

He, for example, said that he would like to add to the president's phrase the following words: "As for Russia's admission as a member of the Council of Europe, it would signify the start of peace talks in Chechnya and the cessation of military operations," and regretted the fact that a peaceful solution to the Chechen problem will not happen without serious pressure upon Russia from Europe and the entire world community.

Sergey Kovalev already has received through Vladimir Lukin, who is in Strasbourg, an invitation to visit as an honored guest entitled to speak. For some reason, however, this trip did not materialize. In Kovalev's words, the gist of the message of the document [he] forwarded to the Council of Europe's Parliamentary Assembly is plain: "If Europe is ready to present to the Russian federal authorities tough terms and if it is ready to state that it undertakes to monitor the observance of these terms, then it should vote for admitting Russia. If Europe cannot bring itself to do this and cannot guarantee its own vigorous actions, the admission procedure should be called off."

Sergey Kovalev, a "Russia's Democratic Choice" deputy, is in principle for the country's integration into European structures, but he would not like Russia to resemble Turkey which, in his words, "has long been a CE member while pressuring its Kurds any old way." Mr. Kovalev also hopes the Council of Europe's leadership will not repeat what the OSCE mission in Groznyy did. The human rights activist accuses it of having "cowardly fled, and it was not grenades it feared but witnessing the elections in Chechnya and falling out with the federal authorities, because it is clear to everyone that there were no elections in Chechnya."

Sergey Kovalev doubts that the CE will want to present Russia with tough terms to achieve peace in Chechnya by peaceful means. Therefore, he turns to it with the following proposal: "[If you are] prepared to work to support democratization in Russia, sign it up. If not, then just say so." According to Mr. Kovalev's information, the CE leadership is leaning toward admitting Russia, but the Parliamentary Assembly "risks not scraping up two thirds of the votes." Therefore, the deputy thinks, whatever views are to be voiced, they assume a special significance. He personally promises that his criticism of the present situation in Russia will be very severe. [passage omitted]

Zyuganov: New Europe 'Impossible' Without Russia

LD2501202296 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1408 GMT 25 Jan 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] STRASBOURG, Jan 25 (INTERFAX) — A new Europe is impossible without Russia, leader of the Russian Communist Party Gennadiy Zyuganov told the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe in Strasbourg on Thursday.

"Russia could be admitted to the Council of Europe with some reservations, as was Ukraine," he said. Zyuganov said he hopes that Russia will be admitted to the Council of Europe as a result of Thursday's vote.

The newly-elected State Duma "consistently works to gain a political, not military, solution to the Chechen problem," he said. "A whole range of measures must be taken" to secure a political settlement. According to him, "the rank of Nationalities Minister should be raised to the level of deputy prime minister" to enable him to engage in talks duly empowered.

"People enjoying respect in the Caucasus — clan elders and religious leaders — should be involved in the negotiating process on a broader scale," Zyuganov said. It is also essential to start "broad building and reconstruction works in Chechnya," which will "make many Chechens lay down their submachine guns and take up trowels," Zyuganov said.

Russia: Zhirinovskiy Calls Council of Europe 'Slime Pond'

LD2501200996 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1531 GMT 25 Jan 96

["INTERFAX-UKRAINE" news item]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] KIEV, Jan 25 (INTERFAX-UKRAINE) — The leader of Russia's Liberal Democratic Party Vladimir Zhirinovskiy has spoken in Strasbourg, where a session of the Council of Europe's Parliamentary Assembly is underway.

"Europe must be grateful to Russia for its intention to join the Council of Europe, because it will put fresh blood into that organization," Zhirinovskiy said. "Russia is the sole country capable of doing without Europe."

He described the Council of Europe as a "slime pond for defunct politicians entitled to free meals."

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About human rights abuse in Europe, the LDP leader said that those rights were being abused in Northern Ireland and Germany, where Turkish workers were the hardest-hit.

Zhirinovskiy declared his intention of founding a union of Slav and Orthodox countries into which he would invite Greece, Bulgaria, Slovakia, Macedonia and Poland.

The Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe is due to consider Russia's admission in the Council on Thursday.

Russia: Zhirinovskiy Addresses CE Assembly

LD2501203596 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1907 GMT 25 Jan 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] STRASBOURG, Jan 25 (INTERFAX) — Vladimir Zhirinovskiy, the Liberal Democratic Party of Russia leader, gave his point of view on the Russian presidency, the war in Chechnya and Russia's admittance to the Council of Europe [CE] at a session of the Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly in Strasbourg Thursday.

The session will decide on whether to admit Russia to the Council of Europe.

"Another president who will finish the war in Chechnya in three days" will be elected in Russia on June 16, Zhirinovskiy said.

"President Yeltsin is too soft a man, too susceptible to the principles of European democracy and he has been tinkering with Chechnya for a whole year," said Zhirinovskiy.

He said, however, that by waging the war in Chechnya, Russia and President Yeltsin "are saving Europe."

"And I will make a corridor to Europe, and Chechen gangs will come here," said Zhirinovskiy, assuming that he will win the upcoming presidential elections.

The LDPR leader accused Europe of a blockade of Iraq, Libya and Yugoslavia and described it as "hell."

He said that "Russia today is the most free country with the most free press and the most free economy."

He refuted the statement that "Russia is ill and Europe is the hospital."

"We can come to you as doctors to treat the ill Europe and the ill Russia together," said Zhirinovskiy.

"If you refuse to admit Russia to the Council of Europe, I will be grateful to you," Zhirinovskiy told the session. "It will be a present to our party, because I have always said that the West is against Russia. And if you admit Russia it will be a big present to you," he said.

The vote on Russia's admission to the Council of Europe will be held later today.

Moscow Supports European Proposal 'To Normalize' Cuban Ties

LD2501155696 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1539 GMT 25 Jan 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] MOSCOW, Jan 25 (INTERFAX) — Moscow backs a European Parliament proposal to normalize relations with Cuba, Russia's Foreign Ministry spokesman Grigoriy Karasin said at a briefing in Moscow Thursday [25 January].

"The resolution contains an appeal to the United States to end Cuba's economic embargo and not to introduce sanctions against countries trading with Cuba. It welcomes moves of several states to develop a dialogue and to strengthen economic ties with Havana," Karasin said.

"Such an approach coincides with Russia's position, which pursues a successive course for liquidating the tension surrounding Cuba and its comprehensive integration into the world community," he said.

Russia: Remaining IFOR Paratroopers Leave for Bosnia

LD2601112396 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1110 GMT 26 Jan 96

[By Anatoliy Frankovskiy]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] IVANOVO, January 26 (ITAR-TASS) — The last military train with Russian paratroopers and combat hardware left here for the Balkans on Friday.

By a decision of the Federation Council, Russian paratroopers will participate in the Bosnia Peace Implementation Force (IFOR).

The job of the IFOR is to disengage the conflicting sides, establish a buffer zone, ensure law and order, bring the population back to normal living conditions, and render humanitarian aid to the war victims.

Twelve trains with Russian IFOR paratroopers from among a separate airborne brigade are on their way to Bosnia, a spokesman at the Press Service of the Commander of Airborne Forces told ITAR-TASS on Friday.

The last plane with Russian peacekeepers will leave for the Balkans on January 29. The number of Russian paratroopers in Yugoslavia will be 1,600.

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Russia: Norwegian Spokesman on U.S. Presence, NATO Maneuvers

MM2601125596 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 26 Jan 96 p 3

[Report by ITAR-TASS correspondent Igor Pshenichnikov: "Exercises Will Take Place, But Later"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Oslo, 25 Jan — The Norwegian Army command has expressed bewilderment in connection with the statement by Grigoriy Karasin, director of the Russian Foreign Ministry Information And Press Department, who voiced concern in connection with the training of U.S. soldiers in Finnmark. "The presence of an insignificant number of U.S. soldiers in Finnmark can in no way be seen as a provocation against Russia!", Lieutenant Colonel Yun Espen Liyen [name as transliterated], press relations officer for the Norwegian Army main command in the north of the country, said.

There are currently 17 U.S. Army soldiers in the northern Norwegian province of Finnmark, which borders on Russia, for the purpose of "routine training in Arctic winter conditions," he said in an interview with an ITAR-TASS correspondent. The U.S. marines' quarters are in the town of Kvenvikmuen [name as transliterated], not far from the city of Alta. They are learning how to ski and to adapt to the climatic conditions of the Arctic. Yun Espen Liyen stressed in particular that "they are not military exercises at all."

He pointed out that "during last December's Moscow talks between Russian Defense Minister Pavel Grachev and Norwegian Defense Minister Jorgen Kosmo, the Russian military commander confirmed Norway's inalienable right to independently decide in precisely what part of Norwegian territory to conduct exercises involving other NATO countries' forces." "Initially the Russian leadership took a negative view of Norway's recent decision to abolish the restrictions it unilaterally imposed back in the fifties on the holding of NATO military exercises in the province of Finnmark, which borders on Russia. But at the December talks," Yun Espen Liyen noted, "the Russian military leadership itself said that there was no longer any question of Russian objections."

As for NATO military maneuvers in northern Norway, Yun Espen Liyen went on to say, they — codenamed Battle Griffin-96 — will take place 12 February-22 March in the province of Troms, which does not border on Russia. These maneuvers will involve army and navy subunits from the United States, Britain, the Netherlands, Germany, Denmark, and Norway. These maneuvers involve the coordination of NATO forces' actions "during a military crisis" and "heightening of readiness to conduct military operations in severe climatic and geographic conditions."

Russia: Foreign Ministry Denies Reports on KAL-007 Survivors

LD2501204596 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 2022 GMT 25 Jan 95

[By Vladimir Suprun]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] MOSCOW, January 25 (ITAR-TASS) — All passengers aboard the South Korean airliner on flight KAL-007, which was shot down over Sakhalin, were killed, Russian Foreign Ministry spokesman Grigoriy Karasin said today. He was commenting on reports published in the South Korean mass media, quoting a U.S. Central Intelligence Agency secret report, that some of the passengers on this flight are allegedly alive and are in Russia.

According to the spokesman, the association of killed passengers' is demanding from the governments of South Korea, the United States, Japan and Russia to make clear all circumstances of the incident, and in addition from the Russian side to pay conpensations to their families.

Grigoriy Karasin said that Russia had "carried out a thorough investigation" of the incident's causes, as a result of which a conclusion was reached that the crew of the plane bore the responsibility for the death of passengers. "This conclusion was confirmed by an authoritative commission of the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO). Hence the demand to pay compensations should be addressed to the air company", he noted.

In this connection Grigoriy Karasin recalled that Russia has more than once proposed to all countries, possessing any documents about this incident, to submit them for their comprehensive study. "The Russian side is ready to closely cooperate with them on this issue", the Russian Foreign Ministry spokesman emphasized.

Russian Fishing Authorities Seek Rights in U.S. Economic Zone

LD2501193096 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1832 GMT 25 Jan 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] MOSCOW, Jan 25 (INTERFAX) — The Russian State Committee for Fishing believes the main question to be decided at the forthcoming session of the Chernomyrdin-Gore commission should be permission to the Russian fleet to catch "unused fish resources in the 200 mile economic zone of the United States."

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According to sources at the State Committee, proposals to this end were submitted to Deputy Prime Minister Aleksandr Zaveryukha, who left for the sixth session of the commission in Washington on Thursday.

The State Committee says that as a result of the June 1990 agreement with the United States on the separation of economic zones, Russian fishermen lost traditional areas for catching valuable species.

Under the agreement, a 16,600 square kilometer section in the central part of the Bering sea became an exclusive economic zone of the United States. The State Committee claims Russian fishermen traditionally took in 150,000 tonnes of fish there.

On the whole the State Committee was satisfied with the standard of cooperation in fishing with the United States. A report drawn up for the commission points out the effectiveness of the ban on salmon fishing in the North Pacific, i.e. beyond the 200 mile zones of the United States, Russia, Canada and Japan.

Besides, the United States supported Russian efforts to stop unregulated fishing of walleye pollock in the central part of the Sea of Okhotsk. The joint initiative of the two countries also allowed a three year moratorium on unregulated fishing in the central part of the Bering sea which should also be extended to 1996.

Russia: Christopher Wants To Meet Primakov in Helsinki or Geneva

LD2501210096 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 2047 GMT 25 Jan 96

[By Ivan Lebedev]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] WASHINGTON, January 25 (ITAR-TASS) — U.S. Secretary of State Warren Christopher thinks that the most suitable place for his forthcoming meeting with Russian Foreign Minister Yevgeniy Primakov could be the capital of Finland Helsinki, a top-ranking U.S. administration official, who wishes to remain unidentified, told journalists. According to him, Geneva also can be considered as a possible alternative venue.

The administration official noted that Christopher cannot accept Russian President Boris Yeltsin's proposal about his visit to Moscow in the near future for meetings with the Russian leadership, since it would be quite difficult for him to arrange such a tour. The Secretary of State's schedule and planned work, in which he should participate, for the time being do not permit him to undertake a trip to Moscow.

According to the American official, a meeting between leaders of the foreign policy departments of the United States and Russia will be held after Christopher's visits to the Balkans and the Middle-East, dates of which have not been finalized.

Russia: Importance of Primakov's Visit to Kiev, Minsk Stressed

MM2601115096 Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA (Weekend Edition) in Russian 26 Jan 96 p 3

[Mikhail Shchipanov report under the "Next Week's Events" rubric: "Primakov Has Work Close to Hand"]

[FBIS Translated Text] It is significant that the new Russian foreign minister's first actual official foreign visit should be to the capitals of our immediate neighbors rather than across the Atlantic. Indeed, a foreign minister's first foreign trip is always symbolic in nature. Analysts traditionally draw strategic conclusions from such visits. If, for example, the first visit by the new officeholder on the Quai d'Orsay is to Washington, they start talking about France's "Atlanticization." This is why the fact that Yevgeniy Primakov's trip is to Minsk and Kiev rather than anywhere else is pretty significant.

The rebirth of Russian diplomacy on the perimeter of the former Union is linked by many with "traditionalist" Primakov's arrival at Smolensk Square, and he has "responded by deed," as it were, to criticism of the Foreign Ministry. In short, having met with his French and German counterparts in Moscow, Russia's top diplomat has preferred to strike while the "CIS iron" is still hot after the conclusion of the Moscow summit of Commonwealth heads of state.

Moreover, the manifest purpose of Yevgeniy Primakov's trip to develop the results of the recently concluded summit must clearly emphasize yet again the presidential cast of foreign policy and at the same time the qualitative restructuring of Smolensk Square's activity — a change of certain bearings and the modification of basic priorities.

And, without doubt, this significant "maiden voyage" of Primakov's will be properly assessed by the former members of the Soviet Union, who are highly sensitive to any sign of respect for their young state sovereignty by Russia.

Moreover, the Kremlin has to demonstrate that it highly values the solidarity showed by Russia's immediate neighbors during the very tragic time of confrontation in Permomayskoye. The fact that the presidents were not stricken by an epidemic of diplomatic illnesses designed for a Western audience and that they all came to Moscow is weighty evidence of the Commonwealth's healthy prospects.

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In short, Yevgeniy Primakov's visit next week is precisely what was expected. Dialogue with the former members of the Soviet Union is, let us hope, regarded as of paramount importance to Russian foreign policy.

Russia: Foreign Minister Primakov Meets European Ambassadors

LD2501204196 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1957 GMT 25 Jan 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] MOSCOW, January 25 (ITAR-TASS) — Russian Foreign Minister Yevgeniy Primakov has met the ambassadors of Central and Eastern Europe today. During the meeting the sides exchanged opinions on a broad range of international problems. The discussion confirmed that the countries whose representatives attended the meeting are interested in permanent contacts and a coordinated approach to the fulfillment of common tasks of strengthening cooperation on the European continent and in some of its regions.

The discussions focused on problems connected with the creation of a model of general and comprehensive security in Europe. The sides stressed the importance of further joint efforts to enhance the efficiency of the OSCE and prevent developments which might lead to a new division of Europe.

The sides exchanged opinions on streamlining contacts in the interests of final settlement in former Yugoslavia, its restoration in the post-war period and comprehensive cooperation with all countries of the region.

At the end of the meeting the sides unanimously declared that such meetings should be traditional.

Russia: Article Warns of Primakov's 'Empire' Policy

AU2501191796 Kiev MOLOD UKRAYINY in Ukrainian 23 Jan 96 p 1

[Report by Bohdan Kushnir, MOLOD UKRAYINY special correspondent, from Moscow: "Yevgeniy Primakov and the CIS"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The move from Yasenovo to Smolensk Square will not introduce any particular changes into the lifestyle of Academician Yevgeniy Primakov, the new head of the Russian Federation's Foreign Ministry, a style that has been worked up over many years. The foreign intelligence, whose head he was hitherto, and the external political department have complemented one another everywhere and at all times. Besides, they have had the same goal. In Yasenevo, the director of the Foreign Intelligence Service had basically one task — political intelligence. Namely, provision of the government with information on plans and specific actions by other states with regard to Russia. The interests of the two departments coincided in promoting the Russian external policy. With the help of intelligence, the department of Academician Primakov helped implement the external political measures of the Russian Federation's Foreign Ministry. Often, it did more by secret ways than through official channels. We will not reveal our "main strategic partner's" professional secrets, nor will we tell how foreign intelligence officers have made Smolensk Square their own and turned the skyscraper, known to the whole world, into a reliable "roof." As for Zubovskiy Bulvar, where the Foreign Ministry Press Center is situated, there is no need to dwell on this, since the foreign press in Russia is traditionally "taken care of" exclusively by trained foreign intelligence officers.

Academician Yevgeniy Primakov did not have to move his team from the special service's Yasenevo headquarters. His disciples already waited for their patron at Smolensk Square, and this enabled the new minister to develop vigorous activity right away.

Talk on the new appointment for the academician started back in May 1995. Before Yevgeniy Primakov joined the Foreign Intelligence Service [SVR] in 1991, he had been head of the Institute of World Economics. The appearance of an outsider in Yasenevo was a great surprise for the personnel of the KGB First Directorate. Two months later, the "First" became an independent special service and was renamed SVR. The worst years for the academician were 1992 and 1993 when, taking advantage of the confusion that prevailed in Russia, about a dozen officers defected to the West.

The two departments did not only acts as partners, but also often as rivals in determining the country's strategic external political course. The views of the cautious conservative Primakov and of the young liberal Kozyrev did not coincide on many points. While, in the hope of catching two birds in the bush, the foreign minister was charming the West with his fluent English, the director of the Foreign Intelligence Service was pursuing an entirely different course — he offered to first catch and tame the single CIS birdie. It is true, though, that the academician never volunteered for open battle.

January 1995: Andrey Kozyrev is excited by his forthcoming trip to yet another foreign country in the hope that the West will help Russia. Smiles, cordial meetings, and receptions — notwithstanding all of this, no expected assistance is anywhere in view. At the same time, Lieutenant General Grigoriy Rapota, deputy director of the Russian Federation Foreign Intelligence Service, is promoting an entirely different strategic course, even though the special service is not supposed to have

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its own departmental doctrine different from the national security or external political doctrine. Academician Primakov's service was created for servicing state doctrines, but his subordinate believes that the special service must have its own plan for actions as to where to direct its efforts: **"Our main task is to specify the threats to our national interests that issue from outside. In this respect, we must contribute, first and foremost, to maintaining integrity of the Russian state. This is task number one. The second most important task is our near-abroad countries and integration processes. The Intelligence Service will do everything to create a zone of stability and good will around Russia."**

After the academician moved, in January 1996, from the office of special service director to the Foreign Ministry on Smolensk Square, he repeated the ideas of Lt. Gen. Grigoriy Rapota almost word for word:

"Russia's relations with CIS countries is a priority task of the Russian foreign policy," said Foreign Minister Yevgeniy Primakov. **"I will do everything I can to advance in this direction."**

It remains to hope that Russia has only formally returned to the practices of the 1950's, when head of the Soviet diplomatic department abroad could simultaneously be ambassador and intelligence resident. The old symbiosis of the new head of the external political department — half-minister and half-KGB officer — and the academician's first steps in the new post and the consequences thereof prompt us to be on our guard and warn us that Russia's strategic course may undergo sharp changes and become more hard-line and aggressive with regard to CIS countries (primarily Ukraine) and that its relations with the West will be more passive. The KGB officer-minister will implement with an iron hand Yeltsin's universally known strategic course toward cooperation with CIS countries to enable it to emerge in the world arena, as in the old times, as an integral and friendly family of Soviet nations. It is only then that the world community will speak to Russia as an equal partner and will not laugh at Yeltsin's threats to resuscitate the Warsaw Pact.

The Russians are increasingly inclined to believe that the West is doing everything to transform their country into a raw-materials appendage so as to prevent restoration of the Russian empire. It was the natural protective reaction — the replacement of Kozyrev, who, according to Gennadiy Zyuganov [chairman of the Russian Federation Communist Party], has deprived Russia of friends, and the appointment of Primakov, who has long proposed that the CIS birdie be first put in a cage and, later, the big bird in the bush may also be caught. The ideas and plans of Boris Yeltsin and Yevgeniy Primakov have coincided both in space and time. Yet for how long? The June presidential elections are not too far off.

There have not been special changes in Yasenevo. The chair of the Foreign Intelligence Service director has been occupied by the former first deputy — Colonel General Vyacheslav Trubnikov. When asked by journalists whether the SVR works in CIS countries, he usually answers in the following way:

"Like other independent states, we have given up work on recruiting agents. This does not, however, mean that we are not obtaining any information. But outside the CIS only. Our intelligence network in third countries provides us with a quite clear idea of the events under way there."

Too good to be true! Even judging by the keen interest on the part of "workers" of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (combining their duties with those of SVR officers) for Ukraine's small journalist corps in Moscow, one can draw an entirely different conclusion: They have been and are interested in Ukraine. However, even without Ukraine, Yevgeniy Primakov's CIS birdie will remain a dream.

The first steps on the new foreign minister's course must already be felt in Kiev: The unexpected and groundless ultimatum on a possible suspension of oil transit or the no less unexpected working visit to Moscow by President Leonid Kuchma. With cap in hand again? How many times should one go to Moscow to finally be able to realize that it is not a reliable and strong neighbor that Russia needs, but a subservient vassal. This is one of Yevgeniy Primakov's old tactical moves — to make the independent states feel their inferiority and dependence upon Russia, so that it would later be easier to drive them into a common cage.

Russia: Polish Diplomat: Oleksy Affair Will Not Harm Relations

LD2501155496 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1408 GMT 25 Jan 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] MOSCOW, Jan 25 (INTERFAX) — The case of Poland's Prime Minister Jozef Oleksy, accused of collaboration with Russian intelligence, "least of all aims to undermine relations with Russia," a Polish Embassy spokesman in Moscow told an INTERFAX interviewer today, recalling that "the former and current presidents of Poland have repeatedly declared that development of good relations with Russia takes a priority in Poland's foreign policy."

Yesterday's decision by Warsaw military district's attorney general to start "a formal inquiry" into charges

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against Oleksy was "the direct pretext" for the Polish prime minister's resignation.

"However, this means starting an investigation of the charges of collaboration with a foreign intelligence service against him, rather than the initiation of a legal case against Oleksy," the diplomat stressed, specifically noting that "all this has been done openly in strict compliance with legal norms."

Russian citizens Vladimir Alganov and Grigoriy Yakimishin will also be under investigation since, as the diplomat said, both have worked in Warsaw as diplomats and both are suspected of involvement in the "Oleksy affair", the Polish Embassy spokesman said.

Russia: SVR: Oleksy Affair Deemed 'Political Provocation'

LD2501155196 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1533 GMT 25 Jan 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] MOSCOW, Jan 25 (INTERFAX) — Russia's Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR) regards the so-called "Oleksy affair" as "an outright political provocation," SVR spokesman Vladimir Karpov has declared in an interview with INTERFAX.

Polish Prime Minister Jozef Oleksy, who has resigned in the wake of charges of "collaboration with a foreign intelligence service, "has had absolutely nothing to do with Russian intelligence," Karpov explained, adding that the recruitment of citizens in socialist countries and spying against these contries was forbidden.

"The only exception was the former GDR, East Germany, where, by an intergovernmental agreement, spying against West Germany was carried out," Karpov said, recalling that when Russian intelligence officer Vladimir Alganov, charged with recruiting Oleksy, worked at the Russian Embassy in Warsaw he only had personal, friendly contacts with him.

"There was no sense what-so-ever to recruit Oleksy since Moscow and Warsaw exchanged all information they had at their disposal," Karpov said.

Yeltsin Approves Legal Cooperation With Poland

LD2501180896 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1323 GMT 25 Jan 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] MOSCOW January 25 (ITAR-TASS) — President Boris Yeltsin approved on Thursday the draft treaty with Poland on legal assistance in criminal and civil cases, his press service said.

The draft was submitted by the Justice ministry after it had been agreed with the necessary Russian departments.

The president authorised Justice minister Valentin Kovalev to reach agreement on the document with the Polish counterparts and sign the treaty on behalf of the Russian Federation.

Russia: Panov: Talks With PRC on Border Forces Moving Closer

LD2401131996 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1300 GMT 24 Jan 96

[By Andrey Kirillov]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] MOSCOW January 24 (ITAR-TASS) — "The talks on cutting armed forces along the border (Eds: Russian-Chinese border) continues, as we believe, very successfully. The sides are bringing their positions closer," Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Aleksandr Panov told ITAR-TASS on Wednesday, commenting on another round of talks between the Chinese delegation and the united delegation of Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan on cutting the numerical strength of armed forces along the former Soviet-Chinese border. The talks ended in Beijing on Tuesday.

Panov explained that the aim of these talks is to cut and ensure military presence along the border at a level "which would not be regarded by the sides even as a distant threat".

Russia: No Georgian-Abkhazian Talks if Peacekeepers' Role Changed

LD2501203696 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1408 GMT 25 Jan 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] MOSCOW, Jan 25 (INTERFAX) — If the CIS peacekeeping force in the Georgian-Abkhazian conflict area are given police functions, any talks between Abkhazia and Georgia will be out of the question, Abkhazian leader Vladislav Ardzinba told INTERFAX Thursday.

Ardzinba said that the Georgian statements about changing the mandate of the peacekeeping force after February 19 without Abkhazia's consent mislead Russian public opinion. According to the guidelines on the CIS collective peacekeeping force, any change of the mandate is impossible unless both parties to the conflict agree, Ardzinba said.

Abkhazia will disregard any unilateral change of the mandate of the peacekeeping force and will not allow its implementation, he added.

Georgia, which insists that the peacekeeping force perform police functions, is deliberately trying to involve

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Russia in the Georgian-Abkhazian conflict, Ardzinba believes.

Russia: General Wants Army in Moldova To Be Peacekeepers

LD2501182696 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1410 GMT 25 Jan 96

[By Anatoliy Yurkin]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] MOSCOW January 25 (ITAR-TASS) — The Russian Army group in Moldova's Dniester region should be given peacekeeping functions, Lieutenant-General Valeriy Yevnevich claimed in an interview with ITAR-TASS on Thursday.

Russia will save considerable funds as a result of this action, the general added. The country's budget will stop making unnecessary outlays for transportation of troops, weapons, and materiel from Russian regions to the Dniester area capital Tiraspol if troops remaining there from the former 14th Russian Army are vested with the mandate of peacekeepers.

According to the general, economic calculations show that Russia will make a considerable saving of money only on excluding transport expenses.

Rotation of peacekeeping units with their constant replacement from the Leningrad and Volga military districts raises squarely problems of adaptation of soldiers and offiers to new conditions.

It takes some time for troops to start service and to arrange living facilities at a new place of deployment.

It is not by chance that the army group shoulders the lion's share of expenses for repairs and minimum living facilities for peacekeepers.

Frequent rotation of peacekeepers in the Dniester area is also unjustifiable from the military point of view, Yevnevich stressed. Tedious service at check points prevents commanding officers from organising efficient combat training.

Officers and sergeants lose knowledge in firing practice and in tactical training. They cannot participate in war games with fire training, which are provided for by plans and which give knacks to servicemen in mastering their military trades.

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Political Issues

Yeltsin: Reforms To Continue Under Kadannikov

LD2601103496 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 1001 GMT 26 Jan 96

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Andrey Shtorkh]

[FBIS Translated Text] Moscow, 26 Jan (ITAR-TASS) — "The reforms have not suffered and will continue," Russian President Boris Yeltsin said when answering a question by an ITAR-TASS correspondent in connection with the appointment of Vladimir Kadannikov as first deputy prime minister.

"One must not say that the reforms have suddenly gone downhill. No. No one will be allowed to turn the reforms backwards, to interrupt them. The reforms will be implemented until they are completed. As I said before, an upward turn will begin in 1996, and it has already begun in the economy and the financial sphere. Material conditions of life will improve this year. In earlier years we could not pay more attention to the social sphere. However, we have the opportunity to do it this year, and we will do anything possible to raise the social sphere."

New Russian Deputy Premier Kadannikov Interviewed

LD2501195496 Moscow Russian Public Television First Channel Network in Russian 1800 GMT 25 Jan 96

[Interview with Russian First Deputy Prime Minister Vladimir Kadannikov by Natalya Chernyshova in Moscow on 25 January — recorded; from the "Vremya" newscast]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Natalya Chernyshova] Vladimir (?Ivanovich), may I have a few words, please? Let me be the first to congratulate you.

[Kadannikov] Thank you, Natasha.

[Chernyshova] Are you going to start work?

[Kadannikov] Of course.

[Chernyshova] What matters will you be in charge of here?

[Kadannikov] Well, in the main, the block which Anatoliy Borisovich Chubays was in charge of, the block of economic issues, although there may be some rearrangement of functions.

[Chernyshova] Are you not worried, that you, as a production manager, will be dealing with virtually the same things as Soskovets?

[Kadannikov] But what is a production manager? A production manager is in charge of everything — economics, production and technology.

[Chernyshova] I do not see any joy in your expression.

[Kadannikov] Well, it is too early yet. When we get something done then joy will appear.

Russia: Soskovets Promises To Cooperate With Kadannikov

LD2601142996 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1338 GMT 26 Jan 96

[By Andrey Shtorkh]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] MOSCOW, January 26 (ITAR-TASS) — Russian First Deputy Prime Minister Oleg Soskovets said he would cooperate with Vladimir Kadannikov, who takes over the key economic post in the government from Anatoliy Chubays.

"We will work in a tandem with new First Deputy Prime Minister Vladimir Kadannikov," Soskovets said in an interview with ITAR-TASS today.

He said he had known Kadannikov since 1977, the time when they were both employed at partner enterprises and met over the quality and schedule of deliveries three-five times a year.

"We have old reliable relations," Soskovets said, adding that Kadannikov visited his office on Thursday, and there was "a constructive talk about further work and cooperation".

Livshits: Kadannikov Appointment 'Fits' Yeltsin's Campaign

LD2501235196 Moscow Russian Television Network in Russian 1726 GMT 25 Jan 96

[FBIS Summary] Host Nikolay Svanidze begins the "Details" program with a 9-minute segment on new Russian First Deputy Prime Minister Vladimir Kadannikov.

Svanidze remarks that President Yeltsin had at last appointed Vladimir Kadannikov as the successor to Anatoliy Chubays as first deputy prime minister of the Russian Federation, in charge of economic issues in the government. Kadannikov had said in his first interview that Russian enterprises require government aid.

Svanidze then asks Aleksandr Livshits, presidential aide on economic issues, to comment on this appointment and to express his view on present-day economic priorities.

Livshits says: "Vladimir Vasilyevich will have many strategic tasks, but there are at least two that will not

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brook delay, the first being the budget, the second the talks with the IMF. Therefore it is too early to say anything now." "The only thing I would like to say is that either abrupt moves or even abrupt statements are quite impossible. The markets are very sensitive. The Russian economy has become highly sensitive like any market economy," he adds.

Svanidze asks whether Kadannikov's appointment as Chubays's successor was indicative of possible or impossible changes in economic policy. Livshits replies, referring to a popular song, that the detachment had noticed the loss of the fighter Chubays and that this had influenced their wish to complete or not to complete singing the song, adding that the song that had been started needed to be sung to the end.

"In the State Duma there are quite a few nominal representatives of the falling ruble party, that is to say, of an out-and-out pro-inflation party," Livshits says. "They belong to various political parties. You see, they might quarrel about various issues, but they agree on making a monetary issue of some 50 trillion. Here, for some reason, right- and left-wingers, intellectuals, and quite different people are in agreement."

Livshits then gives a fictitious example of a large exporting enterprise that is one to two months in arrears with paying its wages and whose non-payments to the budget are about 1 trillion rubles, or perhaps 1.8 billion, well, an enterprise apparently in severe crisis. However, he says, it produces perfectly competitive output for which there is great demand. The normal world price for its goods is, say, 500 dollars per item, but this enterprise sells them at 200 dollars, the remaining 300 dollars being stolen by its managers. These managers were glad about Chubays' departure and would be continuing their methods. "But, let us remark that for the time being there have been no practical actions to restore individual privileges, completely halt privatization, or, going one better, deprivatize or nationalize." After all, some of those who oppose privatization are fighting only for one thing, to keep the 300 dollars stolen by them. "But after the departure of Chubays, there has been no practical move, no practical statements, no practical actions in this direction just as there haven't been any practical out-and-out pro-inflationary decisions."

Svanidze concludes: "Aleksandr Livshits himself was not only regarded as a candidate for the post of first deputy prime minister, but, according to our information, it was him that Viktor Chernomyrdin wanted as his deputy in charge of the economy. However, the president preferred to keep Livshits to himself and did not let him go off to the White House. As a result the round of new appointments was completed and it looks uncommonly consistent. Vladimir Kadannikov has a very strong production reputation and perhaps, somewhat resembles the Chernomyrdin of three years ago. And furthermore, he is completely loyal to the president. Kadannikov's appointment fits precisely into Boris Yeltsin's election campaign and in this context it makes perfectly clear political sense. At first Kadannikov will find it difficult to talk to the experts from the IMF, but, on the other hand, he will not be sparing in making additional payments. The composition of the government is being chosen with the elections in mind and this, in itself, is completely logical even though it has nothing to do with the economy. The only important thing is that the budget does not crack up before that time, and, given this composition of the cabinet of ministers, the role of Viktor Chernomyrdin — the present Chernomyrdin, not as he was three years ago — is not quite evident."

Yeltsin: All 'Major' Personnel Changes Finished

LD2601121696 Moscow Russian Television Network in Russian 1100 GMT 26 Jan 96

[Video report by correspondent V. Skvortsov — passages within quotation marks recorded; from the "Vesti" newscast]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Announcer] President Boris Yeltsin is today meeting with heads of the republics of the Russian Federation. Our correspondent has just come back from the meeting:

[Skvortsov] Apparently Boris Yeltsin has made a final decision to run for another term as president of Russia and has started his election campaign. What he has been saying today confirms this. He started his conversation with the regional leaders by telling them that he has completely recovered from a serious illness, as if responding to the accusations of his rivals. True, harmful habits have to be forgotten for a while, at any rate until 17 June, Oleg Soskovets interrupted. Promising not to diverge from the course of reform, the president intends to intensify the social part of the program — an increase in pensions for pensioners, an increase in grants for students. [video cuts to show a beaming Yeltsin, surrounded by regional leaders and members of the cabinet, speaking to journalists]

[Yeltsin] "I think that these are potential voters — 38 million people."

What is more, the idea of some kind of presidential reserve is being worked on, from which wages would be paid in the event of hold-ups in payment.

[Yeltsin] "A presidential social account will be set up. It will contain a month's wages for everyone in Russia."

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Regarding new people in the cabinet, Boris Yeltsin spoke very warmly of Kadannikov both as a person and an expert. Together with Kazakov, who knows privatization from the inside, they should make a worthy replacement for Chubays.

[Correspondent] "Have the changes in personnel finished or will there be more?

[Yeltsin] "All the major ones have been made."

Yeltsin, Heads of Republics Discuss Economy, Chechnya

LD2601141696 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 1208 GMT 26 Jan 96

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Andrey Shtorkh]

[FBIS Translated Text] Moscow, 26 Jan (ITAR-TASS) — Russian President Boris Yeltsin today suggested that possibilities of setting up a special presidential fund within the budget for clearing wage arrears in cases when it is necessary to make urgent payments to workers in the Russian industrial sphere. Yeltsin met the heads of the smaller republics of the Russian Federation in his nearest residence outside Moscow. Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin and First Deputy Prime Minister Oleg Soskovets took part in the meeting.

Addressing the meeting Yeltsin said that "it is no longer possible to put up with wage arrears." He said that "the most important task for Russia and her regions is to provide full protection of people's social and economic rights."

Speaking against Russia's self-isolation in the economic, commodity, and especially food production areas, Yeltsin said that more conditions would be created for the work of big financial investors but at the same time "we will firmly protect interests of domestic producers both inside the country and outside her borders."

In recent years "we have committed a number of tactical mistakes, one should draw conclusions and we are drawing them," Yeltsin said. A number of decisions have been taken recently, among other things, which simultaneously introduce sanctions for nonpayments and benefits for those enterprises, which always comply with the tax discipline, the president said. Personal responsibility has been established for wages arrears or delayed payment of wages, he emphasized.

Speaking about the personnel policy, the head of state said that a number of his recent decisions had been dictated by the "logic of the situation." On the other hand, although control bodies [organy kontrolya] have now boosted their activity, there are still abuses of power in the bodies of authority, the president said. These abuses can be traced back to the regions, where material values are created and where a lot of money is in circulation. That is why this "is our common problem and the fight against it should be merciless," the head of state pointed out.

Speaking about the situation in Chechnya, Yeltsin underlined that "we are aiming for an internal Chechen dialogue, and now there has been progress toward undoing the knot. The bandits should and will be punished," the president said. "But the people who were confused, deceived by Dudayev's supporters, should be amnestied and pardoned. A conflict that is suspended in the air enables large-scale embezzlement, and this, for its part, prolongs the military confrontation," the president said.

Yeltsin Gives Address at Moscow University

LD2501170296 Moscow Russian Television Network in Russian 1300 GMT 25 Jan 96

[Address by Russian President Boris Yeltsin to students and staff at Moscow Bauman Technical University — live]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Yeltsin] In your place, I would take up the words of the rector, Igor Borisovich Fedorov, when he said that today, everyone can be merry, as everyone has passed their examinations and their tests. [laughter and applause]. This should be understood as meaning that anyone who has not passed should go up to him and present his card for him to sign that he is true to his word [laughter]. Do I understand this correctly? [laughter and applause]

[Fedorov] Boris Nikolayevich, we shall look into this.

[Yeltsin] No. This is an interesting matter. He invited the president, in his presence he gave his word, made a promise to the students, and then after I have gone, he goes back on his word — is that so? [laughter] How are you going to get out of this situation? I would like to know.

[Fedorov] Boris Nikolayevich, we shall take a look at the knowledge shown, and everything. [laughter]

[Yeltsin] It would be a good thing to say that after this, no one should be sent down [laughter] because the president came, they presented reports on fine scientific developments, saying, of course, that we have a good university here, the top one for technical sciences, and in general for the technical branches of knowledge, it is the best in the country, and I don't know whether there are any like it in the world [laughter].

[Fedorov] Boris Nikolayev, we do not think there are. [laughter, applause]

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[Yeltsin] Well, that is what you should think. [laughter and applause] So, don't worry. The main thing is that no one will be weeded out. I shall keep an eye on that. I don't know how many times the State Duma and the Federation Council vote for things and they don't go through. They vote a second time. It does not go through. A third time, it does not go through. A fourth time, it does not go through. And that would be the case, let's say, seven times.

People are already tired. They are already fed up. They need to go somewhere, you understand. And the seventh time, it suddenly goes through. It becomes a law.

This is like you, you understand. You didn't get through the first time, so let's try again, let's go for it a third, a fourth time, but, for all that, to try and ensure that a person does not drop out.

[Fedorov] That is what we are doing. [Laughter and applause]

[Yeltsin] That's good. And you can give me some kind of badge for a new teaching technology. [applause]

Naturally I would not just come to see you without bringing something. I'm telling you this to make you sit right through my speech. [laughter] Then you won't doze off during the speech. Above all, today is a holiday. Today is day for making merry. Today is the St. Tatyana's day, which has had a difficult lot. You see, it was banned, it was disregarded, considering that it had a detrimental effect on the students, and so forth. What things St. Tatyana's day has had to put up with, but it has existed, has continued to exist, it does exist, and it will exist for ever. I feel sure of that.

I know that you've got problems, current problems. They are not big ones, they do exist. Concern over the construction of new buildings, low grants, the government's failure to pay out the allocati ns owed from the budget, including subsidies for food, and subsidies for transport. You used to have a saying at the Moscow Bauman Technical University: Enter sturdy, leave skinny, [laughter] or rather scrawny, leave scrawny.

Over the last month I have lost 12 kg in weight. They are saying about me: So you're not into body addition, but body subtraction. Naturally, I would not like it if students, post-graduates, left this mighty educational institution with body subtraction.

And not for the last time this year, I hope, if you work well in June, this is not the last time, I signed a decree today increasing grants for undergraduates and postgraduates throughout Russia by 20 percent [applause]. That's not much is it? [laughter and cries of "Not much"] Your average grant is 85,000 rubles, so that is around 100,000 rubles, so it is enough to celebrate St. Tatyana's Day [laughter and applause]. Moreover, all of the technical university's debts will be covered, moreover, yes, by the way I did not say that grants will be increased from April [laughter]. Well, they did their calculations, are doing their calculations, 297 billion rubles are needed for this. This is not a small amount for the Russian budget especially since, as you know, things are quite difficult for Russia at the moment. Nevertheless, look, the period of greatest crisis was 1991, 1992, 1993, 1994, in 1995 things had already started to move a little. And nevertheless the system, the mighty system of higher education in Russia was not destroyed, was not lost. It is alive, it is healthy and has now started to grow both in the numbers of students accepted and in the numbers graduating. This is a huge achievement. I understand the patience needed when you want something salty and you're given something hot [laughter].

In brief, I want to say again, take into account, that there were failings here, there were failings at other enterprises, organizations, but with grants in higher education establishments perhaps not. Yes, there weren't, although there were with the subsidies. With subsidies on transportation and with subsidies on food, the government does owe money.

And so I say to you, starting, well, from mid-February, or to be more precise, from 1 March, I shall personally oversee that wages, grants, and pensions throughout Russia will be paid out properly and on time, with no delay.

You do not believe it? [applause] Or has this problem not come to a head yet? But look, the military are two months behind in receiving their pay.

Your university is one of the oldest educational establishments. It has already been mentioned that it has celebrated its 165th anniversary. Over all of these years the graduates of MGTU [Moscow State Technical University] have selflessly served the fatherland and they are still doing so. High-class training has been received here by 140,000 engineers. They have done so much for the country. Without the scientists, without those nurtured by the MGTU, Russia would be a different place. We would not have had our gigantic discoveries and major achievements which we are rightly so proud of. And today I have looked simply with a feeling of great satisfaction at the miracles which the students have made with their own hands and invented such things which do not exist anywhere else in the world, not even in the highly praised United States.

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You students in Russia's top technical university have very rich traditions. Among these traditions is the persistent striving to dig down to the truth and to put concepts into effect. Among them is an acute feeling for what is new and for scientific honesty and, of course, humor, particularly on Tatyana's Day.

Not only in your university but also beyond it, people know of the meaning of the initials MGTU which I have spoken to you about already. You must agree that these words are quite topical. The country is now undergoing great difficulties. Many people in Russia are having a hard time. Our higher educational establishments are receiving far from everything that they need. Are these difficulties justified?

Of course there are lots of goods in Russian shops, there are enough goods in fact. Bans on foreign travel have been lifted — this is good. But the essence of Russian transformation and reforms lies much deeper. All we do is directed towards providing the Russian citizens with political and economic freedoms, and ensuring they know how to use them. This defines the image of modern humankind and its future. This is the essence of the reforms and their overriding goal.

Reacting to political developments, some public figures and many mass media have recently expressed their concern, and even displayed signs of panic, alleging that the president is changing his policy and distancing himself from democratic positions. This is rubbish.

I will be honest and clear: neither the president nor the government are revising the political and economic course of the country. This course is the main part of my political activity at my president's post and I have no intention of altering it.

One should not confuse the speed of the transformations with their objectives. One should not confuse strategy with the tactics of the reforms, forced tactics sometimes. It is also unacceptable to assess cadre changes in such a lightweight and precocious manner, and to draw conclusions on this basis about some alleged abrupt shift in priorities.

Yes, [Vladimir] Kadannikov has replaced [Anatoliy] Chubays. What kind of person is Kadannikov? He is general director of the VAZ automobile works, chairman of the board of directors in the automobile industry, and so on and so forth. By the way, I signed a decree today on his appointment as first deputy prime minister of the government.

In a rather detailed conversation with me today, he expressed an interesting thought on higher education. Three years out of five, this is general education, he said, and only two years go into professional training. Could we do it as follows: the first year is general education, encompassing everything you need to get a diploma or a certificate of let us say a milling machine operator grade five, that is a trade skill, which is closely connected with the profession which is being studied? In the second year, the curriculum is set up in such a way that you not only finish the second year of general studies, but you also get a diploma of a graduate of a vocational training school. One receives education as a technician.

So, if someone has not enough in him, and your drop-out rate is rather big — how many drop-outs do you have in a year?

[Fedorov] 1,200.

[Yeltsin] How many, 1,000?

[Fedorov] In one year, 1,200 drop out.

[Yeltsin] 1,200 people drop out! And all this is a burden to the budget, all this is expenditure. Also, these are people and their future, their tragedies. Instead, one could have a diploma after two years and could get a job with this diploma. If one does not want to continue higher education after the first year one can go and work as a worker. There are people like this, who first dream of higher education and then get disillusioned. One who has received a technician's diploma can work as a foreman. But one will already have a certificate which will help him settle down.

This is an interesting idea. I am not saying that we should implement it tomorrow, but we should discuss it in detail with specialists. Take note of it anyway. I see some of you nodding in agreement and some in disagreement. Obviously there are different perceptions of this.

There are also those who consider it correct. For example, after I graduated I spent a year acquiring, in a year I acquired 12 specialties. I worked in a different team each month. I spent a month with a team of bricklayers. After a month, the commission gave me a certificate and I was a fourth-class bricklayer. In a month I had another one, as a concrete worker, in a month a plasterer, in a month a decorator. And so I refused to work as an expert for a year and in 12 months I received 12 specialties and only after a year could I say now no one can fool me, I can now work as an expert. Things didn't turn out badly [laughter and applause].

I have spoken about reform, about the strategy, the tactics for the reforms. And while I am responsible, I will continue to make decisions which may not suit everyone. But they are dictated by one thing alone, by concern about the country moving forward to a new, civilized mode, towards a better life for the people. That

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is the main thing. Democracy and market reforms in Russia are becoming firmly established, they are already firmly established, I should say. But these disciplines do not exist in the numerous faculties of the Moscow Technical University. You are not preparing for the market economy. You do not know about financial, market finances, on graduation. In your place, I would have something, if only as an optional course, which would enable you all to know about the basics of the market economy, the basics of the financial system for the market economy, because you are not only going to be designers and scientists, there will also be businessmen among you and big leaders, political leaders, and factory managers, and so on. And you must know about these specialties. Igor Borisovich...

[Fedorov] Boris Nikolayevich, we are doing something and we have even opened a faculty of engineering business and management so we are doing something. Of course, this is still little, it is new, but something is being done.

[Yeltsin] That is, you have taken a small part of what I have been speaking about, the market economy and finances.

[Fedorov] Yes, yes.

[Yeltsin] Democracy and the market economy are already becoming firmly established in Russia. They are already giving competent and persistent people the best chances for a business career, financial success and social advancement.

We have not allowed ourselves to be persuaded and we have not gone in for a reduction in the scale of higher education for the sake of short-term financial advantages and savings. This is not acceptable for Russia. [applause] And during the crisis the whole system of higher education remained in place and functioned. We are suffering greatly from an acute shortage of really educated people. We are suffering from ignorance. We are suffering from incompetence. These are serious problems. And you, the present generation of students, will have to resolve these problems in Russia.

To rephrase Lomonosov's words, I think that we can say: the might of Russia will grow from your talents and your knowledge. I place very great hopes in such higher educational establishments as MGTU, in such specialists as your graduates. I place great hope in your energy, in your bright minds.

Dear friends, today is Tatyana's Day. On this splendid festival I wish to present to the best students and post-graduate students of the Moscow Bauman State Technical University certificates showing that they have been awarded grants of the President of the Russian Federation. This is a good addition to their grants. [applause]

Yeltsin's Stock 'Devalued' by Pervomayskoye

MM2501133496 Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA in Russian 24 Jan 96 p 5

[Article by Aleksandr Konovalov, director of the Center for Military Policy and Systems Analysis: "War as an Election Stunt. Reflections After the Federal Troops' Operation in Pervomayskoye"]

[FBIS Translated Text] When assessing the reasons for and consequences of what in the language of the official reports will now be known as the "federal forces' operation in Pervomayskoye," it is useful to remember what official Moscow's position on the situation in Chechnya looked like before Raduyev's gang attacked Kizlyar. It must be said that Moscow had managed to seize the political initiative from Dudayev for perhaps the first time since the troops were brought into Chechnya in December 1994. A leader — Doku Zavgayev — ready to put relations with the federal center on a new footing had appeared on the Chechen political scene. Needless to say, according to the strict standards of a democratic state a host of irregularities were permitted during the Chechen presidential election, which should not have been held at all given the state of emergency that existed there de facto.

However, if you regard the whole event not as an election but as a test of public opinion, then a definite trend can be detected. Doku Zavgayev's position has the backing of a fairly large number of Chechens, who believe that it is more advisable to reach agreement with the federal center than to prosecute the war until their own people are exterminated. What is more, the agreement on Chechnya's special status, signed 8 December last year, has provided quite tangible economic motivation for this choice. As part of this special status Chechnya has not only won something verging on de facto independence (a chance to open its own missions abroad and organize flights abroad from Groznyy, along with a promise of compensation for the material damage sustained during the hostilities, etc) but, most importantly, federal budget aid in restoring the republic's ravaged economy.

Various figures are being cited for this aid. Thus, Nikolay Gonchar, former Federation Council deputy and now a State Duma deputy, said during a television interview that the 1996 budget has made provision for a figure of 15 trillion rubles [R] for the restoration of Chechnya. And Zavgayev himself recently said that he and Chernomyrdin had agreed on Chechnya's being allocated R28 trillion from the federal budget. At this

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point even the greatest of businessmen might have caught their breath. If that is the case, the restoration of the Chechen economy promises to be one of the most profitable forms of commercial activity in Russia. You do not need a fertile imagination to imagine how often that money can be "misused" and in what ways, and how much of it can be written off. Thus, many influential groups and individuals in Chechnya began to regard Zavgayev's position as more rational than and preferable to Dudayev's.

In these conditions, sensing that his social base in Chechnya was beginning to dwindle, Dudayev made another mistake. Raduyev's group was sent to attack the Dagestani city of Kizlyar and took hostages, among them representatives of Dagestan's Muslim peoples and Chechens who, although they had taken no anti-Russian action, were sympathetic and had furthermore given shelter to many tens of thousands of refugees from Chechnya. The federal authorities gained an additional moral edge: An anti-Dudayev wave of indignation flared up for the first time among the peoples of the North Caucasus, and Dudayev himself finally lost the aura of being a national liberation movement leader and was finally categorized as a commonplace bandit.

Thus, at the time that the convoy of buses carrying Raduyev's gang reached the village of Pervomayskoye the federal authorities had on their side such factors as the backing of the public at large and a Dagestan population and leadership indignant at the Dudayevists' actions, as well as Russian society's willingness to take the toughest of measures to capture and, where necessary, eliminate the gang. How did the federal authorities manage the moral and political capital that they had, and how are we to assess the result of the operation in the small Dagestani village? In the process we should remember that, whether we like it or not, over the next few months everything will have to be assessed in accordance with the criteria of election expediency.

In order to analyze the situation in Pervomayskoye it (the operation) must be divided into three component parts: the special operation to release the hostages, the police operation to arrest and neutralize Raduyev's gang, and the military operation proper to capture the hostile population center or, as General Mikhaylov, then director of the Federal Security Service Public Relations Center, said, "battalion-strength fortified position." One may assume that the federal authorities regarded the operation as three-pronged since special subunits of the Federal Security Service, Ministry of Internal Affairs units, and attached units of the Russian Armed Forces were involved. The fact that General Mikhail Barsukov, leader of the Federal Security Service, was given full command of the operation, offered hope that the special operation, that is the release of the hostages, was viewed by the federal authorities as the main one, otherwise it should have been commanded by the heads of other departments (either General Kulikov or General Grachev).

Regrettably, from all that we learned at this tragic time from television reports and explanations provided by the Federal Security Service Public Relations Center for the public and the press we can conclude that there was no special operation. No special systems and methods were employed. The only spetsnaz attempt at a night raid on the bandit base to be reported in the press ended in failure. Raduyev's men spotted them and reacted promptly. The only factor on the first day of the assault to suggest that anyone had remembered the hostages was Gen. Aleksandr Mikhaylov's statement to journalists that heavy artillery was not firing on those houses where the hostages were massed.

But when the "Grad's," designed to hit area targets, were brought up to Pervomayskoye on the last day of the operation and Gen. Mikhaylov told journalists that the use of these weapons was justified since there were supposedly no surviving hostages (but there were), it became clear that from that moment on the special operation had been axed once and for all — after all, there was no longer anyone left to release. That is, there was no silent extermination of sentries or helicopter assault on a stupefied, disorganized enemy to suppress his communications' systems and chances of putting up organized resistance.

Even if you go along with the official statistics, therefore, it should be said not that 82 hostages were released but that they managed to survive during the operation, for which they deserve whole-hearted congratulations, and that this happened despite rather than thanks to the federal forces' actions. Incidentally, official statistics contain another interesting point with regard to the hostages: They talk about hostages who were rescued and hostages who are missing, but there is no mention of a single dead hostage. How was it that 153 gunmen died but the people acting as their human shield did not suffer in the thick of it?

To wind up our discussion of the special section of the operation I must remind you that the problem of the hostages' release has by no means been fully resolved. There is every indication that a large proportion of the Novosibirsk Special-Purpose Police Detachment and some other hostages were taken off with the remnants of the gang during the nighttime fighting near Pervomayskoye and are with Dudayevists in Chechnya, so these hostages still need to be released.

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Now let me talk about the police operation, or rather about the result which its leaders sooner prefer to forget but which will very shortly make itself felt. It is well known that casualties are justified if evil has been punished. The president insistently explained during his statements that half of Raduyev's gang were people who had been in Budennovsk and that they must not be let loose now, so as to avoid more bloodshed. Yet they have been let loose. The core of the gang and its commander made their way into Chechnya with dozens of hostages as a result of a very well-organized (on the part of the Chechens) nighttime battle. Thus, the operation to rout the gang and arrest its leaders was a total failure. Raduyev's gang sustained losses, but the bulk of the combat-capable terrorist unit survived.

It is simply embarrassing to talk about the purely military aspect of the operation. Clearly it will not go down in the history of Russian arms as a rip-roaring success. But the military are least of all to blame for this. It was not they who thought that the small village could be described as a "battalion-strength fortified position." Raduyev's men certainly used the hostages to dig full-scale trenches, but they were after all given time to do so. However, had the people producing the information "stew" taken care to look at military instructions which say what a modern motorized rifle battalion looks like when it is engaged in defense, they would have noticed that Raduyev's gang was nothing like a battalion in terms of either firepower, the preparation of its positions, or even numbers. It is rather sad how absurd the horrifying stories of a secret Dudayevist underground base near Pervomayskoye with "permanent emplacements and earth-and-timber emplacements" look. The small cellar dubbed an ammunition shelter that was shown on television as "material evidence" only reinforced the suspicions regarding the adequacy of the information being supplied to the president.

You can argue long and hard as to why the helicopter pilots and artillerymen often hit their own people and meet with the response that the artillerymen should spend more time firing at test ranges and pilots should spend more time in the air but that no money is being allocated for either. Although, even given these difficulties it is still obvious that the organization of collaboration between the representatives both of different departments and branches of forces involved in the operation was deplorable. In actual fact it is hardly proper to talk about the effectiveness of an armed forces' operation in peacetime on your own territory. The fact that Russian politicians forced the Russian Army (needless to say, this did not happen in Pervomayskoye but much earlier) to be the instrument of resolving domestic conflicts on their own territory is something to ponder.

So, let us sum up some of the results. Strictly speaking, there was no special operation to rescue the hostages and, even if there were the rudiments of a special operation, you cannot call it anything other than pitiful. The fact that some hostages were rescued was not the result of the operation but an unexpected byproduct.

The military part of the operation to capture the "enemy fortified position" was carried out successfully, costing us, according to the official version, 26 fatalities and dozens of servicemen wounded. What is more, a village inhabited by around 200 families was destroyed, and they now have to ponder where and how they are to live now. Generally in a normal country at least the head of the security service and the internal affairs minister would resign after such a "success."

It would, however, be quite wrong to think that the results of the operation are confined to the above. They are far broader than that. The moral and political capital that the federal authorities have acquired, as mentioned at the start of this article, has been considerably devalued. You can hardly say that Dudayev has restored his appeal as a Chechen, never mind a Caucasus leader, but the waves of protest that have arisen in the North Caucasus over what happened in Dagestan will be directed considerably more against Moscow than against Dudayev. It was, after all, the federal troops' guns that burned Pervomayskoye. It was the federal authorities that were unable to ensure the security of neighboring Dagestan when the Dudayevist gang was already in Kizlyar and who tried to shift responsibility for resolving the situation onto the Dagestani authorities. No one in Dagestan now needs to explain that they can take better care of their own security themselves and that there are quite enough weapons there as it is, just as there are throughout the North Caucasus. If the situation in Dagestan starts to take the direction in which it is being pushed by the people behind the operation in Pervomayskoye, that could spark off a landslide of destabilization throughout the Caucasus region.

What made the Russian political leadership take such risky steps? Above all it was the extreme pressure of time that the president and his immediate entourage are working under. It is patently obvious that he intends to run in the presidential election and that the decisionmaking process was dominated by electoral considerations. The only thing that is not clear, however, is whether this really was the best decision. It is clear that, if the president fails to resolve the situation in Chechnya one way or another before mid- April this year and enters the finishing straight in the election

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race still burdened by the war, the daily reports on the deaths of Russian soldiers, and the continuing terrorist acts in Chechnya itself and, more importantly, outside Chechnya, his chances of winning the election in June will then be nil. It seems that his immediate entourage managed to persuade him that in these conditions there was only one way of resolving the conflict quickly — purely by force.

All the channels for proposing alternative ways to resolve the problem or at least to use political instruments as well as force are being consistently closed. Which member of the Dudayevist opposition has been subjected to fiercest criticism by the Moscow authorities recently? Maskhadov, Dudayev's chief of staff. He is alleged to have organized the operation in Gudermes and planned the Raduyev gang's actions. Yet he is one of the few members of Dudayev's entourage with whom General Romanov has managed to negotiate.

Prime Minister Chernomyrdin's conduct in connection with the events in Pervomayskoye is very indicative. It must be said that, ever since the Russian troops have been in Chechnya, Viktor Stepanovich has demonstrated an excellent political flair and disappeared from the political arena into the shadows whenever the Russian leadership has decided to commit an act of "folly on the grand scale" in Chechnya. For example, he clearly managed to distance himself from Pavel Grachev's actions during the infamous assault on Groznyy, and conversely he was not afraid to assume personal responsibility during the tragedy in Budennovsk. In any event, Chernomyrdin embodied the possibility of a different policy in Chechnya. Let us recall that Viktor Stepanovich flew in from Orenburg after Raduyev's gang had attacked Kizlyar and told journalists that all the bandits would be punished but that this would not be done by means of a "frontal assault using tanks." Just a few days later federal tanks supported by helicopters and artillery began a frontal assault on Pervomayskoye, contrary to the premier's statement.

Given the reliance on methods clearly alien to him, the premier again retired into the shadows citing a "slight catarrhal infection." This time, however, it seems that the premier had to "justify himself." After the next meeting with the president at the height of the events he sent a letter to the State Duma proposing support for the federal forces' actions in Chechnya. Then Viktor Chernomyrdin stated in front of the TV cameras that the whole world could now see "that it is impossible to negotiate with these people." As he said this the premier's facial expression left no doubt that he would rather swear an oath of loyalty than express his firm conviction.

The president's public comments throughout this period occupy a special place in the story of the attack on Kizlyar and the seizure of Pervomayskoye. As always in Russia it began with the punishment of the innocent. General Nikolayev, chief of the border troops, was given a public dressing down. Boris Nikolayevich then made some strange remarks which suggested that the president was operating in an information area radically different from the one inhabited by his fellow citizens. What was the point of his impromptu meeting with the press by the Kremlin wall, when he informed journalists about the 38 snipers constantly tracking their targets and about the smoke-filled streets of Pervomayskoye along which the hostages would be dispersed en masse, so that the targets "will be hard to kill."

Despite the impromptu nature of the news conference, someone prepared this information for the president. So why was it necessary to present the country's leader in such a bizarre light, to put it mildly? I wonder whether this was the result of the carelessness of the information suppliers or whether the way they appear in the president's eyes matters more to them than the way the president looks in the eyes of the country and the whole world. Did it really not occur to them that if 38 snipers could track their targets constantly then it was also possible to station 250 snipers around Pervomayskoye, one for each bandit, and finish off Raduyev with a single shot? Then the story about the Dudayev forces' "mounds of weapons" and "fortified underground base" in Pervomayskoye appeared, and finally there was the report on the effective completion of the operation. The president was quick to share that news with journalists. (But Boris Nikolayevich clearly forgot to report that the ringleader of the gang had escaped safely from Chechnya along with his comrades in arms and some of the hostages).

Now the president, confident that Dudayev has been "taught a proper lesson," is promising to embark on the complete eradication of terrorism from Chechen soil and the destruction of "Dudayev's bases in those areas where there is no civilian population." And his chief of staff, Yegorov, has stated that the time has come to end the shameful state of "neither war nor peace" in Chechnya. At the same time hinting perfectly clearly which option has been chosen.

There is no denying that terrorism must be fought by all available means including force. Bearing in mind the factor of the rapidly approaching election campaign, the means and strategy of this campaign must be chosen with extreme precision. But right now it is impossible to avoid the conclusion that the president is somehow being urged to choose a strategy which is going to be an absolute disaster for his electoral interests. For

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all the Russians' readiness to use adequate strong-arm measures against terrorists, they are not inclined to encourage or forgive the authorities' impotence and ineffectiveness. I believe that during the operation in Pervomayskoye the president lost many thousands of potential voters.

Can his advisers estimate realistically how many days it will take to capture mountain strongholds in winter if it took almost a week to take Pervomayskoye, which is located on a plain. Are those who give this advice confident that it will be dealt with before mid- or late April, let alone whether the resulting casualties can be justified? Perhaps in these conditions it would have made more sense to activate the inter-Chechen dialogue? Furthermore, Doku Zavgayev has had some success in that regard. Whereas we by our actions could "cut off his oxygen supply" inside Chechnya.

The events of the past few days also demonstrated that our democracy has reached a fundamentally new stage in its development: First, despite the development of information technology, information can be successfully blocked and a whole country can be kept in ignorance of important events. Second, and perhaps even more dangerous, giving the Russian president doses of preprocessed information can have a very serious impact on his chosen strategy and the decisionmaking process. That includes prompting him to take steps which are extremely disadvantageous for the country as a whole and for his own political future.

Recently the president has demonstrated how sensitive he is to the development of the election situation and to the Communists' success in the Duma. Yabloko leader Grigoriy Yavlinskiy really caught it in the neck for objectively forming a bloc in the Duma with the Communists, according to the president, which enabled them to elect Comrade Seleznev as speaker. Nevertheless, this criticism is only partly justified. Even if all the members of the Yabloko faction had voted for Ivan Petrovich Rybkin, Seleznev would still have been elected — such is the disposition of forces in the Duma nowadays. But here is what the president should have focused his attention on most closely. The Communists categorically rejected such an anti-president action as a vote of no confidence in the government over the operations in Chechnya. The speaker stated that a government reshuffle quite suited the Communists, and the Chechnya problem was put off till later. I do not believe that the president is so naive as to think that the Communists do not want to create extra difficulties for him. They want to do that very much.

Clearly the Communists sympathize with the sufferings of the Chechen people and of all the Russians, but their feelings are not so deep as to make them forget their own group political interests. Why should they interfere in the situation and warn the president against making new mistakes? After all, a job is being done in Chechnya and Dagestan which is very difficult but very useful from their viewpoint — the burial of Boris Yeltsin's hopes of successful participation in the forthcoming presidential election. Who would stop his sworn friend [zaklyatyy drug] from wringing his own neck? But should they be so keen to meet the wishes of these workers?

PRAVDA Denies Yeltsin Shift Towards Communism

MM2501130596 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 25 Jan 96 p 1

[Boris Slavin commentary under the "Events and Commentaries" rubric: "Will the President Redden?"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Boris Yeltsin's speech at the opening of the first session of the Federation Council has been interpreted by some as an exposition of his "campaign manifesto" and by others as the complete surrender of his former democratic positions.

In my view, it was neither one nor the other. He, as usual, expressed his desire to tackle the "very difficult" task of coordinating the interests of the Federation and its components. Regarding Chechnya, he called, on the one hand, for "dialogue," and, on the other hand, "tough repression." Despite the collapse of the strong-arm policy in the Caucasus, the president sought to convince the senators, in his traditionally optimistic vein, that he has recently succeeded in reducing "separatist feelings" and strengthening "the integrity of the state." Criticizing the way the federal assembly has adopted the budget, he urged the senators to study it more thoroughly in the light of the "government's findings."

What, then, frightened our neoliberals in the president's speech? I think it was chiefly the fact that he treated them on a par with the Communists, saying that Russia "has experienced many doctrines, ranging from ultracommunism to the most liberal." But there is no actual "volte-face" in these words. There is merely a certain shift of policy toward the center under the influence of Russia's general movement toward the left.

However, all this does not mean that Yeltsin is becoming a Red. He still demands that the bourgeois reforms be seen through "to the end." The fact that a number of well-known democrats have left the Presidential Council is not indicative of a fundamental evolution on Yeltsin's part: They virtually had no function. In actual fact, as we see it, what is happening is a simple change in the

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president's bearing away from foreign, exploitative capital toward national capital.

Boris is also trying to revive his former populism on this wave, but now by criticizing not so much the Communists as the radical democrats. It is naive to think that the president is becoming a "restorer of communism" or someone who is implementing the "opposition's goals." Boris Yeltsin's reconversion into a Communist would, in my view, be tantamount to suicide.

Metallurgists Nominate Yeltsin for Second Term

MM2601102996 Moscow ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI in Russian 26 Jan 96 p 1

["Reportage" by Sergey Milyanchikov and Vladimir Smyk: "Metallurgists Gamble on Boris Yeltsin"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Representatives of 10 major Russian metallurgical enterprises have formed an action group to nominate Boris Yeltsin for the post of Russian Federation president for a second term. They include representatives of Magnitogorsk and Novolipetskiy Metallurgical Combines, Krasnoyarsk and Bratsk Aluminum Plants, the "Nosta," "Severstal," and "Tulachermet" Joint-Stock Companies....

Serafim Afonin, chairman of the Russian Federation Committee for Metallurgy, drew the attention of the gathering to the fact that in the process of the reforms metallurgy has been preserved as the country's base sector and is distinguished today by mobility, readiness to react to market changes, and the ability to meet Russia's requirements for metal. "There has been no wholesale unemployment in the sector," he emphasized, "and skilled cadres have been retained. Stability would not have been achieved if the country's leadership and the head of state personally had not kept their eye on the situation in Russian metallurgy."

Taking the floor, Nikolay Gavrilchenko, a repair shop worker at Stoylenskiy Mining and Enriching Combine, proposed that metallurgists nominate Boris Yeltsin for the post of Russian president. His argument was that the course of the reforms being implemented by the head of state has enabled the combine to work with an efficiency which could not have been achieved under the old economic conditions. He was supported by Oleg Obukhov, chairman of the Young Metallurgists' Union of Magnitogorsk Metallurgical Combine, who said that Boris Yeltsin's reelection will ensure the reforms' continuity. "To halt this process halfway," he believes, "when the most painful and difficult part has already been covered, would mean losing the prospect of developing both the sector and the country. You do not change horses in midstream.... We certainly do not think that no blunders have been made in recent years, but Boris Yeltsin must be given the opportunity to see the course of reforms through to the end, and this course must not be diverted from resolving social questions."

Nikolay Gutsol (Sredneuralsk Copper Smelting Plant) pointed out that he had worked with Boris Nikolayevich for seven years and that he knows him as a strong-willed, exacting leader. Nevertheless, he expressed a wish that the head of state rely on more objective information which has not been adapted to fit the situation.

Genrikh Shilov, member of the Veterans Council of Magnitogorsk Metallurgical Combine, proposed that the president pay attention to the social thrust of the reforms, reckoning that the election outcome will depend on the country's pensioners.

The metallurgists pointed out that Boris Yeltsin should improve the state's tax policy and tackle the growth in crime. They are sure that the present Russian head of state still has time to amend the socioeconomic policy being implemented. In the opinion of the members of the action group, at the present time only Boris Yeltsin is capable of ensuring stability in the country and the continuation of the economic reforms.

The representatives of Russia's major metallurgical enterprises approved a decision to ask Boris Yeltsin to give his consent to run for the post of the country's president for a second term.

Yeltsin Mailbag Offers Campaign Advice

MM2601124796 Moscow ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI in Russian 26 Jan 96 p 1

[Unattributed report: "How to Rob the Opposition of Its Trump Card. Writers of Letters Dedicated to Approaching Russian Presidential Elections Offer Advice"]

[FBIS Translated Text] In an exclusive report for ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI, Mikhail Mironov, chief of the Russian Federation President's Administration for Work with Citizens' Appeals, has announced that it received over 170 letters and telegrams last week on the forthcoming elections of the Russian head of state. Almost two-thirds of them are joint messages. In Mironov's opinion, the mailbag exhibits the following characteristic moods.

A number of letter writers have already made up their minds — they are going to choose Boris Yeltsin. They see him as a politician whose work as president "will help to stabilize the situation and improve the life of ordinary people" (according to a joint letter from Nizhniy Novgorod). The opinion is expressed that Boris

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Yeltsin's refusal to run again "will inevitably raise the question of the collapse of democratic presidential rule in Russia" (M. Ramazanov and F. Muzafarova from Ufa). The hope is expressed that under his leadership "the people will surmount all the difficulties and Russia will become a more powerful, prosperous state" (a joint letter from Rybnoye, a city in Ryazan Oblast).

A second group of letters from Russians as well as from writers in states of the near and far abroad are also couched in positive terms. These correspondents fully support the Russian Federation president's activity. However, they believe that it is inadvisable to hold the presidential elections in the near future: The sociopolitical situation in Russia today is such that there is no absolute guarantee that Boris Yeltsin will win. Neither the Russians nor the world community stand to gain from a change of head of state. Here is what B. Layetem [name as transliterated] writes from Canada. Noting that the situation in the country is difficult, the writer stresses: "It will take time to change the economy completely and the people are usually impatient when the majority of them are suffering and they transfer their impatience to the leader because they do not understand that the difficulties are created not by the leader but by the economic situation."

There is a third group of opinions which is ambivalent in character. Their authors sympathize with Boris Yeltsin but say that they will only vote for him if the economic and social problems worrying them are resolved before the elections.

Finally, a number of correspondents would rather see someone else as president of the Russian Federation. There are two reasons for this: Disagreement with the policy proclaimed by the country's leadership — but more importantly, disagreement with the way it is actually being implemented.

The suggestions that the elections be postponed because of possible negative international and domestic political consequences are hardly acceptable. To judge from the feelings of most writers, the elections should be held on the prescribed date. When preparing for the elections, the mailbag stresses, it is necessary to resolve three tasks at the same time: **to unite Boris Yeltsin's supporters, convince the waverers, and remove his opponents' main trump cards.**

Organizationally speaking, this means that not a single voter must be overlooked. The writers urge greater reliance on the social formations which support B.N. Yeltsin. They could undertake agitation and explanatory work. The success of the elections depends on how often the country's leadership and the heads of the local administrations meet with labor collectives and talk with people in the work place and residential districts. Writers also suggest that a number of charity events and marathons be held in the major cities and regions of the country. E. Baykov from Ruzayevka believes that "this will not just provide real financial help for the needy. It will also be a propaganda campaign which could boost the president's popularity rating and enhance his prestige among the population."

In the **socioeconomic sphere** this means implementing a number of appropriate measures. The need for the prompt payment of wages, pensions, and allowances and for their timely indexation is emphasized. The main theme of many of the messages is that the federal program "Housing" should be implemented more vigorously and that the Law "On Veterans" should be comprehensively fulfilled. The relevant resources can be found by organizing real state monitoring of the production and sale of alcoholic drinks. This measure alone, the letters claim, could yield 1-2 trillion rubles a month for the budget.

Many writers still regard as topical social problems the repayment of money to investors duped by the commercial banks, the indexation of savings wiped out during price liberalization, and an aggressive campaign against crime and terrorism. "It is important that the most 'flagrant' cases (those of A. Men, D. Kholodov, V. Listyev, and the murder of Russian State Duma deputies) be resolved and that even minor officials be prosecuted for corruption in the state organs," according to Kh. Shirshetskiy from Moscow. A frequently expressed view is that the privatization program should be amended urgently because for the majority of Russians "vouchers turned out to be a fiction," Ye. Movchan from Stavropol Kray writes.

A considerable proportion of the election mailbag contains suggestions linked with **improving the functioning of the power structures** at the center and in particular at local level because "many Russians are aggrieved not so much at the fact that their lives have deteriorated (although in my view this is a contentious issue) as at the fact that local officials simply ignore them," Z. Yushkova from Kurgan writes. From Kaluga and a number of other oblasts there are letters offering evidence that the administrations in those oblasts are taking liberties with federal budget resources intended to support the needy. Writers cite instances of civil rights violations and examples in which the local authorities issue normative-legal acts which contravene federal law, flout the edicts and directives of the country's president, and make decisions which take account of the interests of individual officials, not of the state.

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Consequently the letter writers propose that unprincipled local leaders who are concerned solely with personal gain, and who besmirch all the power structures, be dismissed as soon as possible and that the role of the president's representatives in the regions be enhanced and their rights expanded, and that they should "prevent negative phenomena, not merely note them" (A. Dagayev from Novosibirsk).

According to Mikhail Mironov, Boris Yeltsin has replied to a number of letters.

Headquarters Set Up To Help Yeltsin Guard Constitution

LD2501135296 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1326 GMT 25 Jan 96

[By Andreo Surzhanskiy]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] MOSCOW, January 25 (ITAR-TASS) — The pan-Russian presidential election headquarters has been set up to assist President Boris Yeltsin in his function as the guarantor of the constitution, presidential law aide Mikhail Krasnov said.

He said in an interview with ITAR-TASS today that the headquarters is a political, not an electoral body which is called to help nomination of presidential candidates whose political views do not challenge the Russian constitution. The guarding of the foundations of the constitution is the responsibility of Yeltsin, Krasnov said.

"We are still in a judicial and political situation which does not preclude that the regular (presidential) elections may become the last. The foundations of the constitutional order may be undermined," he went on to say.

Asked about political forces harbouring such a threat, Krasnov said the threat is "subjective".

"For example, it (threat) looms in the programme aims of communists. They in particular want the president to make amendemnts of the constitution which would eliminate the presidential post as such," Krasnov said.

In Russia's setting, this would spell a comeback of the Soviets, and the Soviet power denies the separation of the executive and legislative power branches and is designed to gradually wipe out the freedom of expression, the multi-party system and other liberties, Krasnov continued.

"This is what it is all about, the value which cannot be protected today by some narrowly judicial methods. Political methods are needed here," he said.

Krasnov admitted that the status of the presidential election headquarters is so far lacking certainty. However, he said, there is nothing illegitimate to this as the president guides the work of the government and has the power to order government officials to assist him in his constitution-protecting function.

Krasnov stressed that the headquarters would not take over any powers of the Central Electoral Commission.

With the commission arranging for the elections, the headquarters is there to guard the constitutional order, with the president spearheading the vigil, Krasnov explained.

He assured that Yeltsin would not be in a position to bar any presidential candidate with the use of the headquarters. "This is out of the question," he said.

Movement Urges Yeltsin To Amend Security Policy

LD2501203296 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1408 GMT 25 Jan 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] MOSCOW, Jan 25 (INTERFAX) — The Reforms-New Course movement has prepared a range of proposals for Russian President Boris Yeltsin designed to correct the country's eonomic and political course. The president will be requested to include them in his annual message to the Federal Assembly, Vladimir Shumeyko told the movement's council on Thursday.

Shumeyko stressed the importance of these proposals and said: "we get the opportunity to determine our positions in the election campaign."

With reference to the president's annual message to the Federal Assembly, the former speaker of Russia's Federation Council said: "in fact this will be Yeltsin's election platform."

Shumeyko singled out the problem of national security. According to him, the situation in that area has "deteriorated in all directions," and therefore security policy needs to be substantially corrected. It must be built on the need to maintain Russia's territorial integrity, and prevent strategic concessions in the area of nuclear and public security at the talks with the G7, Shumeyko pointed out.

As for the economic area, changes in the tax policy should be given top priority. A new policy in the area of revenues and changes in the process of privatization must become the nucleus of the corrected course: the State Property Committee must be abolished, and its functions must be transferred to the Economics and Finance Ministries, Shumeyko said.

The proposals of the Reforms-New Course movement also point to the need to form a mechanism for exercising state power on all levels.

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The president is invited to initiate amendments to the Constitution, "to expand freedom of action for the government." Shumeyko said that "the president's current power over the government is not beneficial to him, because it entitles the president to bear full responsibility for the government's blunders and mistakes."

In addition the movement calls for altering the procedure of appointing deputy prime ministers and key ministers: their candidacies must be approved by the State Duma.

If the president fails to correct his present policy, Reforms-New Course "will face the difficulty of opting for some other candidate," Shumeyko pointed out. Nevertheless Yeltsin remains "the most acceptable figure" as the future president of Russia — "a country in a state of political confrontation," Shumeyko said.

Russia: Commentary Assesses Primakov Appointment

AU2501184796 Moscow NOVOYE VREMYA in Russian No. 3 Jan 96 pp 11-13

[Commentary by Marina Pavlova-Silvanskaya: "One Minister Hastens To Replace Another...."]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Field Marshal General von Moltke once remarked: "In the German Headquarters, all the new people are old people."

About a year and a half ago, Andrey Kozyrev [former Russian foreign minister] invited a few journalists, who covered international affairs, to meet with him and talk. The guests turned out to be quite ambitious and methodically rebuked the minister for his tendency to misuse great-power rhetorics. Kozyrev tried to leave, but was literally driven into a corner. Then he suddenly breathed out in a low voice as a half-joke: "What a pity to live in such a time!"

It was an unexpected revelation by a favorite of fortune, a man of a special egocentric make, produced by the Moscow State Institute of International Relations, rather than by a politician or a citizen. Apparently, the hectic work did not give him inner satisfaction, and ambition was burning him out from inside. Striving to remain at the top, Andrey Kozyrev had to pay an excessively high price for that pleasure. The "patriots" and Communists did not forgive him his pro-Western and pro-American preferences, while liberals scorned his flamboyant great-power declarations, all the more so since he did not act in ignorance. Kozyrev's famous Stockholm memorandum (end of 1992) was indisputable proof that he knew perfectly well what kind of game he was playing. [passage omitted]

Kozyrev's unprecedented political agony lasted too long and broke off in a no better way, without dignity, without a word of gratitude, and even without a farewell audience. A new boss appeared at Smolensk Square without delay.

Primakov's Career — Fortune's Fit of Generosity

If Yevgeniy Primakov's ministerial appointment did take somebody unawares, this can only be said of Western diplomats. At the same time, his candidacy was not a total surprise for Russian observers. Newspapers began to mention his name abundantly in connection with Kozyrev's "withering away" as far back as last spring and then again at the end of summer. It was only closer to the time of his resignation that other competitors emerged in the foreground. However, according to the press secretary of the former SVR [Foreign Intelligence Service] director, the Foreign Ministry portfolio was only offered (and very insistently) to Primakov much later, and he did not accept it right away or unconditionally. More than one competitor and their highly-placed patrons fought for the post of Russian diplomat number one. To grasp the tasty morsel right from under their noses meant to unwittingly create a multitude of ill-wishers, if not enemies. In all likelihood, Primakov's life in Foreign Intelligence was not so bad at all. At any rate, he referred to the years he spent in Yesenevo as perhaps the happiest in his life. One may thus surmise that, for him, after he had already made his way into the highest echelons of power, the unbridled and brain-drained Foreign Ministry, which it had already become a custom or even good manners to curse, could hardly seem like a prize. [passage omitted]

Given such biographical background, there is nothing surprising about the fact that the press did not show particular enthusiasm about the new minister, indicating unambiguously that it saw in the new minister, who has served so many bosses, a living incarnation of time-serving. The recent attempt by Valentin Zorin [Soviet and Russian diplomat] to present Primakov on the television as a free-thinker, who has made it to the top through thorns, was, in the light of Zorin's own reputation, a classic well-meant action with an opposite effect. However, it is now not a matter of Primakov's personality, but rather his inborn "heightened flexibility," which has matched a certain important trend that is taking shape.

In the Neutral Area

Having become, in 1991, head of foreign intelligence, Primakov immediately went to a rather deep political shade. Until quite recently, he gave practically no interviews, was not spotted on television programs, and

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only gave very few news conferences, where he delivered SVR's analytical reports. The monthly ratings of the politicians compiled by the "NG" [NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA] placed Yevgeniy Primakov in the third or even fourth dozen in terms of influence, but this, clearly, did not conform to the true political weight of the man, who had a personal access to Boris Yeltsin on a weekly basis. However, the low-profile maintained by the former SVR director can hardly be attributed to the fact that intelligence does not, by definition, tolerate the limelight. In all likelihood, Primakov's reserved manners were carefully thought out.

Judge for yourselves. Primakov's loyalty to the president was never questioned. Nevertheless, while being one of the four "power bosses" appointed by the president, the SVR director contrived to remain "in the neutral area." He managed to keep some independence, and after voting in the Security Council against the beginning of the Chechen war, he evaded collective responsibility for it. It is not accidental that the intelligence chief has, so far, not inspired a single "puppet" sketch [on the Russian television satirical program "Kukly"].

His press secretary, Tatyana Samolis, asserts that her boss consistently tried to achieve maximum depolitization, not only for himself, but, more importantly, for his department. After the umbilical cord that had connected the foreign intelligence with the KGB had been severed and the SVR became an independent department, Primakov contributed much to its liberation from the "dense ideological party control" and thereby objectively started an important venture — laying a foundation for a depoliticized state department. [passage omitted]

The way our press has assessed Primakov's career indicates how unstable Russia's sociopolitical system has been so far. The majority of living people witnessed its change; moreover, the citizens are strongly alienated from the state. For that reason, a new moral approach to a nonpoliticized state service could not take shape, but the known concept of time-serving still retains its quite real ethical meaning.

Not an Outsider, but Not "Our Own Man" Either

For the Foreign Ministry personnel, the new minister is not quite an outsider and not a dilettante, but nor is he sufficiently "our own man" to make one hope that everything will be quiet at Smolensk Square. Primakov is a person from another circle, and it is, psychologically, much easier for him than for any deputy minister or ambassador, no matter how talented they might be, to take an independent view of the Foreign Ministry and halt the disintegration in progress there.

Everybody agrees that Primakov has a chance to become a strong and influential minister. He is a professional in international relations, and he has spent his whole life in that milieu and among those problems. Over the years spent in the SVR, its chief not only maintained his good form, but was even destined to become one of the best-informed people in the world. It appears that his knowledge of things and of the true state of affairs in the world is not inferior to that of Andrey Kozyrev and his deputies, each of whom was in charge of some individual trend. By comparison with Kozyrev and all other career diplomats, he has indubitable advantages, which might have determined the president's choice.

The new minister has, behind him, rather long experience of work with Yeltsin and with present Security Council members, and this enables him to build relations with them on a healthier basis. As with the prime minister and defense minister — to make it possible to really coordinate actions of the departments abroad and to eradicate the harmful disoriented character of the Russian external policy. However, even for the president, Primakov will be psychologically closer than Kozyrev: The same generation and similar experience in life and politics. At the news conference, Primakov, who knows his service and his place in the power hierarchy, emphasized that, in accordance with the Constitution, it is the president who determines Russia's foreign policy and that is why his own role as minister should not be exaggerated.

However, his very first meeting with colleagues from CIS countries showed that Primakov is inclined to act more resolutely and independently than his predecessor. It is a reflection of the personality structure of the new Moscow diplomacy boss, of his age and of his habits. And not just that. It goes without saying that Primakov will act within the coordinates system agreed upon by Yeltsin, who obviously expects from the new minister more independence, thoroughness, and as a consequence, impressive external political achievements — brightly painted eggs for the Christmas holiday of presidential elections. The style that Primakov sported during his first public appearance — sharp, unrefined, and without verbal embellishment — had a strong resemblance to the president's own style.

However, if Primakov is destined to become a strong minister, it is not quite clear why a special coordination body — the new Presidential Council for External Policy — had to be created. It was initially meant for weakening Kozyrev's positions. Vladimir Slavin, a young (40) career diplomat, who was appointed as secretary of the council and who was formerly associate of presidential aide Dmitriy Ryurikov, is hardly capable, alone, of raising the status of the new-born department.

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Well, this is not the only one such inoperative council created under the president!

The Play at Give-Away With Zyuganov?

A question of no small importance: Should the replacement of the foreign minister be viewed as Boris Yeltsin's reaction to the outcome of the [parliamentary] elections? More specifically, as his desire to bring the government in line with the will of the electorate? If so, one would be able to say that the most important element of democracy has started working in Russia. Not quite the way the liberals would prefer, but it has started working. It was, therefore, strange to hear [Russian Prime Minister] Viktor Chernomyrdin deny, with sincere passion, any connection between these two events, as he tried to shake off any suspicion of compromise with the Russian Federation's Communist Party.

In reality, however, the situation is not that simple, and Chernomyrdin is probably right: The mechanism of adjustment between the elections and the government personnel has not yet been properly triggered. On the one hand, the coming of Primakov will rather secure those changes in the Russian foreign policy that took place in recent years, after the Yeltsin team intercepted the "state" ideas exploited by Communists and nationalists. Primakov's advent will somewhat block their demagogic attacks on the Russian diplomacy, but it is unlikely that they will recognize the new minister himself as one of their own people: Anatoliy Lukyanov has already made a statement that is quite in the spirit of the newspaper ZAVTRA, having added Primakov to that same "universal team" that also included Kozyrev. On the other hand, however, the former minister was not so much "eaten up" by Communists and Zhirinovskiyites as by the people of the president and by politicians. The confidence with which Primakov gives to understand that he intends to stay in his present post longer than six months rather indicates that, while appointing a new minister, Boris Yeltsin was thinking about strengthening his team and not about playing at give-away with Zyuganov.

Contradictory Signals

Commentators are unanimous in saying that they don't expect sharp movements or substantial changes in the Russian foreign policy from the new foreign minister. It is, however, meaningless, so far, to predict Primakov's concrete steps. His first steps and recent texts written by him may only be regarded as preliminary signals of his future external policy. These signals are contradictory. For example, in the speech delivered on the occasion of the 75th Anniversary of Russian Intelligence, he voiced a sober and sensible idea on the need to give up "globalism and totalitarianism" and embark upon the road of "diversifying tasks, sufficient flexibility and ability to retarget our strength and possibilities." However, soon after that: "The more diversified and strong the Russian position in the world becomes, the more the United States and its NATO allies will reckon with it — this is an axiom."

According to Primakov, Russia's central task in relations with the West is not to permit NATO's expansion to the East. It was strange to hear from his lips at a news conference, when answering the question on his own position on this sensitive issue, he limited himself to repeating, word for word, the formulation from the 1993 SVR report "Prospects for NATO Expansion and Russia's Interests." Even though much has happened since those times, he even resorted to the argument, used then, on the time that medium-range and tactical missiles may take to hit their targets. At the same time, in his anniversary speech, he asserted that "we are not such primitive people as to believe that the NATO expandsion is for the purpose of creating a bridgehead for a direct strike against Russia."

Neither in the aforementioned report nor at his news conference did the new minister mention central Europe — despite the fact that everybody shouts from the rooftops about Kozyrev's blunders in that region. The CIS states are Primakov's declared main regional priority. With such an alignment of forces, central Europe remains a "gray zone."

At the same time, Primakov demonstrated his heightened interest in the East (in a broad sense of the word) quite openly. A politician with ties in the Arab East (even with Saddam Husayn), with an understanding of the Muslim world and of the difference between Islamic extremism and Islamic fundamentalism, he may be of great use for Russia — particularly in the Caucasus and in Central Asia. Let us hope that the already announced participation of the new Russian foreign minister in the process of Near Eastern settlement will not introduce disorientation into that process, something that Kozyrev's Western partners complained about in Bosnia.

Primakov was asked at a news conference whether one should expect a "brain drain" from Yasenevo to the Foreign Ministry. He joked that one such brain is already at Smolensk Square, and there is not much need for others. Colonel General Vyacheslav Trubnikov succeeded him in the Foreign Intelligence Service. He had been the number two in this special service in recent years. Together with Primakov, he naturally took part in formulating the position of the Service on such important issues as policy regarding the CIS states.

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NATO expansion to the East, and the threat of the proliferation of nuclear weapons. Thus, even without a formal "brain drain" or special coordination measures, we have a coincidence of the political lines of the Foreign Ministry and the SVR, something that was not the case under Kozyrev.

At any rate, two players in the presidential "quartet" will play in unison.

Kazakov Not Likely To Change Russia's Economic Course

MM2501163396 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 26 Jan 96 p 1

[Report by Irina Savvateyeva: "A. Kazakov Has Been Appointed Russia's New Privatizer. Privatization Seems To Be Left With a Chance"]

[FBIS Translated Text] To a considerable extent yesterday was to decide the fate of the economic reforms in Russia: By the time this issue had been signed to press, a most important appointment in the Russian Federation Government had been made, but another one was also expected.

So, Aleksandr Kazakov, who earlier headed the Administration for Work With Territories in the Presidential Staff, has been appointed chairman of the Russian Goskomimushchestvo [State Committee for the Management of State Property] by a presidential edict. To all appearances, the question of the appointment of the first vice premier in charge of economic policy is being decided at the very moment that this issue is being prepared for publication.

Boris Yeltsin met Thursday with Vladimir Kadannikov, general director of the "AvtoVAZ" Production Association.

The possibility of Kadannikov's appointment as first vice premier is regarded by government sources as highly likely. One government analyst briefly described the consequence of such an appointment: "This will mean inflationary budget funding with all the ensuing consequences."

A government source also conjectured that Yevgeniy Yasin, minister of economics, might resign if Kadannikov is appointed first vice premier in charge of economic policy.

Government analysts reckon that the appointment of Aleksandr Kazakov, a former member of the Presidential Staff and leader of the Administration for Work With Territories, as Goskomimushchestvo chairman does not mean a change in the privatization policy. The government is inclined to believe that Kazakov is "the best option in the present political situation."

Aleksandr Kazakov has more than a nodding acquaintance with the problems of privatization. While Anatoliy Chubays was chairman of the Goskomimushchestvo, Kazakov was the department's deputy leader and dealt with the setting up of regional property committees. According to colleagues, he showed himself to be a good organizer at that time. Aleksandr Kazakov is still regarded as someone very close to Chubays.

Aleksandr Kazakov also has a good relationship with the premier. Since September 1995 Kazakov has been a member of the council of the "Russia Is Our Home" movement. He worked quite closely with Chernomyrdin within the framework of the election campaign. The government believes that the new head of the Goskomimushchestvo will fit in well with the premier's team. At the same time the new appointment also suits the Presidential Staff perfectly.

In the end, the actions of the head of the Goskomimushchestvo will be predetermined to a considerable extent by this year's budget legislation. The need to "deliver" 12 trillion privatization rubles to the treasury will not allow the government to curtail the destatization program abruptly without extremely painful consequences for the whole budget sphere.

Aleksandr Kazakov will also take over the vice premier's chair, which is due to the head of the Goskomimushchestvo in keeping with his status.

Aleksandr Ivanovich Kazakov was born in the city of Moscow 24 May 1948.

In 1971 he graduated from Moscow's S. Ordzhonikidze Engineering and Economics Institute, and he is a planning engineer by specialty. He is a doctor of economic sciences and a docent. He speaks German. During 1973-1976 Aleksandr Kazakov worked as a junior scientific associate at the USSR State Planning Committee. During 1976-1984 he was in party work in Moscow's Cheremushkinskiy Rayon party committee.

In 1992 Aleksandr Kazakov was appointed chief of the Main Administration for Organizing the Work of Territorial Committees on the Russian Federation Goskomimushchestvo. During 1993-1994 Aleksandr Kazakov was deputy chairman of the Russian Federation Goskomimushchestvo, and in 1994 he became chief of the Presidential Staff's Administration for Work With Territories.

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Russia: Kovalev Hopes To Set Up Civil Rights Structures

MK2601080996 Moscow OBSHCHAYA GAZETA in Russian
No. 3, 25-31 Jan 96 (Signed to press 24 Jan 96) p 2

[Interview With Sergey Kovalev by Yaroslav Leontyev: "Kovalev Sounds the Gong"]

[FBIS Translated Text] On Tuesday [23 January] IZVESTIYA carried an open letter of the well-known human rights activist Sergey Kovalev, where he notified the president of his quitting the Presidential Council and the Human Rights Commission under the Russian Federation president. An OBSHCHAYA GAZETA analyst asked Sergey Adamovich [Kovalev] about whether or not other members of the Commission would follow suit?

[Kovalev] I am not supposed to answer this question for them. I assume, though, that some members of the Commission will quit it. This is my impression from some preliminary discussions. But I would not like to see this decision to become collective, that is to say, I would not like to sway the Commission's decision.

[Leontyev] Don't you think these resignations are going to seriously harm the nascent civil society instead of the presidential structures?

[Kovalev] No, I think and hope that this cannot harm (I'd hate to be mistaken) the civil society because harm is being done by disparity between what is said and done. You should not say "the Human Rights Commission under the president" if the president's stance does not quite match the functions of guarantor of rights and freedoms to the citizens.

[Leontyev] Don't you find now that Andrey Sinyavskiy was right in saying that all that happened after December 1994 was a direct consequence of the October 1993 developments?

[Kovalev] I do not see it as so direct, but there is undoubtedly a genetic connection.

[Leontyev] Tell me, would you have left your post had there been no tragedy in Pervomayskoye?

[Kovalev] I was giving it a thought even before the latest events, but I am a slow thinker, and I do not think I did the wrong thing by reflecting long and carefully. It is not only Pervomayskoye that matters. The elections in Chechnya, for example, gave me a very strong jolt. This travesty was staged by the state authority; there is nothing worse than this.

[Leontyev] What are you going to do now in addition to being a deputy? Or will it take up all your working time?

[Kovalev] Although it will take a very big part of it, I hope it will not take all of it. I am dreaming about working to organize several independent public structures dealing with civil and human rights matters. I think there is an urgent need for that at this stage, and this is a much more promising road than to create state-run human rights bodies. In my view, the latter are doomed to hypocrisy, rather than to independent existence. Such is the political situation in the country that has taken shape lately. This marks the ruin of my many efforts, and I clearly realize this.

[Leontyev] In this case, could your current state be described as "internal immigration" of sorts?

[Kovalev] No, not at all; this is a rather active state; as I was saying, this is not retiring on pension; this is a gong for yet another round.

Latsis Backs Yeltsin Reelection Despite Resigning

LD2501224596 Moscow Russian Public Television First Channel Network in Russian
1700 GMT 25 Jan 96

[FBIS Summary] In the "One-to-One" program presented by Aleksandr Lyubimov, Otto Latsis, IZVESTIYA columnist and former member of the Presidential Council who resigned on 21 January 1996, and Leonid Smirnyagin, member of the Presidential Council, Moscow University lecturer, and employee of the Analytical Department under the president, face each other in a 41-minute live studio discussion.

Explaining his decision to leave the council, Latsis says: "I left because I could not calmly watch what your colleagues were showing from Pervomayskoye and realize that I had any relation, albeit an indirect one, to all that. As a member of the Presidential Council, I regarded myself as being silently involved in that." Later he adds: "I left because they did not spare people's lives. That is all. Because one cannot punish terrorists by killing hostages."

Speaking about the role of the council in general, Latsis says: "The Presidential Council is not an organization whose members can go to the president to give their advice. They go when the president asks them to come. And he has not asked us to come for a long time now."

He continued: "By my action, I am trying to explain to the president that, by some of his actions, he is destroying his cause and opening the way for Zyuganov. I do not want Yeltsin to lose the elections, if he decides to run."

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The presenter asks: "Who is the president listening to? Who advises him?"

Latsis replies: "It is well known who are the closest to him. First of all, there are his aides and the chief aide among them. By their position they perhaps should be the closest to him. Viktor Ilyushin is the most senior: all papers go through him. Also, from the president's book we know that he has a friend, General Korzhakov, who is a close friend, moreover, he is in charge of the president's bodyguards. That is well known and a lot has been said and written about that."

Smirnyagin says: "There are several circles around the president. And the closest of them is, of course, his aides. In general, a narrow circle of people have access to personal contact with the president. The aides have this access, above all. Therefore their influence could be measured by the frequency of their meetings with the president."

Latsis adds: "During my three years in the Presidential Council, I was in the same office or in the same room as the president but I never had a conversation with him tete-a-tete. For the members of the Presidential Council that is out of reach. But in a group of six or — there are 28 of us in all but we rarely meet in full — in a group of six, ten or twenty people we have met about 20 times in the last three years. I mention that in order for you to understand to what extent we were able to give our advice."

In his turn, Smirnyagin says: "What amazes me in the presidential entourage is the fact that at least several people there are most untypical of the powers-that-be in general. I cannot imagine people of this kind in Brezhnev's entourage, for example. I cannot imagine people like Georgiy Satarov or Aleksandr Livshits so close to the president, to the head of state. Honestly, that is something almost abnormal... I am an American specialist and I cannot imagine such people in the White House, for example. High officials, experienced and sophisticated courtiers, are expected to occupy these posts. And these people are not like that at all."

Both Smirnyagin and even Latsis, despite his resignation from the Presidential Council, say they would vote for Yeltsin in the presidential elections in June, if he decides to run.

Smirnyagin says that Yeltsin was still in charge in Russia and that he had not exhausted his potential yet. He says: "He has several very important advantages which his opponents do not have. In my view, he has preserved his position and remains above the fray. Compare him with any other candidate. They all belong to various parties or groups. He has preserved his position as a nationwide leader. And this is a very winning position.

"Next, he is a man of action. He can be accused of getting some things wrong but, at least, he has been doing things and he has done a lot. And this is important."

Replying to a question from the audience, Smirnyagin says: "President Yeltsin is a special type of president. His team consists of several groups. These are not just people who hold the same views or a united team of like-minded people and everyone who thinks differently is persecuted. He has many, at least several, groups. Some of these groups are arguing with each other a lot. And that is of a certain advantage for the president. From the purely tactical point of view, he is a uniting link in this pyramid and without him it will fall apart. And, also, he has a spectrum of opinions."

Russia: Cabinet Discusses Oil Industry, Federal Programs

MM2501203196 Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA Weekend Edition in Russian 26 Jan 96 p 3

[Report by Vladimir Kucherenko under the "In the Russian Federation Government" rubric: "There Should Be Fewer Programs. About One-Tenth As Many"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Having definitively approved the federal "Fuel and Energy" program at yesterday's Russian Federation Government sitting, the ministers wondered how they might reduce the number of documents like it.

According to Fuel and Energy Minister Yu. Shafranik, his sector has reached a dangerous watershed. If we continue to use the fuel and energy complex in 1996 without putting anything back into it, the following year may see the beginning of an energy crisis. The previous program bearing the same name for 1993-1995 was carried out lop-sidedly: The sector provided the country with raw materials and currency according to plan, but only received about one-half of the investments (29 percent in 1995).

The situation is precarious: Equipment obsolescence has reached 80 percent in oil extraction and one-half at electric power stations, and one-third of gas and oil pipelines literally have holes in them.

In accordance with the new program, which is planned to run from 1996 to 2000, a whole range of measures is envisaged — energy saving measures, innovations, state regulation. However, it requires a great deal of money: 702 trillion rubles, including 100 trillion this year.

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Only 796 billion will be supplied for the program by the federal budget. The rest of the money is supposed to come from the regions, the fuel and energy complex enterprises themselves, and amortization payments. The inclusion of investment expenditure in electric power stations' tariffs is envisaged in particular. According to the assurances made by the Ministry of Fuel and Energy and the Ministry of the Economy, this will raise the tariffs by 13-14 percent at the most.

However, what can you do — there is not enough money in the budget. In order to save the fuel and energy complex, it will be necessary to reduce the number of construction projects in other programs that are funded from the Federation treasury.

Listing the federal programs which the central government will have to make provision for in 1996, Economics Minister Ye. Yasin advised: There are too many of them. The majority of them are indisputably justified, but the only problem is that there is not much money in the treasury. Ideally there should be about 10 of them at the most, but there are actually 49, all funded by the country's budget. If you count those which have been ratified but are not being funded, and those which are being elaborated on the instructions of the cabinet and the president, then you get 186 in all. For which a minimum of 130-150 trillion is required every year. So it works out that the state is scattering funds around and cannot concentrate them in several "break-through" spheres.

Vice Premier O. Soskovets, who chaired the session, noted the complete lack of control over the expenditure of funds for federal programs and the delay in establishing order here for three whole years. A revision of the number of programs has been postponed until February, when the results of last year will be summed up and a forecast for the medium term will be put together. However, a basic principle was approved: Every program must be funded only by its state client. So that other people's money is not wasted again.

Media Issues

Russian TV Producer Murdered in Moscow

LD2601110796 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1101 GMT 26 Jan 96

[By Larisa Kislinskaya]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] MOSCOW January 26 (ITAR-TASS) — A producer of a popular TV programme was shot dead late on Tuesday in his apartment by two unknown gunmen.

Police told Tass on Friday that Oleg Slabynko, 34, the producer of the "Moment of Truth" programme, which is a frank and open dialogue with outstanding personalities, was killed by the gunmen who he, evidently, was acquainted with.

The gunmen knocked on the door of his apartment at 23:00 hours on Thursday. Slabynko let them in and they shot him dead.

Police found four cartridge shells from, presumably, a Makarov pistol on the site of the murder.

The search for the killers is underway, police said.

Military Issues

Yeltsin Names Kokoshin Defense Secretary of State

LD2601094696 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 0930 GMT 26 Jan 96

[By Anatoliy Yurkin]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] MOSCOW, January 26 (ITAR-TASS) — President Boris Yeltsin signed Thursday [25 January] a Decree to appoint Andrey Kokoshin to the post of Secretary of State-First Deputy Defence Minister of the Russian Federation. ITAR-TASS was told today at the Russian Defence Ministry that the appointment of Kokoshin, who previously held the post of First Deputy Defence Minister, gave him broader leeway for doing business with legislative bodies. For instance, he will maintain contacts with the State Duma and the Federation Council on cardinal problems of military development.

Aware of Kokoshin's rich experience in military science and defence industry, experts of the Defence Ministry hope that the military budget will now be more scientifically corroborated, which will facilitate its discussion and adoption in the Parliament. The Secretary of State and his apparatus are expected to focus attention on the principal and perspective areas of the development of military technology, and on the coordination of military-technological cooperation with other countries.

Kokoshin's new duty, experts note, is an important element in the reformation of the military establishment's upper echelons. Russia is beginning to draw on the experience of other countries, where connecting links of Defence Ministries are staffed by civilians, whose job is to actively work with the law-makers and the military industry.

The Press Service of the Russian President released a statement today in connection with Kokoshin's appointment to the post of Secretary of State-First Deputy Defence Minister of the Russian Federation, saying: "The opening of such jobs, earlier introduced in other ministries and agencies, presupposed, in particular, the

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promotion of interaction with the Federal Assembly. Kokoshin, who was First Deputy Defence Minister of the Russian Federation, had previously discharged much these duties, too."

Federal Assembly

Russian Duma Chairman Seleznev Profiled

964F0863A Moscow ARGUMENTY I FAKTY in Russian Jan 96 No 4, p 2

[Article by Andrey Uglanov: "Speaker of the State Duma"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The Communist Gennadiy Seleznev has become one of the top officials of Russia—chairman of the State Duma. Many democrats see this fact as a tragedy, virtually, and the beginning of the end of reform of the political system. The president also has expressed clear dissatisfaction at his election.

At first sight those who consider themselves reformers really do have something to think about. Take if only his biography. After Army service, Communist Youth League work. After graduation from Leningrad University, a rapid career in party press organs (we would recall that at that time ALL newspapers were either party organs or under the strictest supervision of the CPSU Central Committee and Comrade Zamyatin personally). Up to 1980 he was the editor of the Leningrad youth paper SMENA, which in the perestroyka times became a spokesman for the democratic movement. Up to 1988 he was chief editor of KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA. And there is hardly any need for reminders about this newspaper's role in Russia's advancement along the path leading to democracy. Up to August 1991 G. Seleznev was chief editor of UCHITELSKAYA GAZETA.

And then came August 1991 and the putsch. M. Gorbachev "threw" G. Seleznev into the position of chief editor of PRAVDA. Gorbachev's choice was not fortuitous. PRAVDA, which had by that time become the spokesman for the leaders of orthodox communism, I. Polozkov, in particular, needed, in the general secretary's opinion, a person who was to have given the paper a new focus. How far Seleznev succeeded here, it is hard to say—the PRAVDA work force had taken shape over decades. But it is a fact that the paper did not sink to the level of a primitive rejection of the Russian reforms. But it also remains a fact that the cohesive PRAVDA collective influenced the chief editor also. He was elected secretary of the Communist Party of the Russian Federation Central Committee. But was he here a Communist capable of stopping the mouths of the press and pulling people back, to wage-leveling, and of "banning and barring"? Most likely not.

A member of our editorial staff was a regular attendee in the times of Brezhnev, Andropov, Chernenko, and Gorbachev at showdowns in the CPSU Central Committee. It was standard practice for the editors of all newspapers to be taught what's what and to be flogged mercilessly for the least free-thinking. So, then, one of the few who dared to contradict Comrade Zamyatin, secretary of the CPSU Central Committee for ideology, was G. Seleznev. He did not, as a rule, remain silent in response to the obvious absurdities of the party leaders. The newspapers with such editors were interesting and had big circulations.

Does the president know all these in's and out's of G. Seleznev? Hardly. Nonetheless, he should, in our view, find a way of getting closer to him in order to avoid a new president-speaker opposition, tragic for Russia, arising.

G. Seleznev also surely has some character traits and habits through use of which such a partnership could be achieved. We might suggest that Gennadiy Nikolayevich likes coffee and cigarettes and, as a true Russian, is a good judge of liquor.

Two More Appointed to Russian Federation Council 'Working Group'

MM2501140096 Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 25 Jan 96 p 4

[Russian Federation president's directive No. 22, signed by Russian Federation President Boris Yeltsin and dated 17 January 1996]

[FBIS Translated Text] Further to the Russian Federation president's directive No. 10 of 6 January 1996, I.M. Shabanov, chairman of Voronezh Oblast Duma, and V.A. Maltsev, chairman of Tomsk Oblast Duma, are hereby added to the composition of the working group.

[Signed] Russian Federation President Boris Yeltsin
[Dated] 17 January 1996

Russia: Communists in No Hurry To Back Yabloko Group

LD2501194196 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1458 GMT 25 Jan 96

[By Ivan Novikov]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] MOSCOW January 25 (Itar-Tass) — Communists at the State Duma (Russian parliament lower house) are in no hurry to back the Yabloko group, insisting on passing a no-confidence vote in the government for actions of federal authorities during the operation on freeing hostages in the Dagestani

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city of Kizlyar and village of Pervomayskoye, Anatoliy Lukyanov, chairman of the Duma Committee on Legislation and Judicial Reform, told Itar- Tass here on Thursday.

Lukyanov expressed doubt that Grigoriy Yavlinskiy's group will collect 90 signatures, necessary for debating a no-confidence motion in Viktor Chernomyrdin's cabinet at the Duma.

"Even if all signatures are collected, it is necessary to think whether an object for criticism by the opposition should be removed now, at a time of preparations for the presidential elections," he noted.

Stressing that he expresses his personal point of view and not the opinion of all Communists at the Duma, Lukyanov emphasised that even if all signatures are collected, the Communist group will discuss whether it is necessary to support the no-confidence motion and intimated that this will not evidently happen.

It will be remembered that the Yabloko group collected slightly over 50 per cent from the necessary number of deputies under its no-confidence motion in the government.

Leftists Dominate Russian Duma, Key Economic Committees

MK2601113896 Moscow KOMMERSANT-DAILY in Russian 25 Jan 96 p 2

[Report by Boris Boyko: "Onward, Communists!"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The State Duma's future economic policy is beginning to shape up. Chairmen and deputy chairmen of key economic committees have been chosen. Furthermore, yesterday first indications emerged about the preliminary composition of these committees. Even now it can be predicted that the majority in them will belong to representatives of the parliament's left wing: Pending economic bills will aslo have a corresponding orientation.

It is certainly very important who chairs the Duma's key economic committees. It will be recalled that the posts of chairmen were distributed as follows. Like before, the Budget Committee is headed by Mikhail Zadornov (Yabloko), the Industry Committee by Vladimir Gusev (LDPR [Liberal Democratic Party of Russia]), the Labor and Social Policy Committee by Sergey Kalashnikov (LDPR), the Agrarian Committee by Aleksey Chernyshev (the Agrarian group), the Economic Policy Committee by former USSR State Planning Committee chairman Yuiry Maslyukov (CPRF [Communist Party of the Russian Federation]), and the Property, Privatization, and Economic Activity Committee by Pavel Bunich, former deputy chairman of the same committee (NDR [Russia Is Our Home]).

The positions of deputy chairmen of economic committees are equally important. In the process of their approval, which took place on Tuesday [23 January], the Duma followed a very simple guideline. Deputy committee chairmen — between four and five in each committee — are selected in such a way that the leadership of each committee should effectively represent the Duma's entire political spectrum; that is to say, if the chairman belongs to one factiôn or group, his deputies represent other political associations.

The composition of the budget committee is noteworthy. Three newly elected deputy chairmen — Aleksey Golovkov (NDR), Aleksandr Zhukov ("Russian Regions"), and Gennadiy Kulik (the Agrarian group) — worked quite successfully in the Fifth Duma's Budget Committee, and Gennadiy Kulik even occupied the same position. CPRF deputy Yuriy Voronin, who has now joined them, headed the Budget Committee of the former Supreme Soviet, and was then deputy chairman of the Russian Federation Supreme Soviet. Another deputy is Mikhail Kuznetsov, an LDPR representative.

What is probably the most important thing, however, is who will be rank and file committee members. After all, decisions will be made by a common vote procedure, and both the chairman and his deputies will have only one vote each. Yesterday first information emerged about the possible composition of the committees, namely the deputies' wishes to join a particular committee (the committees' capacity is limited and ranges from 12 to 35 deputies). CPRF deputies are showing the highest activity. Of the eight deputies who have signed up for the privatization committee, six represent the CPRF, and one belongs to the People's Power group, affiliated with it. Amor„ the eight deputies who have given their preference to the Economic Policy Committee, five represent the CPRF, and one, People's Power. Seven of the eight deputies in the Labor Committee are CPRF members. Ten from the Industry Committee's list of 15 are from the CPRF, and three, from People's Power. The only exception is the Budget Committee. Of the enrolled 26, only seven belong to the CPRF, and three, to People's Power. It is noteworthy that neither NDR nor the LDPR have so far submitted their committee candidate lists.

Although the final committee lists are to be approved only on 31 January, even now it is clear that leftist factions will dominate there. It is also clear what kind of legislation will be adopted by the new Duma. The procedure can be very simple. The committees will prepare drafts suiting the leftists, and State Duma

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plenary sessions will support them. The fact is that the Communist faction (149 deputies) and Nikolay Ryzhkov's and Sergey Baburin's People's Power group (37 deputies), provided they are joined by the Agrarian group (35) and some of the 16 remaining independent candidates or part of the LDPR, are quite capable of garnering the requisite 226 votes to pass any decision.

It should be noted, however, that there is one thing the left wing cannot do: easily override a presidential veto (two-thirds — 300 — of the deputies' votes are needed for that). Therefore, the legislative and the executive branches will have to look for compromises in any event.

Russia: DVR Leader Rues Democratic Split in State Duma

MK2601074396 Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA in Russian 25 Jan 96 p 2

[Report by Grigoriy Nekhoroshev: "Democrats Continue to Quarrel. They Are Impaired by Excessive Ambitions and Lured by High Positions"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Division within the ranks of radical democrats continues unabated in the new State Duma. During the election period the Russia's Democratic Choice [DVR] movement split into six election blocs, with none of them clearing the 5-percent threshold. After the elections, deputy Sergey Yushenkov, a DVR leader, tried to unite democratically-minded deputies into a liberal-democratic-oriented group. The attempt failed.

"All recent attempts to unite democrats have been reduced to satisfying the personal ambitions of individual leaders. This time, in their chase for portfolios, democrats even teamed up with the Communists," Sergey Yushenkov told NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA's analyst. He leveled this charge personally against Ella Pamfilova, Irina Khakamada, Vladimir Lysenko, and Pavel Medvedev. All four joined Russian Regions, a motley group headed by deputy Artur Chilingarov. Mr. Chilingarov has an established reputation as a second-echelon legislative branch figure unsinkable under any regime. He was very close to Ruslan Khasbulatov; then he became an associate of Ivan Rybkin, and today he can often be spotted in Gennadiy Seleznev's office. Many deputies believe that Chilingarov created the Russian Regions group in order to occupy the position of Duma deputy speaker.

Relying on Chilingarov's abilities in backstage horse-trading, such diverse people as General Boris Gromov and radical economist Irina Khakamada, former General Prosecutor Valentin Stepankov and "people's" investigator Telman Gdlyan have rallied around him. As a result, Chilingarov became deputy speaker in the Duma, whereas the deputies from his group were invited to form a committee on affairs of the North. The group urgently called a news conference to state that the deputies' intellectual potential and experience of work in state agencies was being unclaimed.

"In the final analysis, they were simply used. It was this group which helped start the Communists' triumphant march in the State Duma," Sergey Yushenkov said commenting on the event. He is disappointed with his former allies; he does not refer to them other than as "so-called democrats." He believes that there are only 13 convinced supporters of an anti-Communist line in the Duma today. According to him, the creation of a full-fledged deputies' group around them is possible but for now unlikely.

Russia: Change to Deputies' Pension Law Rejected

MM2601113496 Moscow ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI in Russian 26 Jan 96 p 1

[Unattributed report: "Deputies Wanted Special Pension Conditions"]

[FBIS Translated Text] In accordance with part 3 of article 107 of the Russian Federation Constitution the Russian Federation president yesterday rejected the federal law "on the introduction of changes to article 30 of the federal law 'on the status of the Federation Council deputy and the status of the Russian Federation Federal Assembly State Duma deputy.'"

The change submitted for article 30 of the Federal law "on the status of the Federation Council deputy and the status of the Russian Federation Federal Assembly State Duma deputy" provides for pensions for a Federation Council deputy and State Duma deputy on terms established for members of the Russian Federation Government. The Russian Federation president believes that there is no need to make such a change since Russian Federation legislation does not provide for a special procedure for pensions for members of the Russian Federation Government, whose pensions are set on a common basis in accordance with the RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] law on state pensions in the RSFSR."

Economic Issues

Russia: Chernomyrdin-Gore Commission To Speed Up Land Reform

LD2501154096 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1535 GMT 25 Jan 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] MOSCOW, Jan 25 (INTERFAX) — Russian Deputy Prime Minister Aleksandr Zaveryukha is confident that the outcome of a session by

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the agrarian committee of the Chernomyrdin-Gore commission will help widen cooperation with the United States in the area of farm production and speed up Russia's agrarian reform, Zaveryukha told INTERFAX on Thursday [25 January] before his flight to Washington, the venue of joint committee meetings due on Friday. The commission itself meets in a two-day session on January 29.

The deputy prime minister said the session would open up big opportunities for further cooperation in the process of reform and privatization in Russia's agro-industrial complex and its breakthrough into the world market, as well as in the manufacture of farm equipment and machinery.

Zaveryukha said the Russian farming sector's shift to market relations raised some interest in the United States for cooperation in the area of farm production, but this "has so far been a one-way traffic" aimed at increasing U.S. farm exports to Russia. However, he said, what Russia needs more is foreign investment into its agriculture as well as advanced machinery and equipment to help raise work efficiency and make Russian farm producers more competitive.

The two sides are cooperating in as many as 12 different areas, but Russia wants two others in addition: the development of information systems in the sector and personnel training. Machinery and equipment is returned, which will disrupt the transfer schedule, Kolpakov said.

A major task today is to organize repair works for the purpose of restoring the technical readiness of these ships, he said.

According to Kolpakov, despite all these difficulties, more than 50 percent of the ships received from the Black Sea Fleet will be put into commission by the end of this year, if the funds for this are obtained.

The Black Sea Fleet of the former USSR included 840 ships of different types. Under bilateral agreements it was divided on the fifty-fifty basis. In fact Ukraine will receive only 18.3 percent, because some of the ships will go to Russia to cover Ukraine's debt to it.

Last summer Ukraine's Navy had about 80 ships of different classes.

As INTERFAX-UKRAINE learned from the press center of Ukraine's Navy, when the transfer of ships is concluded, Ukraine's Navy will have 170 vessels. At present 18 vessels are being transferred in Novoozernyy (Donuzlav).

Russia: News Conference on RD-180 Engine Sale to U.S. Reported

MK2501150296 Moscow KOMMERSANT-DAILY in Russian 25 Jan 96 p 9

[Report by Yevgeniy Ostapov: "Russian Rocket Engines in the United States. Earthbound Passions Move Into Outer Space"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Yesterday, a news conference was held at the Russian Space Agency on the results of the tender for the supply of rocket engines held by the American Lockheed Martin Astronautics [preceding three words in English]. The choice was made in favor of the Russian RD-180 engine, developed by the Research and Production Association "Energomash". Remarkably, locked in competition in the final stage of the tender were two Russian companies: "Energomash" and "Dvigateli NK." [passage omitted]

"Energomash" General Director Boris Katorgin stated in assessing the prospects of RD-180 shipments to the United States that "this will benefit Russia, "Energomash," and Pratt & Whitney [preceding three words in English]." The program is to go on for at least 20 years. About 100 RD-180 engines will be shipped to the United States during this time. They will be produced in Russia to earn it about $1 billion. The RD-180 has been developed on the basis of the RD-170, which is in use on the Russian "Energiya" and "Zenit" rockets. Boris Katorgin also gave free rein to his imagination stating that, if things in this area should move well, the four "Energomash" branches may become supplemented by a fifth, based in the United States. Until then, "Energomash" together with Pratt & Whitney will be taking care of production (in Russia) and marketing (in the United States) of RD-180 and other rocket engines.

According to Yuriy Koptev [Russian Space Agency general director], he understands the disappointment of "Dvigateli NK," which expected to sell about 70 of its NK-33 engines in the United States with support from Aerojet [preceding word in English], in which event, however, Russia would have lost between 6,000 and 8,000 jobs while the bulk of the money earned from this deal would have remained in the United States. This swung the Russian Space Agency's support to "Energomash" although "Dvigateli NK" also has sponsors in Russian power structures, and discussions on possibilities to sell their engines in the United States are still in progress.

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Russia: Yeltsin Aide: 'Too Early' To Know Kadannikov's Policy

LD2501142196 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1409 GMT 25 Jan 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] MOSCOW, January 25 (ITAR-TASS) — Whether Russia's economic course will change with the appointment of Vladimir Kadannikov as first deputy prime minister is too early to say, Russian presidential economics aide Aleksandr Livshits told ITAR-TASS today.

Kadannikov takes over the key economic post in the government from Anatoliy Chubays, who has been recently dumped by President Yeltsin on the grounds that his economic policies accounted for the massive showing for communists in the recent legislative elections.

"Statements and actual steps of the new deputy prime minister, who is in charge of the economy, will be decisive," Livshits said.

He stressed that "the general economic strategy of Russia has been set by the president, and the tactics have been worked out by the government".

Livshits cited as Russia's "known and understood" key economic priorities the execution of the federal budget with a focus on the revenues section, enactment of presidential decrees on regular payment of wage to budget-dependent sectors and successful negotiations with the International Monetary Fund on the loan for Russia.

"There mustn't be any sharp movements and statements now. Any of them threatens with a collapse of markets, with which no deputy prime premier will cope," Livshits said.

Russia: Wage, Pension Increase Seen as Election Ploy

MM2501171896 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 25 Jan 96 p 1

[Commentary by Dmitriy Dokuchayev: "Duma Increasing Wages and Pensions. Expect Increase in Prices"]

[FBIS Translated Text] After appointing its leaders and distributing all its portfolios, the first non-staff-related question dealt with by the Duma was the examination of the draft law on increasing the minimum wage and pension by 20 percent from 1 February to 75,900 rubles [R].

This move, involving an unjustified increase in the minimum wage and pension, has been a tradition for our country's supreme legislative organ since the days of Khasbulatov's Supreme Soviet. However, since then people have firmly grasped that the main consequence of such humane resolutions is an immediate increase in store prices and irreversible inflationary spiral. As far as the promised money is concerned, it is paid with a considerable delay, thereby increasing the already great social tension. There is probably no need to explain for whom such a scenario is advantageous on the eve of the presidential elections.

Behind the examination of the draft law was Sergey Kalashnikov (LDPR [Liberal Democratic Party of Russia] faction), chairman of the State Duma committee for Labor and Social Support. This is what he said to IZVESTIYA on this matter.

"This question was raised because according to the law, pensions should be indexed and wages increased every three months. As the previous indexation took place 1 November, the government should have prepared the appropriate draft law by the Duma's first session so that we would have time to study and adopt it by 1 February. The government did not do this and I was personally forced to submit the draft law in which the minimum pension is increased to R75,900. As yet the law has only been adopted in its first reading. I have no doubt that it will be adopted in its entirety 31 January as 16 June (the date of the presidential elections) is hanging over everybody and the contest as to who gives the most will inevitably begin."

Sergey Kalashnikov's main opponent at the State Duma's plenary session was Mikhail Zadornov ("Yabloko" faction), chairman of the State Duma Budget Committee.

"I am not opposed to indexation as such," he said in an interview to IZVESTIYA. "But there are three reasons why I came out categorically against this decision today.

First. According to Duma standing orders, any draft law concerning a change in the size of wages or pensions requires preliminary findings to be submitted by the government and Pension Fund. We were making a decision without them. Through this, the Duma showed disregard for its own standing orders from literally its first decision. How can we hope to gain the people's respect if we do not respect ourselves, our own rules?

Second. We should also wait for the government's findings because such findings signal a simultaneous coordination of the very mechanism for implementing the law and a search for sources of funding for it. Otherwise the decision will have no substance and will signal that the people have been tricked purely and simply.

Third. There may also be a great disparity between the wage which has been set and that which is actually paid out. We will put the Federation components in a

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difficult position as two-thirds of expenditure on wages is met by their budgets. But I know that they are in a very bad way, especially in the regions receiving subsidies (which accounts for more than 50 oblasts). There are territories where wages have been held back since before September. People are expecting the Duma to first of all pay off these debts and not create new ones.

Sergey Kalashnikov insisted at the plenary session that his draft law should be adopted in its entirety in accordance with the practice that developed in the previous Duma. However, Mikhail Zadornov's arguments were also heeded and the draft law has so far been adopted in its first reading.

For all the great differences in their standpoints, both Sergey Kalashnikov and Mikhail Zadornov concur on one thing: It is now the government's move — it has a week to submit appropriate proposals to the Duma. According to a Ministry of Labor administration chief, Yuriy Ryabinin, there is at present an intensive process in train to get the Federation components to coordinate the possible versions, as the resolution of the question of increasing the minimal wage will affect them the most. As yet the majority of administration heads have said that they support the decision but do not have the money to implement it.

So the Duma has started off with decisions that do not really accord with its standing orders and are ill thought out with regard to the budget. Sergey Kalashnikov does not accept that they are populist in nature, claiming that the law on this year's budget, which had been adopted earlier by the Duma, does not set specific percentages for indexation broken down into quarters. He does, however, recognize that if the minimum pension and wage is increased by 20 percent each quarter, all budget expenditure will very quickly soar.

Mikhail Zadornov asserts that in general, according to the Law on the 1996 Budget, the first indexation should take place only from 1 April based on the figures for the quarter.

As concerns the actual figure of 20 percent, it raises serious doubts, as official inflation figures for the past three months (including the preliminary figures for January) have hardly exceeded 15 percent.

The Committee for Labor and Social Support calculates that the draft law adopted in its first reading 23 January will "cost" more than R1 trillion a month, of which R300 billion will come from the federal budget and the rest from local budgets. But the question as to where to get these considerable sums has not yet been resolved.

Russia: Government Issues Decree To Support Exporters

MK2601123996 Moscow SEGODNYA in Russian 26 Jan 96 p 2

[Report by Ivan Remizov: "The Government Is Giving Additional Privileges to Exporters. The Federal Program for the Development of Exports Has Been Drawn Up in the Form of a Decree"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The Russian Federation Government has adopted a decree "On Additional Support of National Exports of Commodities and Services." It envisions a number of measures to stimulate exports, to support high-tech export-oriented projects, and to create an up-to-date system of export crediting and insurance. It is proposed that state financial support of exported goods and services of Russian commodity producers will be effected using federal budgetary funds "on a returnable and paid basis."

According to the document, state support will be mainly provided by giving state guarantees against a pledge for export-oriented enterprises and by guaranteeing and insuring export credits to protect exporters from long-term commercial and political risks. As a guarantee obligation, the Finance Ministry will furnish a financial pledge on the security of the credits attracted. In accordance with the decree, beginning in 1996, funds for these purposes will be provided for in the federal budget. Machine-building enterprises producing exported goods will be able to receive short-term financial support from the federal budget as early as this year (during the current fiscal year). This support can be provided on a returnable basis, with interest paid at a rate of 50 percent of the Central Bank's discount rate. The decree also envisions granting export-oriented enterprises a number of customs and tax privileges.

This governmental decree cannot be regarded as a great surprise. As recently as a month ago, at a government meeting, a federal program for the development of exports, worked out by the Foreign Economic Relations Ministry, was presented. That time, however, the program was turned down since, as the prime minister put it, "the financial questions have not been elaborated." Now, the concepts of the program have been drawn up as a decree. As is known, some 500 billion rubles have been allocated for credits to exporters in the 1996 budget, and it is these funds that will be probably used to support exporters.

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Russia: Edict Allows Deferred Payment of Back Taxes

MM2501144296 Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 25 Jan 96 p 4

[Russian Federation Presidential Edict No. 65, signed by President Yeltsin and dated 19 January 1996: "On the Granting to Enterprises and Organizations of a Deferment of Payment of the Amounts Owed Prior to 1 January 1996 in Respect of Taxes, Fines, and Penalties for Violations of Tax Legislation"]

[FBIS Translated Text] With a view to improving the financial position of enterprises and organizations and strengthening payment discipline for current tax payments to budgets at various levels, I decree that:

1. It shall be laid down that enterprises and organizations which pay their current tax payments (excluding payments levied by customs organs) in full and on time and which owe money prior to 1 January 1996 on taxes, fines, and penalties for violations of tax legislation (hereinafter, the debt), shall be granted a deferment on payment under the procedure envisaged in this edict.

2. In order to obtain the deferment on paying the debt, enterprises and organizations shall submit to financial organs and Russian State Tax Service organs by 15 March 1996 a deferment application stating the reasons why the debt cannot be repaid within the time laid down by current legislation. Along with the application, enterprises and organizations shall submit a form from a tax organ showing the total size of the debt owed prior to 1 January 1996, indicating the size of the amounts owed to budgets at various levels.

3. Decisions on the granting to enterprises and organizations of a deferment on the payment of the debt or a refusal to grant such a deferment shall be made by financial organs within 15 days of the submission of the application. Different decisions may not be made for the amounts owed to budgets at various levels. The decisions on the granting of the deferment shall be submitted by enterprises and organizations to the appropriate tax organ in order to ensure oversight of the timely and full remission [vneseniye] of deferred payments.

4. Enterprises and organizations which have been granted a deferment of the payment of the debt owed prior to 1 January 1996 shall remit 50 percent of the total debt in the period from 1 April 1996 through 1 October 1998 in tranches of 5 percent of the total debt per quarter, the sums payable to include a penalty charge of 30 percent a year beginning 1 January 1996.

Enterprise and organization deferred payments shall be distributed among budgets at various levels in proportion to their share of the enterprise and organization debt.

5. In the event of enterprises or organizations failing to pay their current tax payments on time or in full — including payments to the Russian Federation Pension Fund — as well as in the event of violations by enterprises or organizations of the procedure for remitting deferred payments envisaged by this edict, the decision adopted in accordance with this edict to grant a debt-payment deferment to the enterprise or organization in question shall be rescinded by the financial organ which made it, following a submission from the appropriate tax organ.

Under the established procedure fines shall be levied on the full amount left unpaid by the enterprise or organization at the time the deferment decision is rescinded, beginning 1 January 1996.

6. In the event of enterprises and organizations meeting their commitments to remit their current tax payments and their deferred payments in full and on time in the period between 1 January 1996 through 1 October 1998, the appropriate financial organ, upon application from an enterprise or organization certified by the corresponding tax organ, shall make a decision on granting a deferment of the remaining 50 percent of the total debt over the next five years in equal tranches of 2.5 percent per quarter without levying any fines.

7. Monitoring of the implementation if this edict shall be entrusted to the Russian Federation president's Oversight Administration.

8. This edict comes into force from the date of its official publication.

[Signed] Russian Federation President B. Yeltsin
[Dated] Moscow, the Kremlin
19 January 1996
No. 65

Russia: Kaliningrad Shipyard Produces Carrier for Estonia

MM2501204796 Moscow Russian Television Network in Russian 0800 GMT 22 Jan 96

[From the "Vesti" newscast: Video report from Kaliningrad's Yantar shipyard by G. Sablin, identified by caption]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Sablin over video of new ship] On the eve of the 300th anniversary of the Russian Navy the government drew up a program entitled "Russian Shipyards." The aim of the program is to revive Russian shipbuilding traditions. I have been told by the management of the Yantar Baltic shipyard that

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documents are currently being drawn up to ensure the inclusion of this shipyard in the aforementioned Russian program. This program would not only help the Yantar shipyard to replenish its coffers, it could also act as a guarantee for obtaining credit from Russian and foreign banks.

Aware that the absence of military orders spells ruin for the shipyard, the management has been actively seeking to obtain orders for merchant ships.

This bulk carrier, for example, is the first of a series of ships ordered by the Estonian Maritime Shipping Company. The shipyard workers wish the ship safe sailing and extend their gratitude to small Estonia. Judging by the funding for military orders, big Russia has completely forgotten that Kaliningrad shipbuilders know how to build super-modern ships. [video shows ship about to be launched, interior of Yantar shipyard, partial views of other ships, including warships]

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International Affairs

OSCE Official Calls For International Aid for Ukraine

LD2501184096 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1443 GMT 25 Jan 96

[By Raisa Stetsura]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] KIEV, January 25 (Itar-Tass) — OSCE [Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe] high commissioner for affairs of national minorities Max Van der Stoel said at a meeting with Ukrainian Vice-Premier Ivan Kuras in Kiev today that without international assistance Ukraine would be unable to resolve the problem of the accommodation of deported people. The OSCE high commissioner arrived in Ukraine on a four-day official visit to study the situation in Crimea.

The commissioner said that he had contacted OSCE governments asking them to provide financial assistance to Ukraine for the accommodation of the deported people on the territory of Crimea. The commissioner believes that the forthcoming meeting of donor countries due to be held in Switzerland soon under the UN auspices will considerably help resolve the problem of financing.

According to the Ukrainian vice-Premier, around 250,000 Crimean Tartars have already returned to Crimea. Around 300 trillion karbovanets (over 1,5 billion U.S. dollars) are needed for their accommodation. The Ukrainian vice-premier said that the draft budget for 1996 envisages 4,5 trillion karbovents for these purposes only. Ivan Kuras added that Turkey had already begun housing construction in Crimea and had pledged to provide 100,000 apartments to representatives of national minorities.

Udovenko: Visit to Belgrade 'Opportune'

LD2501205896 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1637 GMT 25 Jan 96

[From the "Diplomatic Panorama" feature]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] BELGRADE, Jan 25 (Interfax - Ukraine) — Ukraine and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia intend to expand bilateral relations in all spheres of life, Ukrainian Foreign Minister Hennadiy Udovenko told journalists in Belgrade Wednesday.

Udovenko heads a Ukrainian state delegation, on an official visit to the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.

"Given the results of the first day of our work we can confidently say that we have been expected; the visit is an opportune one," Udovenko said.

He pointed to the absence of political problems in bilateral relations. "This opens up wide opportunities for the development of scientific-technical and trade-economic cooperation, especially since international sanctions against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia were removed," he said.

Belgrade Backs Kiev's Wish To Take Part in Restoration Work

LD2501205396 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1625 GMT 25 Jan 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Belgrade, January 25 (Interfax - Ukraine) — President Slobodan Milosevic of Serbia and that country's Premier Radoje Kontic have expressed support for Ukraine's wish to participate in restoration work in former Yugoslavia. This was disclosed to newsmen by Ihor Podolev, member of the Ukrainian delegation, Deputy Minister of Foreign Economic Relations and Trade. According to him, "Ukraine has the support of Serbia's two most influential persons". Radoje Kontic declared Serbia's wish to do its utmost so that Ukraine should take the biggest possible part in that process.

I. Podolev said in the course of the meetings today that the sides discussed the idea of a customs union of the Balkan countries and the countries of Central and East Europe. In the opinion of the Deputy Minister, this is designed to speed up exchanges not only of goods, but also of capital.

The deputy Minister noted that in the course of the meeting with President Slobodan Milosevic, prospects were examined in detail of mutual investment activities and mutual penetration of capital. I. Podolev noted that the aim of this effort is not so much the resolution of bilateral economic problems as ensuring for the two countries of the possibility to set up joint ventures and thus become some kind of bridgeheads for the penetration of their commodities into the markets of other countries.

In the opinion of Ihor Podolev, it will be real already in 1996 to increase the volume of trade turnover to reach 300-400 million dollars. This is a hundred times as much as last year, the Deputy Minister noted. Meanwhile, he did not exclude the possibility of reaching within the next two years of a volume of 1500-2000 million dollars, which was declared on Wednesday by Ukraine's Foreign Minister Hennadiy Udovenko. If Ukraine wishes to take a "worthy place in the implementation of the international economic programme for the rehabilitation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the attainment of such a level is quite possible," I. Podolev believes.

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German, Ukrainian Nationalists To Sign 'Friendly Accord'

LD2501203996 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1424 GMT 25 Jan 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Kharkov, January 25 (Interfax - Ukraine) — The national-democratic party of Germany intends to sign "a friendly accord" with the Ukrainian National Assembly (UNA).

This was disclosed at a press-conference in Kharkov Wednesday by Wolfgang Nachrat, head of the executive committee of Germany's ultra rightist national-democratic party.

W. Nachrat visited Ukraine in order to, as he put it, "familiarize himself with real socio-political life in the country."

Answering questions of newsmen, W. Nachrat said that his party's main aim is "to restore Germany's national and cultural standards." He also insisted that he did not recognize the division into East and West Germany. There is West and Central Germany but East Germany is in Poland's territory, he said.

He also noted that he was looking forward to the times when his children and grandchildren "will build, jointly with the Russians, Ukrainians and Baltic peoples, a common border in the east."

W. Nachrat explained that his party is very much concerned over the rapid growth of the population in China, as a result of which, in his view, the Europeans will get under a "biological press."

Germany's National-Democratic Party was founded 30 years ago. Now its it has a membership of five thousand.

Ukraine: Kharkov To Manufacture Turbines for Iranian Nuclear Plant

WS2501142096 Kiev INTELNEWS in English 0018 GMT 25 Jan 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Kiev, Jan. 24 — Kharkov's TurboAtom plant is expected to sign a production contract with Moscow's ZagranAtomEnergoStroy (Nuclear Energy Construction Abroad) for the manufacture of two turbines for an Iranian nuclear power plant in Bushehr.

Sources at TurboAtom say the contract will be signed during first quarter 1996. Original construction of the plant was begun by ZagranAtomEnergoStroy and the German firm of Sieman's during the early 1980s, however, work was halted following the international embargo blocking the sale and development of nuclear technology in Iran. Russia has only recently resumed construction in Bushehr.

National Affairs

Kuchma Visits Zaporizhya, Predicts Economic Improvement

LD2501231496 Kiev Radio Ukraine World Service in English 2200 25 Jan 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Ukraine's President Leonid Kuchma began a working tour of Zaporizhya Region on Thursday, 25 January. Speaking on his arrival at the Zaporizhya airport, Kuchma told journalists that he was convinced that the economic situation in the country had substantially improved. Kuchma pointed out that the population's real income is rising at a faster rate than inflation and that Ukrainian enterprises are beginning normal operation, and that inflation no longer eats up their working capital. Kuchma described 1996 as a crucial moment for the Ukrainian economy and added that the economic situation in the country should begin to improve this year.

Kuchma visited the settlement of Tepnogorsk where he met senior officials of Vasiliyev district. He also visitid Tavrichesk mining and ore-dressing plant which had been earmarked for closure. Kuchma promised government's assistance to the district's 7,000 residents who would lose their jobs as a result of the the plant's closure.

The Ukrainian president also visited Energodar, where he inspected the Zaporizhya nuclear power plant's sixth reactor and met the plant's senior officials.

Kuchma is accompanied by Deputy Prime Minister Anatoliy Kinakh, senior officials of Ukrainian ministries and departments and by Vyacheslav Pokhvalskyy, head of the Zaporizhya Region [state] administration.

Ukraine: Zaporizhya AES Seen Not Safe

964F0798A Kiev KIYEVSKIYE VEDOMOSTI in Russian 5 Jan 96 p 6

[Article by Vladimir Shunevich, journalist: "Ukraine's State Committee on Atomic Energy Use Does Not Want Zaporizhya To Be a Second Chernobyl. Therefore, It Has Expressed Distrust in the Director of the ZAES"]

[FBIS Translated Text] It is already more than a month since the collegium of Ukraine's State Committee on the Use of Atomic Energy decided by a majority vote to dismiss Vladimir Bronnikov from the position of general director of the Zaporizhya Atomic Electric Power Station [ZAES]. For serious slips in his work. But the last period has not yet been placed on this matter. Petitions and requests by the ZAES collective and influential persons and organizations to suspend the State Committee on Atomic Energy Use decision of 21 November of

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last year are being addressed to the president, prime minister, and chairman of the Supreme Council. As became known through confidential sources, Vladimir Bronnikov will nevertheless be reinstated in his former position. The future of Mikhail Umanets, the manager of the branch, is more obscure for the time being. As before, he is under medical treatment. However, it is said that not very long ago Mikhail Panteleyevich talked on the telephone with the president for almost an hour.

A proposal to discuss the scandalous events with executives of Goskomatom [State Committee on Atomic Energy Use] did not evoke enthusiasm. Not ruling out the fact that both Bronnikov and Umanets had become pawns in somebody's big political game, interviewees flatly rejected the version that Umanets did not oblige Russia because of attachment to the technologies of the Western firm of Westinghouse. As for Bronnikov—he is a normal fellow, but of late the burden has become unbearable for him.

Vladimir Bronnikov is a well-known person not only among atomic scientists. In the first most horrible days of the Chernobyl catastrophe he became the chief engineer of the ChAES [Chernobyl Atomic Electric Power Station] and worked, as they say, in forward positions in the struggle with the raging reactor. In the meantime he did not lose consciousness as a result of inhuman overwork and irradiation. Neither did he sit with arms folded when he headed the Zaporizhya AES, one of the most modern and largest in the world, whose output after the sixth power unit was turned on reached a level of 6 million kilowatts, that is, about 40 percent of the output of all AES's in the republic. In what way did the 53-year-old experienced atomic scientist not please his leaders in the capital? An excursion through the Goskomatom computer network, to which all technical and economic information about the work of the branch and each AES individually flows, led me to some distressing conclusions.

The Zaporizhya AES has been working worse and worse of late. The number of failures of basic equipment has grown significantly, and idle time in repair has increased. As a result of this the country has not received an enormous amount of electric power, which is in short supply. The shocks that have started in the branch, which is the only one that still supports the vital activity of the country, can be called catastrophic.

On 4 December 1995 at 1400 the first power unit of the ZAES was shut down under emergency conditions. The voltage fell in the Ukrainian network, and electric power from the Russian network linked with it surged—in amounts exceeding the capabilities of our electric power transmission lines. In order to prevent the latter burning up, protective automatic equipment kicked in, and the power systems of Ukraine and Russia were disconnected. As a result, Ukraine is putting out significantly less power than it needs, and the frequency in the network during the morning and evening peaks does not drop by one hertz to the last safety line of operation of atomic stations—40 hertz. Below this limit the implacable automatic protection systems, without asking anyone, automatically decrease the power of the atomic reactors by 10 percent. This causes a chain reaction of a further drop in frequency and the complete failure of the power system across the country, with an uncontrollable cutoff of consumers. To put it simply, not only will heavy machines burn out at plants and factories that are still working, but the lights will be turned off in maternity homes and surgical operation facilities.

But this is only one example of all possible kinds of unpleasantness in which, when it comes to numbers, the ZAES has recently become a champion. It is also very alarming that the reasons for the emergence of some defects here still remain unexposed.

It has come down to paradoxes. The sadly well-known and Ukraine's oldest AES—the Chernobyl AES—is equipped with less modern, and consequently, some believe, less reliable equipment. But in the fight for survival its collective has raised itself to such a level of technical policy, labor, and technological discipline that in the overall picture of the condition of the operation of atomic units, the Chernobyl station is now the most reliable AES in Ukraine. But the steady trend of growth of ChP [emergency situations] at the more modern (and consequently, it would seem, more reliable) ZAES arouses alarm.

The general director of the ZAES was repeatedly warned about this. In the course of the last year and a half Vladimir Bronnikov was reprimanded four times, and his bonuses were taken away. But Vladimir Konstantinovich, Goskomatom believes, has not drawn the necessary conclusions. They were made by members of the collegium at a meeting to examine the readiness of Ukraine's AES's for work in the autumn-winter period. Usually such personnel questions are personally decided by the chairman of Goskomatom. This is in his jurisdiction. This is done without any special discussions and considerations. When the manager of an enterprise commits a major error and has shown, so to say, failure—there is an order and the labor book is handed over.

This time the problem was resolved, as we see, in a way that was not traditional for the department, which until recently was a semi-military organization, where

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even now there is still respect for tough discipline and subordination, without which it would scarcely be possible to run such responsible industrial facilities. This was done, taking into account Bronnikov's prestige and merits, in order to ensure maximum objectivity during consideration of the degree of personal blame of the director for the deterioration in the work of the collective he heads.

The thick pile of computer printouts and various documents and information illustrated with tables, diagrams, and histograms characterizing the work of atomic power engineering as a whole and each station separately that I acquired indicate that the successes of the ZAES are quite modest. It would seem to be time for the new management, together with the collective, to roll up its sleeves in earnest and crawl out of the pit in which the ZAES found itself heading for trouble. Not a chance.... Resolutions are already flying out of the office on Bankovaya demanding that the order concerning the dismissal of the director who was at fault be stopped, and various committees are checking and rechecking the degree of validity of the harsh punishment. Of course, it is not within our competence to revise the decision of the Goskomatom collegium. But at the same time, the fact is perplexing: An administrative question, which should be resolved only by professionals, has once again moved over into the political category and is being resolved by officials and deputies who are not legally responsible for the safety of the work of the AES! Has the time not come for the whole Goskomatom collegium to go into retirement?

Vladimir Bronnikov himself is stubbornly not coming out to meet with the press, and offers no explanations for everything that has happened. But of all of the possible versions regarding the dismissal of both Bronnikov and Umanets, the official one remains most viable: The ZAES director's failure to fulfill the plan and the low coefficient of use of power, of which both Bronnikov and Umanets are guilty as managers of the branch.

[Begin boxed item]

Incidentally, Breakdowns Were Also Not Avoided During the Holidays

On 1 January at 1908 the automatic protection system halted the fourth unit of the Zaporizhya AES because of a personnel error. The cause—an unforeseen stoppage of the pumps that perform reactor cooling. As reported by the information agency, at 1400 on 2 January the unit was turned on again and is now working in a normal regime. On 3 January, for the first time in the history of the ZAES, all six power units worked simultaneously. According to information of INTERFAX-UKRAINA, which was received in the ZAES information center, at 2145 on 2 January, after planned repairs, the third unit was connected up with Ukraine's power system. The total power of all the power units of the station on the morning of 3 January was 4,815 megawatts.

On 1 and 2 January, because of work violations, the voltage of the third unit of the South Ukraine AES and the first unit of the Zaporizhya AES was reduced. At 1700 on 31 December the third power unit of the Rovno AES was shut down after a crack was found in the steam pipe of the first circuit. According to information of Ukraine's civil defense headquarters, this unit was turned on again the same day after repairs. [end boxed item]

Ukraine Approves Stock Market Regulatory Guidelines

LD2501164796 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1118 GMT 25 Jan 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] KIEV, Jan 25 (Interfax - Ukraine) — The Ukrainian Cabinet of Ministers on Wednesday approved a draft resolution on measures to develop the stock market and improve state regulation of it.

The draft resolution would divide authority for stock market regulation over the first six months of 1996 between the State Commission for Securities and the Stock Market, and the Anti-monopoly Committee for Regulation of Securities Market Activities.

Brokers will be relicensed in 1996 and proposals drafted in the event changes in existing legislation are needed.

These two committees are to draft guidelines within the first six months of the current year regarding asset requirements of securities market participants, their financial accountability, common standards, and rules for the operation of stock exchanges and off-exchange trade and information systems and their interaction with institutes corresponding to international standards for organizing capital markets.

The State Commission for Securities and the Stock Market jointly with the State Property Committee Fund are to provide conditions for the development of depositories, clearing organizations, independent registrants of securities and other market institutions.

According to the State Commission for Securities and the Stock Market, the total cost of all securities emitted and in circulation in Ukraine as of July 1, 1995, was 99.9 trillion karbovantsy. In the first six months of 1995 Ukraine emitted securities worth 56.7 trillion karbovantsy, of which securities worth 3.7 trillion karbovantsy remained uninvested.

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As of Jan 1, 1996 the Ukrainian Finance Ministry approved 851 brokerage licenses, including 121 for commercial banks.

Ukraine has one stock exchange with 29 subsidiaries, as well as the Kiev international stock exchange which has yet to hold auctions. The off-exchange market is being self-regulated through the Ukrainian Investment Association, the Ukrainian Association of Securities Traders, and the Ukrainian Association for Investment Funds and Companies.

The government-prepared bill "On state regulation of the securities market" is currently in the Ukrainian parliament.

Ukraine Prosecutor General Calls Crimea Situation 'Dismal'

WS2601104296 Kiev INTELNEWS in English 2240 GMT 25 Jan 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Simferopol, Jan. 23 — Prosecutor General Hrihoriy Vorsinov upbraided the Crimean public prosecutor's office for failing to investigate a single one of the 75 contract murders committed on the peninsula in 1995. Vorsinov said last year there were more than 4000 murders in Ukraine, and that "the situation in Crimea is the most dismal." He called the work of the Crimean prosecutor's office "unsatisfactory," noting that out of 170 actions initiated by the Crimean prosecutor, all but 32 were thrown out of court. Vorsinov said it is necessary "to shuffle the personnel and introduce new forces" in the Crimean office, and warned that "Prosecutor's Office workers have no right to get involved in the political struggle."

Ukrainian, Tatar Nationalists Train Militants in Crimea

WS2501143096 Kiev VSEUKRAINSKIYE VEDOMOSTI in Russian 19 Jan 96 p 3

[Report by Volodymyr Kolychev: "Ukrainian and Tatar Nationalists Are Training Militants. Who Will Become Their Victim?"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The leader of the Crimean Tatar people, Mustafa Dzhemilev, has recently shared with journalists his opinions about the events in Kizlyar and Pervomayskoye. Mr. Dzhemilev said the following: "This is a desperate attempt to save their people from Russian aggression. This is not a gang resolving its selfish interests. The only thing they demand is to hold talks on the withdrawal of Russian troops from Chechnya."

"Despite the fact that the Crimean Tatar national movement is guided by other, nonviolent principles, we do not deem the actions by our Chechen brothers gangsterism. This is an adequate reaction to Russia's terrorism," Mr. Dzhemilev stated. He condemned the Russian stance: "In my opinion, the actions of the Russian Federation leadership, who want to devolve the responsibility for holding negotiations on the Dagestani leadership and are thus dragging the Dagestani people into a confrontation with the Chechens, are nothing more than deliberate fueling of an interethnic conflict among the Caucasian peoples."

Yet, we will not deal with the question as to why Dudayev's militants went to Kizlyar, which is located on the territory of a neighboring republic. Nor will we discuss the topic as to whether hostage-taking is terrorism or not. It was Russia that "got itself into hot water" in Chechnya, and it is currently trying to get out of it. Let us turn our attention to Ukraine, and particularly to Crimea. Many Ukrainian citizens do not even suspect that our domestic militants have been training for several years in the republic. In this regard, one cannot but be alarmed by the touching friendship between the "State Independence of Ukraine" [DSU] political association and the Crimean Tatar Adalet nationalist party. In an interview with the Crimean Tatar AVDET newspaper, Svyatoslav Lukyanenko, chairman of the DSU Kiev branch, reported that the DSU was set up in Lvov in 1990 as an "organization of Ukrainian nationalists in Ukraine, at the same time as the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists operated abroad." In 1991, a paramilitary organization — the DSU Guard — was set up "to show the invaders who is the master of this land, not only in words, but also by deeds." According to Mr. Lukyanenko, every quarter the DSU conducts military training exercises in various regions of Ukraine. The following are his comments on a training exercise held in Bakhchysaray: "Russia and its special services are trying to do everything to drive a wedge between the two indigenous peoples of Ukraine — the Ukrainians and the Crimean Tatars. By conducting joint actions, we demonstrate that they will fail."

What did the Ukrainian and Crimean Tatar "tough" guys do in the vicinity of the historic city of Bakhchysaray? They studied the terrain, carried out sorties, climbed mountains, and learned various types of one-on-one combat. The DSU first deputy chairman and guard commander, Volodymyr Stadnychenko, stated that "if Russia knows that we are preparing to defend our motherland every day, people in Moscow will not sleep in peace."

Crimean Tatar nationalist leader Server Kerimov was no less outspoken. According to him, Adalet has always maintained contacts "with national-patriotic movements of Ukraine." This year the party is going to send it

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members to other regions of Ukraine for joint training exercises. Unlike the DSU leaders, Mr. Kerimov did not say anything about enemies, noting that what took place near Bakhchysaray was "education of defenders of the state."

What can be said in this regard? Of course, we must educate the defenders of our motherland. But appropriate state structures should deal with this, and not private individuals or nationalists. And it is time for the Ukrainian Security Service, the Interior Ministry, and other power structures to ask the following question: "What are the newly born 'scouts' preparing for? Are their activities not posing a threat to the same state they are apparently going to defend?"

Economic Issues

Kuchma's Speech at Privatization Conference

LD2501175996 Kiev Radio Ukraine World Service in Ukrainian 2000 GMT 24 Jan 96

[Speech by Ukrainian President Leonid Kuchma at a privatization conference in Kiev on 24 January, which is attended by Yuriy Yekhanurov, Ukrainian State Property Fund chairman, and other officials — recorded]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Today's discussion has painted a more or less complete picture of the state of privatization in Ukraine. I will say right away that I do not see grounds for taking it easy. Because of the chronic non-implementation of scheduled volumes of privatization, the remaining high level of monopolization in the economy, the imperfect state of the methodological and normative base, the lack of information about privatization processes, and the weakening of attention to the problem of post-privatization support, there is a danger that reforms will be delayed, and maybe even discredited completely.

To a great extent these ills are brought about by insufficient cooperation with the Supreme Council, much of the responsibility for which lies with the executive authority too. [passage omitted]

The main aim of privatization is to cardinally reform ownership relations, and on this principle to fundamentally and qualitatively change production relations. Our task is not simply to create private owners, even in large numbers, but to create a society of private owners. And the main aim of privatization is not to get money for the budget, although this is an important source, above all for financing social programs, but to combine property with an efficient owner, and on this basis to ensure the dynamic development of society's productive forces. Privatization is also a condition for speedy restructuring of our economy toward satisfying the needs of the individual. It is also a precondition for reforming the economy from a spending one to a resource- and energy-saving one.

Finally, it is called on to help shape the individual of the modern age — an active, entrepreneurial individual, able to ensure a worthy life for himself. This is perhaps the most complex task now. [passage omitted]

We should proceed from the position that privatization makes it possible to substantially increase each individual's responsibility for his own life and to diminish the state's paternalistic role, which has attained an unprecedented scope. [passage omitted]

We should return to people faith in the necessity and irreversibility of privatization and, mainly, in its considerable social prospects. This is why I would say that the ideological arguments for it are one of the key tasks of the present day.

Now one often hears calls and urgings for equal conditions for all forms of ownership. But for some reason it is forgotten that this idea is acceptable and correct only if forms of ownership were equally developed now. Thus, such declarations are nothing but a disguised attempt to actually keep inequality. I think there is no need to try and convince you that an exclusively political sub-text is concealed behind all this.

It is extremely important to see this now, because the first positive steps of reform are usually linked to financial stabilization, and it could be brought to nothing if we do not strengthen it with efficient structural policies in the area of production. It is a very good thing that Deputy Prime Minister [for industrial policy] [Anatoliy] Kinakh mentioned this [presumably at the same conference]. Movement in this area has been minimal because it has not been reinforced with a broad privatization process.

Our reforms will be doomed to failure if a guided, I emphasize guided, and well-grounded wave of privatization does not catch up with the wave of financial stabilization. It is precisely for this, for efficient implementation of any kind of socially significant programs, that political will, appropriate legislation, and organizational structures are needed. What do we have of these?

Both the president and government of Ukraine have political will and the understanding that without mass privatization there can be no question of truly progressive reform of Ukrainian society. Judging from our conversations, these are inherent in those present in the hall here too. It would be very desirable to have more allies on this issue in the Supreme Council too, for the course and direction of privatization processes surely depend to a defining extent on legislative provisions. It is very regrettable that the legislative process is still proceeding

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slowly and inconsistently. The existing legislative base is contradictory and entirely absent in many important aspects.

The president of Ukraine is endeavoring to adjust the normative base of privatization with appropriate decrees, but you understand that my possibilities there are overly restricted. I believe that the creation of the necessary organizational structure for carrying out privatization has already been established — that is, Ukraine's State Property Fund, its regional branches, and the communal property funds. However, one should think about possible organizational changes to strengthen those privatization trends, which are currently lagging behind.

There are also certain achievements in information provision for privatization, but the problems in this area considerably outweigh the achievements.

There is no need to try and convince you that the populace's attitude to privatization and how actively it participates in it depend to a considerable extent on the true value of property securities. Recently the problem of their devaluation has become extremely aggravated, which could lead to considerable social tension. Actually primary privatization by certificates and secondary privatization by monetary funds affect each other. The pressure of monetary privatization devalues privatization securities. This situation discredits the idea of privatization by certificates. It is necessary to right this situation urgently.

The privatization of a separate group of objects is a special issue. We cannot be satisfied with the state of privatization of enterprises with a large stock of arms and a large number of staff — the H group, uncompleted buildings, and the agro-industrial complex.

Privatization of H group facilities demands an individual approach, its own methods and special supervision. This has been very well demonstrated by the experience of privatizing the Motor-Sich production association, the Bug (?iron) [word indistinct] combine, and the Nikolayev aluminium oxide plant. They have also been mentioned here today. However, we should not restrict ourselves to mentioning the privatization of these three enterprises. We ought once again to return to the fundamental principles of privatizing enterprises in this group, taking into account the existing experience, negative or otherwise, and to draw up on this basis appropriate organizational and normative documents. Proposals on this and draft presidential decrees have already been elaborated. [passage omitted]

The state of privatization in the agro-industrial complex surely causes the most concern. Perhaps I should have begun with the agro-industrial complex, because it is practically functioning on the same economic principles. To my great regret, there has so far been far too little substantial movement in ownership relations in rural areas. Political reasons considerably affect the speed and direction of privatization in the agro-industrial complex. It is precisely in this area that political will to reform ownership relations and production relations meets the most opposition. [passage omitted]

Now a few words about the privatization of communal property. The most worrying thing about this is local leaders' almost complete unwillingness to privatize this property in the volumes and time scales determined in law. At the same time, on the one hand, there are no funds to maintain or use it, and on the other hand, there is a wish to own it for as long as possible. Is this for the good of the matter? I doubt it.

In connection with this, I would like to remind local leaders and Ukraine's State Property Fund that by law communal property belongs to the state. Therefore all acts concerning privatization apply to it, as does accountability for not implementing them.

Another aspect of privatization, perhaps the most important one, is linked to the social aspects. Right now privatization is to some extent viewed with suspicion in society. And as privatization occurs various moments of economic reform, the corresponding attitude to this reform and to all of our economic policies is then shaped. Why is this? It is difficult to convince the average citizen that the problem of difficulties in life is not at all because of market reforms, but because the reforms are slow, not always decisive, and not consistent enough. Therefore, I would like to stress once again that there is no alternative to hastening privatization and improving it.

Now about the organizational problems of privatization. What have we established at this conference? We have chronic violations of the schedules for drawing up, approving, and implementing privatization plans, be they state-wide, sectoral, or regional ones, the imperfect nature of corresponding methods, and insufficient organizational development of privatization bodies, especially in the regions.

But privatization is not only a matter for Ukraine's State Property Fund, its branches, and the communal property funds. It is a matter for practically all leaders of ministries and departments, and definitely of all state administrations without exception. Because this is not an action, not an individual measure, but state policy. At the same time, there are grounds to say there is still a certain vagueness in ministries, departments, and other bodies of state executive authority regarding their place in the privatization processes. This is precisely why

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it is necessary to fundamentally increase the personal accountability of officials in bodies of state executive authority for adherence to privatization plans, and for the state of privatization in general.

In the series of organizational problems of privatization, individual attention should be drawn to the fact that thus far the Ukrainian president's policies and Ukrainian Supreme Council decisions have often been distorted or simply not been directly carried out in the regions. Therefore, it is also necessary to substantially increase the accountability of managers of individual state-wide and communal enterprises liable for privatization. Holding back or blocking these processes, which the State Property Fund has drawn attention to, not only actually slows down privatization, but also prolongs monopolism, and in the non-state sector of the economy too. For example, holding is used for this, which it is proposed to set up on administrative rather than market principles, without taking into account economic factors and third-party participants, specific holding companies. [passage omitted]

The real state of privatization should be grounds for more fruitful and mutually coordinated work, above all of the executive authority, and for its constructive cooperation with the legislative authority on the one hand to improve the normative base for privatization, and on the other hand for steady and precise adherence to it.

Incidentally, we have now come to a more general problem: Who forms state policy for privatization and who should bear responsibility for divergence from it? And what finally of conditions for the division of property? Is state policy the policy of the president of Ukraine, the Supreme Council, the Cabinet of Ministers, or regional political elites? Right now we have a combination of all these elements. It is very vague, malleable, and not very productive. We have a certain lack of accountability for the existing situation.

Therefore, it is finally necessary to take a definitive position that the president of Ukraine shapes state policy. In the elections he asked the people for their support to form and implement namely his policies, and he got it. The only restriction on the content of these policies — the direction, speed, and so on — is the Ukrainian Constitution, or now the constitutional treaty. This is supported at least by all sorts of veto — the presidential veto to postpone, and the Supreme Council veto as a final one.

I have touched on this issue today namely because of privatization. Therefore, I want to emphasize again that I attach fundamental political importance to it. This is practically the only way of fulfilling our common desire to become a truly developed society. But the president's policies come up against ever more active counteraction from well-known political forces. I cannot but note that there is a certain counteraction from them in the structure of executive authority too. That is why I call on everyone, and namely representatives of the executive authority, to take a principled stance once and for all in their own actions, and not in declarations, to create a market economy and on these principles to ensure the well-being of the people is no worse than that in developed countries [word indistinct]. [Words indistinct] a number of privatization problems and ways of resolving them have now become comprehensible not only to specialists, but to most of Ukraine's citizens too.

In particular, thanks to privatization we will be able to separate enterprises with prospects from those doomed to closure because they are chronically loss-making. We will remove the social welfare burden from production so that it becomes competitive. It is namely in this direction that reform should proceed; for example, in the coal industry and in machine-building.

A privatized enterprise is a potential object for attracting foreign investment. A state enterprise can hardly count on this. Unfortunately there is now a view common in society that it is better for an enterprise to be privatized for the existing collectives than to allow foreign capital into the process. This especially concerns some machine-building enterprises. The main thing in resolving this problem is to think about how to bring the enterprise up to a modern technological level, provide people with jobs and the state with taxation revenue, and how to begin to work rather than stick to one's principles while remaining proud beggars.

As a result of today's conference I have determined the following strategic tasks: to essentially improve the involvement of Ukrainian citizens in participation in privatization, to support private owners, to promote the development of small business, to create a more organizationally and economically favorable environment to attract foreign investment to Ukraine's economy, in particular its participation in privatization.

At the same time, we have to solve a number of important specific problems with the direct participation of the Ukrainian Cabinet of Ministers. The first is to increase the motivation of Ukrainian citizens to take part in privatization, to stimulate enterprise staff and managers to take an active part in carrying out privatization programs, and to make state officials more accountable for qualitative and timely implementation of privatization program tasks.

The second is to carry out a number of measures to guarantee privatization securities with real property in

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order to prevent their devaluation; then to simplify the procedure for determining the price of privatization facilities, especially those to be privatized by commercial competition or auction; to take a more well-grounded stance on establishing additional conditions for privatization, their expediency, how they affect efficiency, the viability of time scales and so on; to reduce considerably the time scale for privatizing all facilities. [passage omitted]

I want to emphasize that, taking into account the extreme social and political importance of completing primary privatization in 1996, its course, problems, and most essential decisions will constantly be in the Ukrainian president's field of vision. [passage omitted]

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Belarus

Belarus Foreign Minister Briefs Press on Upcoming Primakov Visit

LD2601110896 Moscow Mayak Radio Network in Russian 0930 GMT 26 Jan 96

[FBIS Translated Text] A briefing has taken place in Minsk on the forthcoming visit by Russian Foreign Minister Yevgeniy Primakov to Belarus. Correspondent Oleg Mikhalevich is greeting listeners from our studio in Minsk.

[Mikhalevich] Good morning. Belarusian Foreign Minister Uladzimir Syanko today held a briefing for the media. The minister told correspondents about the results of the Moscow summit and the visit of Kazakh President Nursultan Nazarbayev to Minsk. Syanko also spoke about the issues to be discussed during the forthcoming visit to our republic by Russian Foreign Minister Yevgeniy Primakov. The Russian foreign minister will arrive in Minsk on 30 January. Talks are scheduled for that day between the two foreign ministers as well as meetings with President Alyaksandr Lukashenka, Prime Minister Mikhail Chyhir, and the CIS acting secretary Ivan Korotchenya. On 31 January Primakov will meet Belarusian Speaker Semyon Sharetskiy. Primakov will also address a meeting with Belarusian diplomats, experts in sociology, politics, and teachers and students of the Management Academy attached to the Belarusian president. A joint news conference by Primakov and Syanko will take place at the end of the official visit.

Lukashenka's Moscow Visit To Amend Bilateral Relations

LD2501210496 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1652 GMT 25 Jan 96

[From the "Presidential Bulletin" feature]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] The reluctance of President Alyaksandr Lukashenka to sign any documents at the CIS summit in Moscow does not indicate that the interests of Belarus have turned from the East to the West.

The statement was made at a Thursday news conference in Minsk by Foreign Minister Uladzimir Syanko who called such assumptions in the media erroneous.

He is convinced documents were not signed for purely technical reasons. According to the minister, the president can do that in the near future at home because the depository of CIS treaties and agreements is located in Moscow.

The minister described as rumors and inventions press reports of a conflict between the presidents of Kazakhstan and Belarus.

Syanko described as successful the Jan. 17-18 visit of the Kazakh president to Belarus. "The talks will undoubtedly have beneficial consequences for the two countries," he said.

The minister found nothing new in the fact that in Moscow Lukashenka once again criticized the suggestion of Nursultan Nazarbayev to set up a Eurasian union. In his opinion a moral question rises in relations between the two presidents: "Why wasn't the matter finalized during bilateral talks in Minsk but submitted for a general discussion in Moscow?"

Speaking of economic relations between Belarus and Russia the minister expressed regret that Moscow is not as eager to promote them as Minsk. He felt the standard of relations in the military sphere is above the standard of economic relations.

Syanko hopes the situation will be amended during Lukashenka's official visit to Moscow scheduled for the end of February - the beginning of March. He said the visit would be preceded by a meeting of the two prime ministers.

Syanko said an active dialogue between the leaders of the two countries will be launched by a two day working visit of Russian Foreign Minister Yevgeniy Primakov to Minsk. IF NOTE: Primakov is expected to be received by Lukashenka, Prime Minister Mikhail Chyhir, speaker Semyon Sharetskiy and CIS Executive Secretary Ivan Korotchenya. Primakov should address Belarussian diplomats, sociologists, the faculty and students of the Management Academy.

Syanko also told the press the president would be unable to lead the Belarussian delegation to the world economic forum in Davos. He did not name the reason but said it was not political. "The absence should not be regarded as underestimation of the forum", the minister said.

He said Belarus would be represented by Prime Minister Chyhir and speaker Sharetskiy.

On Lukashenka's statement made during the Moscow summit that if the NATO expands to the East, Belarus might revise its decision on the withdrawal of nuclear weapons from its territory Syanko said:"The statement was hypothetical, not a clearly expressed intention of the country."

Syanko: Russia Lukewarm on Enhancing Economic Relations

LD2501204796 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1629 GMT 25 Jan 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] MINSK, Jan 25 (Interfax-West) — Moscow's response to Belarus's desire to

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step up economic relations with Russia is lukewarm, Vladimir Syanko, Belarussian foreign minister, said at a news conference in Minsk on Thursday.

Syanko added that bilateral military ties are developing at a faster rate.

The situation may be improved when Belarussian President Alyaksandr Lukashenka visits Moscow late in February or early in March, Syanko said. A meeting of the two prime ministers will precede the visit.

Furthermore, Russian Foreign Minister Yevgeniy Primakov is to pay a working visit to Minsk on January 30 and 31.

Syanko said that the talks will concentrate on the expansion of economic and military-political relations between Belarus and Russia, and all the bilateral documents signed by the two countries in 1995 will be analyzed.

Primakov's appointment did not surprise Syanko, who described Primakov as a powerful figure, widely known in the world of foreign policy.

Belarus Opposition Opposes Oil Sector Cooperation With Russia

WS2601103596 Minsk BELAPAN in English 0755 GMT 26 Jan 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] On 25 January, about 40 representatives of the Belarusian Popular Front (BNF) picketed the House of Government. The picketers, holding placards which read: "BNF demands the return of property to the Belarusian people," "The Belarusian petrochemical industry sold dirt-cheap to Russia," "The petrochemical industry is the main source of state revenues," protested against agreements which were signed by the Belarusian Government with a number of Russian oil companies in 1995.

According to those agreements, 51 percent of the shares in the Mozyr oil refinery are to be transferred to the Slavneft company, and 74 percent of the shares in the Naftan Production Amalgamation, including the Navapolatsk oil refinery and some other enterprises of petrochemical industry, will be given to Lukoil and Yukos. "In this event, Belarus will lose a strategically important industry which could be highly profitable and even become the lever to lift the country out of crisis levels, provided certain resources are reasonably invested, and the government follows a relevant policy," BNF Press Secretary Syarhey Navumchyk, who also participated in picketing, said. According to him, this picketing was only the first action on the subject of the national petrochemical industry. The BNF intends to launch a large-scale protest campaign to draw the attention of the public to the fact that "the process of seizing state property, of course, with the violation of legislation and the disregard the national interests of Belarus has started."

According to Mr. Navumchyk, representatives of the Belarusian Popular Front are now establishing contacts with Supreme Soviet factions to have those agreements discarded by the legislature. As is generally known, the BNF suggests the realization of the project of a Black Sea-Baltic Sea oil collector. "We realize well that this project is very expensive and its realization will take a lot of time," Mr. Navumchyk said. "On the other hand, a number of large companies in France, Germany, and the United States are ready today to extend credit for the reconstruction of the Mozyr and Navapolatsk refineries, and to participate in it on conditions more favorable for Belarus than those of Russia. Of course, we will have to repay this credit."

Mr. Navumchyk added that in view of the reduction of oil production in Russia, this country could no longer be regarded as a reliable and stable source of oil. That is why it is essential to look for an alternative. Mr. Navumchyk is sure that "the Lukashenka Government will realize this in a year or two, but time will be lost." This BNF picketing was not authorized by the Minsk authorities, but they did not take any preventive measures, seemingly considering it inexpedient to allow the BNF to gain political capital out of an incident.

Diplomatic Ties With Iraq Deemed 'Objectively Necessary'

WS2501143296 Minsk BELORUSSKAYA DELOVAYA GAZETA in Russian 18 Jan 96 p 5

[Report by S. Kalinkina: "Belarus-Iraq: To Be Continued"]

[FBIS Translated Text] **No matter how the Belarusian leadership attempted to present [Lukashenka's aide] Uladzimir Zamyatalin's trip to Iraq as an insignificant event, a majority of analysts have asserted that it was only the beginning. Analysts have been right: According to recent information, the Foreign Ministry of Belarus is actively examining possibilities for establishing diplomatic relations between Belarus and Iraq. Deputy Foreign Minister Mikhail Khvastow comments on the situation:**

"This is an objectively necessary process. Following the introduction of sanctions against Iraq, no state, including the United States, has broken diplomatic relations with this country, although the United States has even adopted a special law designating tough sanctions against the states that cooperate with Iraq. Thus, in a

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situation where we have created an independent state, the process of establishing diplomatic relations is an objective necessity.

"Some consider Iraq a potential source of oil supplies to Belarus. We are now working over this question in detail. However, one should clearly realize that as soon as the sanctions against Iraq are lifted — this may occur at the end of 1997 or in the beginning of 1998 — Iraq will be instantly flooded by interested international concerns which are already experienced in cooperation with this country. This primarily refers to the French, the Chinese, and also to Russia.... Speaking frankly about the chances of Belarus, I am absolutely not assured that we could get a stronghold in this market immediately. The primary reason is that our countries have not created a treaty-legal basis between them. In contrast to Belarus, those countries which traditionally cooperated with Iraq — not with the regime, but with the country — already have a treaty-legal basis. They have established ties and contacts. Therefore, we should not count much on the possibility of quickly obtaining something considerable from Iraq. Furthermore, right after the sanctions are lifted, Iraq will have to pay about $100 billion, or even slightly more, to Kuwait and other states which suffered because of the aggression.

"Thus, for the time being, the prospects of cooperation with this country should be approached with caution, even if realistically. While approaching the issue of establishing diplomatic relations with Iraq, we fully realize that future cooperation may be very promising. In the first place, this country is interesting for our construction complex, since Iraq will conduct large-scale work intended to restore the ruined economy. At the same time, we clearly realize that our possibilities in extracting oil and prospecting its deposits are not very promising since there are companies which have been occupied with this for a long time. In general, however, we proceed from the assumption that, following the lifting of sanctions, Belarus should try to establish advantageous cooperation with Iraq, as it has with states of former Yugoslavia.

"Regarding oil supplies from Iraq to Belarus, they are unlikely for the time being, because it is much more expensive to buy oil there than in Europe and Russia; transport is very expensive. Regarding the possibility to buy oil in Iraq and sell it to nearby countries — that is, to assume the role of an intermediary — everything will depend on the smartness of our company. However, I repeat that it is too expensive to import oil from Iraq or Iran, even though their oil is of a very good quality."

Belarus: IMF To Extend $97 Million Stand-By Credit

WS2601103396 Minsk Radio Minsk Network in Belarusian 0400 GMT 26 Jan 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Thanks to the extension of the IMF stand-by credit, a considerable influx of foreign financing to the Republic is expected to take place in 1996.

There are forecasts that the amount of this credit, which could be channeled to cover the budget deficit, will reach $97 million. It is expected that this money will completely meet the needs of settling Belarusian main debts for foreign credits.

This year, resources from the enterprises' settlement of their debts for Russian technical credits and to U.S. commodity-credit corporations — according to estimates, they amount to $20 million each — will continue to be transferred [as heard].

Moldova

Snegur Views Economic, Language Issues With Romania

AU2401203396 Bucharest VOCEA ROMANIEI in Romanian 17 Jan 96 p 5

[Interview with Mircea Snegur, president of the Republic of Moldova, by Cornel Cepariu; place and date not given: "Economic Ties More Solid Than Flower Bridges"]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Cepariu] Some time ago you knelt down in Putna at the tomb of Stefan cel Mare si Sfant [former Romanian ruler]. Those moments made a contribution to building those wonderful "flower bridges" across the Prut River which permitted the resumption of natural contacts between the Romanians who have been separated by the cruelty of time. Now can you still talk about a "flower bridge"?

[Snegur] Certainly. We can talk about it and I can tell you that during my visit to Bacau County I visited Borzesti, the place where Stefan cel Mare spent his childhood, to consolidate the cycle of knowledge about what we are and where we come from. It is true that some difficulties also appeared, some erroneous interpretations, but, also some normal changes, of shifting contacts from a strictly emotional level to an economic, more pragmatic, less visible level, which can make a contribution to a more evident consolidation of our relations.

[Cepariu] You have a cherished idea, namely to establish at least 100 joint enterprises which would allow for economic integration. Has this intention taken shape?

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[Snegur] It is taking shape. Here is a confirmation of this fact. At the end of 1995, there were 250 such joint enterprises recorded in Moldova, but I believe that this is no longer enough. Currently, we have to talk about a joint free economic zone. I was very pleased when I visited the AGRICOLA INTERNATIONAL firm of Bacau, because I am convinced that it will encourage our economic ties. They have many good intentions. Unfortunately, the economic firms do not make use of all the facilities and existing possibilities. You can cross the Prut River, coming in the morning from Romania, get an agreement, and return home in the evening. I was sorry when I realized that such possibilities are used very reluctantly and with difficulty. I think that we have many areas in which we can cooperate. Recently, the establishment of joint ventures was only a stage in which we realized that we can work together and can make certain things not only for ourselves but also for third markets. Likewise, the western market, as well as the eastern market will remain good markets where we can sell our products. Hence, in this order of ideas, I will stay optimistic and I regard it as a very good thing that I had the opportunity to verify these intentions once again during the meeting I had with President Iliescu. The president must stimulate such ventures. At the meeting with Mr. Ion Iliescu we talked in somehow more relaxed manner about a future official meeting, during which new agreements will be initialed. In this respect we agreed that the interministerial commissions of the two governments should revitalize their activity to expedite future meetings, where, I believe, more concrete steps toward cooperation will be taken.

[Cepariu] Mr. President, what is the feeling that overcomes the ordinary citizen in the Republic of Moldova now at the beginning of the new year?

[Snegur] It is optimism. We all have pledged that 1996 will be a turning point in promoting economic reforms. Our basis is what has been achieved in 1995. Subsequently, I wish to inform you that currently we have a stable and convertible national currency. We have inflation virtually under control. We have concluded privatization, in exchange for privatization coupons, and large- scale privatization in exchange for money will begin soon.

[Cepariu] Did the referendum in Dniester, where 80 percent of the population voted for a separate constitution and association with the Russian Federation hinder your activity?

[Snegur] The referendum and elections in Dniester are anticonstitutional and have no judicial support. To my great regret, not all politicians in the Republic of Moldova agreed with this, and there were some political forces — members of the agrarians and of the Socialist Union "Edinstvo" who have welcomed the referendum.

[Cepariu] Has the situation deteriorated after the elections in Russia?

[Snegur] It is clear that Russia has to play an important role because it has an Army in this region. Ukraine also has to play an important role because it is a neighboring region. That is why, our dialogue with leaders in Tiraspol is attended also by representatives both of President Yeltsin and of President Kuchma.

[Cepariu] The Romanians have valued your attitude toward teaching history in the educational system of the Republic of Moldova. However, there are voices that said you hesitated in promulgating the moratorium....

[Snegur] When one talks about something, one has to support it with arguments. I would like to talk with those people who made those remarks. I believe that every time one makes a remark about one thing or another, he needs to stick to reality. This is the case here, too. The majority faction in the parliament of the Republic of Moldova — the Democratic Agrarian Party of Romania and the Socialist Union — attempted to introduce modifications in the education program to eliminate some scientific truth and historic realities, and, the result of it would have been that the history of Romanians would not have been studied and Romanian language would not have been used, because in our country we allegedly speak the Moldovan language. This fact became intolerable and I am shivering at the thought of how far one can get by proclaiming such aberrations, confusing the students. Then I introduced the presidential moratorium to put an end to this action, hence, the Romanian language and the history of Romanians is being studied in schools in the Republic of Moldova. Therefore, the moratorium is valid until this issue becomes clear to everybody, although there is not much that has to be clarified in connection with the language, because, as is known, there is only one literary language, and that is the Romanian language. As far as the history of Romanians in concerned, we have all the signs that in the coming period the staff of the Education Ministry will make the correct decision. Now we have other problems. In the Republic of Moldova we have only one Romanian language textbook for every three students, because those who claim the existence of a Moldovan language are against bringing textbooks from Romania. We cannot publish them because the authors, except for one, do not wish to write them if on the cover it is not written "Romanian language." I am glad that the intellectuals, both in towns as well as in villages, support the presidential initiative, and I believe that this is the main thing until reason will prevail. I would like

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to refer also to the presidential initiative that was not aired much in the media, that of reintroducing religion in schools. By joint agreement with the Metropolitan of Moldova, a school program is currently being worked out, so that as of 1 September this initiative can be realized, too.

[Cepariu] Do you wish to convey something to the Romanians for the new year?

[Snegur] I wish them to overcome the stress brought about by floods and act together for their own benefit.

Moldovan Spokesman Discusses Dniester, CIS Issues

AU2601075896 Chisinau BASAPRESS in English 2120 GMT 24 Jan 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Chisinau 24/01/1996 (BASA-press) — The recent reunion of CIS heads of state in Moscow was the subject of today's press conference at the Moldovan Presidency.

Valerian Verstiuc, head of the presidential chancellery, said Mircea Snegur subscribed to eight resolutions and rejected two others "which contradict the Moldovan Constitution."

Vasile Grozavu, presidential spokesman, said "Moldova had no separate view about the CIS collective security problems — it simply did not participate in these talks."

Petru Dascal, presidential adviser, said Moldova participated in the debates over conflict prevention in CIS and signed the respective resolution. "Moldova had a separate opinion, demanding that peace keeping troops have a mandate from the UN or OSCE [Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe]," he said.

Adviser Victor Josu said the joint statement by Russia, Ukraine and Moldova on the Dniester conflict settlement obliges the parties to follow the principle of Moldova's territorial integrity. He said "Ukraine's involvement in this matter at the highest level is a diplomatic achievement. Besides, the statement cuts the ground under the feet of Dniester leaders who claim the existence of two legal subjects within Moldova," said Josu. The statement, he said, calls for the acceleration of the Dniester conflict solution and regards the degree of Dniester's autonomy as Moldova's internal affair.

The presidential representatives said it is possible that Dniester leaders visited in Moscow in an attempt to attend the reunion.

"Although Snegur has received Dniester leader's request to join the CIS, this is something unrealistic since all CIS states recognized Moldova's territorial integrity," said Dascal.

Snegur's Advisers Promise Transdniester Special Status

LD2501215496 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1652 GMT 25 Jan 96

[From the "Presidential Bulletin" feature]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Full-scale talks between Chisinau and Tiraspol on a future status of Transdniester will begin at the end of January, president Mircea Snegur's advisers said at a briefing on Wednesday [24 January].

Presidential adviser Viktor Zhosu said the meeting of the Moldovan President Mircea Snegur and parliamentary Speaker Petr Luchinskiy with the leader of the self-declared Transdniestrian Moldovan Republic Igor Smirnov, which took place after a three-month interval, was a working one. Primarily monetary and financial affairs were discussed.

Zhosu said that experts were now preparing for "another full-scale meeting" where a future status of Transdniester will be discussed.

Snegur pointed out that Transdniester's special status must be established in keeping with article 111 of the Moldovan constitution and that "the structures of power in the left bank areas of the Dniester, after they have been given such a status, will not be identical to those of the unrecognized Transdniestrian Moldovan Republic."

Zhosu recalled that in a joint statement on the Transdniestrian problem, which the presidents of Moldova, Russia and Ukraine signed at the last CIS summit, "the territorial integrity of Moldova was confirmed again and the call was made for speeding up the settlement of the conflict on the basis of giving Transdniester a special status within Moldova."

Presidential foreign policy adviser Petr Daskel said it was important that for the first time the Ukrainian head of state explained his attitude to the Transdniestrian problem. About the status of Transdniester Daskel said that "the idea that Chisinau and Tiraspol were equal entities must be abandoned."

The chief of the presidential secretariat, Valeriu Verstyuk, has said that Snegur several days ago received a statement from the Transdniestrian leader Igor Smirnov with the request for admitting Transdniester in the CIS. "Apparently the same statement was sent to other CIS leaders. However, there are no chances the request will be considered, because Transdniester is an entity nobody has recognized yet and this statement runs counter to all charter documents of the CIS," he said.

It was also stated at the briefing that the latest measures taken by the Transdniestrian leaders, including the

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introduction of a state of emergency in the economy and check-ups of motor vehicles going through the region "contradict the earlier concluded agreements between the leaders of Moldova and Transdniester and hinder the negotiating process." IF NOTE: The Transdniestrian Moldovan Republic leader Igor Smirnov on January 11 signed a decree on what he described as the "state of emergency" in the economy. This measure implies tighter law enforcement, special entry and exit rules, control of the copying and radio equipment and censorship of the mass media.

Until the Moldovan and Transdniestrian customs services settle their relations customs control will be tightened up of export, import and transit of cargoes belonging to Moldovan economic entities. Customs duties will be charged in keeping with Moldovan rates.

The authorities were empowered to suspend political parties, non-governmental organizations and citizens' associations.

Presidential economics adviser Aleksandr Shcherbanskiy, who took part in the briefing, dwelt upon energy supply. He said that "if the energy problem remains unsettled, the country's national security may soon be affected."

Shcherbanskiy said that the energy network and the delivery of fuel to the country relied on an outdated system. He said that Moldova was spending five or six times more energy to make the same amount of products than industrialized countries and fuel consumption for electricity production was twice or thrice the norm established in Soviet years.

The presidential adviser said Snegur had some proposals for finding alternative sources of energy. However, the lack of a government program did not let translate them into reality.

Moldova: 14th Army Equipment Leaves Dniester

LD2501230596 Moscow NTV in Russian 1900 GMT 25 Jan 96

[Report over video by correspondent Boris Koltsov; from the "Segodnya" newscast]

[FBIS Translated Text] Lieutenant General Valeriy Yevnevich, commander of the Russian Federation troops in the Dniester Region, announced today that all technical problems relating to dispatching to Russia of 19 trainloads of engineer equipment have been solved. The first trainload left the Dniester Region today.

Meanwhile, the latest scandal over the figure of General Aleksandr Lebed, the former commander of the 14th Army, is coming to a head. Boris Koltsov has the details.

[Koltsov, over video of military equipment on train flatcars, Yevnevich addressing meeting] The first trainload of military engineer equipment belonging to the 14th Army left for Russia today. Under the Moldovan-Russian intergovernmental agreement, a total of 19 such trainloads is to leave the Dniester Region before the summer. The Russian military from the group temporarily stationed in Moldova, headed by General Yevnevich, are not inclined to concern themselves with the question of the trains moving through the Dniester Region. According to Yevnevich, if anyone hinders this, then the local authorities should solve such problems. However, these bodies seem for the moment to be taken up with other problems.

The affair of the arrest under accusation of abusing their official powers of two former Dniester Region militiamen, Ivan Josan and Vitaliy Landyrev, is developing into more and more of a scandal. After the militia, the arrestees went on to serve in the special detachment of the 14th Army military commandant's office. These Spetsnatz forces were commanded by Colonel Bergman. The arrested men say their arrest is linked to the attempts to gather incriminating material on Colonel Bergman and General Lebed. Ivan Josan, who escaped from prison in Tiraspol a few days ago under somewhat mysterious circumstances, talked about this at a news conference in Chisinau today. He says that the investigators were interested most of all in what had happened to the weapons confiscated from illegal formations in 1992.

[Begin Josan recording, shown talking at news conference, documents showing his and Landyrev's names] The commandants' office of the 14th Army confiscated these weapons. Landyrev and I were allegedly supposed to know where the weapons cache was, where the weapons were buried. [end recording]

[Koltsov] Josan said that representatives of the Russian special services put them under psychological duress.

[Begin Josan recording] They said I'd be put inside, and for a long time, and only because of Lebed. If Lebed does not get into the Duma — that is what they said — then you'll be free. You'll be inside until Colonel Bergman is in Lefortovo prison. [end recording]

[Koltsov] However, there are other riddles connected with the Josan-Landyrev affair. We still do not know how they managed to combine work in the Moldovan police in Bendery, where they arrived in March 1995, with service in the Spetsnaz, from which they were dismissed only in August 1995. Josan explains it like this:

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[Begin Josan recording] I served in Bendery, but Colonel Bergman put me on detail only at night, I combined it like that. [end recording]

[Koltsov] General Yevnevich, however, has long been describing this account as a well-planned provocation. This scandal may go on to develop in two directions.

Chisinau, Tiraspol Leaders Debate Financial Issues

AU2601080196 Chisinau INFOTAG in English 2114 GMT 23 Jan 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Chisinau, 23 January (INFOTAG) — The Moldovan leadership and Dniester Administration held a meeting in the parliament building in Chisinau today.

It was attended by President Mircea Snegur, Parliament Chairman Petru Lucinschi, his Deputy Dumitru Motpan, Deputy Prime Minister Valentin Kunev, Minister of Finance Valeriu Chitan, National Bank President Leonid Talmaci; Dniester President Igor Smirnov, parliament chairman Grigory Marakuta, state secretary Valery Litkai, as well as some other officials from Chisinau and Tiraspol. The meeting was mainly dedicated to economic issues, restoration of ties between enterprises on both river sides.

The parties discussed financial and banking problems, in particular — the realization of the memorable agreement on monetary and credit arrangements. It was signed on July 5, 1995 but failed to be fully implemented due to the worsened Chisinau-Tiraspol relations.

The Tiraspol officials begged Chisinau to impose no obstacles on the delivery of a new consignment of coupons to the region. The new "money" was printed to cover the severe cash deficit in Dniester. The coupons were printed in Munich (Germany), but Chisinau is against their delivery to Tiraspol.

The sides exchanged their "coupon opinions" today, after which the working groups of experts were instructed to analyze the implementation of earlier agreements, and to draft the agenda for the next negotiation round.

The expert groups, whose work was interrupted after the unhappy summit of September 13, will now resume their joint activities to prepare the next summit to be held in the near time.

Today's meeting was arranged without a preliminary preparation. It was organized directly by negotiation intermediaries — the OSCE Permanent Mission at Moldova, and the special envoys of the Russian and Ukrainian presidents.

Observers believe, the negotiation process is being resumed thanks to the last week's CIS Summit, at which the Presidents of Moldova, Russia and Ukraine signed a joint statement on the necessity to speed up the Dniester settlement process, with preserving the territorial integrity of the Republic of Moldova.

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Kazakhstan

Nazarbayev, Russia's Grachev Discuss Military Cooperation

LD2501185196 Almaty Kazakh Television First Program Network in Russian 1500 GMT 25 Jan 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Russian Defense Minister Pavel Grachev arrived in Almaty today on a working visit. Talks between the two power-wielding ministers of Kazakhstan and Russia are to take place today and tomorrow. They will end in the signing of a huge package of documents on bilateral cooperation, based on the same principle as military cooperation between Russia and Ukraine and Russia and Belarus, Pavel Grachev told journalists.

Afterwards, Russia's defense minister was received by Kazakh President Nursultan Nazarbayev.

[Begin recording] [Grachev] It is a great pleasure for me to be received by Kazakh President Nursultan Abishevich Nazarbayev, whom I have informed of the issues that are to be discussed tomorrow at an expanded-format meeting of the two defense ministries. Yes, we have touched in brief upon the issue of signing an accord on state control; that is, on control over the quality of the products [produktsiya] coming into Kazakhstan from Russia and to Russia from Kazakhstan. This is in general. Apart from this issue, I have informed the president of Kazakhstan of those agreements we intend to sign tomorrow at 1900 and of those agreements we intend to present for signing to the heads of government.

[Nazarbayev] We have a global agreement on military cooperation between Russia and Kazakhstan signed on 3 March 1994 — all issues have been discussed. There are 21 agreements relating to military and technical cooperation between Kazakhstan and Russia. During my last meeting with Boris Nikolayevich Yeltsin, we discussed the issue of further intensifying integration between Russia and Kazakhstan. In this context, military cooperation is, of course, not at the bottom of the list. If you mean common defense space — yes, first, we signed such an agreement earlier and today we talked about air defense, the use of testing grounds on Kazakh territory, about defining their status and the procedure for using these grounds — we discussed these matters and we are moving toward this. All other problems relating to training our officer corps at military higher and secondary education establishments in Russia, a joint solution on the issue of building, with Russia's assistance, Kazakhstan's own sea base on the Caspian Sea and joint work there in general, and all other issues have been discussed. The problem of common defense space is where we are up to now.

[Grachev] I may just add that Nursultan Abishevich is the most active supporter of the idea of joint use of those facilities that are of mutual interest for ensuring security both in the PVO [air defense] system and the SPRM [phonetic; expansion unknown]. Naturally, Nazarbayev has agreed to all the issues with Boris Nikolayevich [Yeltsin]. As for us, we, as defense ministers, will endeavor to carry out their instructions. [end recording]

Nazarabayev, Russia's Grachev Hold Talks

LD2501171096 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1543 GMT 25 Jan 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] ALMATY, Jan 25 (Interfax) — Kazakh President Nursultan Nazarbayev and Russian Defense Minister Pavel Grachev met in Almaty Thursday.

The discussion centered on issues relating to common defense, Nazarbayev told journalists after the talks with Grachev.

He also said that at his latest meeting with Russian President Boris Yeltsin in Moscow on January 19, they reached agreement on further integration between Russia and Kazakhstan, including in military cooperation.

Nazarbayev recalled that the two countries signed a large-scale agreement on military cooperation on March 3, 1994, and 21 agreements on military-technical cooperation.

Currently, Moscow and Almaty are resolving concrete issues related to joint air defense, the status and order of the use of test fields in Kazakhstan, the training of Kazakhs in Russia, assistance in the creation of a Kazakh naval base on the Caspian Sea and other issues.

Grachev told journalists that all these issues will be discussed tomorrow at a joint session of the two countries' Defense Ministries, after which a series of joint documents are expected to be signed.

He also said that Nazarbayev is the most active champion of the joint use of facilities for mutual security interests, for air defense and for the system of missile attack warning.

According to Grachev, there is complete mutual understanding on these issues between Nazarbayev and Yeltsin, and the defense ministers "will fulfil their instructions."

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Azerbaijan

Aliyev Denies Supplying Arms to Chechnya

NC2501202996 Baku Radio Baku Network in Azeri 1700 GMT 25 Jan 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Azerbaijani President Geydar Aliyev today received (Kazhernikov), deputy director of the Russian Federation's Frontier Service.

Geydar Aliyev stated during the meeting that lately some Russian mass media have been publishing reports and articles concerning Azerbaijan that are not objective. Reports on assistance being sent to Chechnya through our territory are mere lies. Allegedly gunmen and military hardware sent to Chechnya from various countries are transported through Azerbaijani territory. Those who concoct such lies want to damage the ties between our countries. It goes without saying that some groups and individuals who fled Azerbaijan and went into hiding in Russia and who are charged with involvement in crimes against the state are interested in disseminating such slanderous reports against our republic. They are supported in their efforts by some circles in Russia.

Geydar Aliyev stated that in view of such calumnies he has appealed to the Russian leadership requesting an on-site inspection to gather concrete information.

The Azerbaijani president also noted that it could be that some criminal groups from our republic may have crossed into the neighboring Russian territory. However, the allegations of Azerbaijani support for the separatists or the sending of assistance to them by air from various countries is nothing but a fabrication.

The Russian ambassador to our republic, Aleksandr Blokhin, who was present at the meeting, said that some press organs in Azerbaijan are also publishing reports and articles that could damage relations between our countries.

Commenting on the issues raised by the Azerbaijani president, (Kazhernikov) said that, accompanied by colleagues from our republic, he had visited a number of locations to investigate the veracity of such reports and is working to clarify the situation. It has become obvious that none of the reports on assistance to Chechnya being sent via Azerbaijan is in accordance with reality.

Aliyev Meets Deputy Director of Russian Border Service

LD2501224696 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 1346 GMT 25 Jan 96

[By Sevindz Abdullayeva and Viktor Shulman]

[FBIS Translated Text] Baku, 25 January (ITAR-TASS) — The main aim of the visit of Lt-Gen Aleksey Kozhevnikov, deputy director of the Federal Border Service of the Russian Federation, to Azerbaijan is to improve the protection of the Russian-Azerbaijan border. Kozhevnikov underlined his aim at a meeting with Azerbaijani President Geydar Aliyev which took place in Baku today. At the same time, the general expressed confidence that his working visit to the republic, in the course of which he had already visited several objects and held talks with Azerbaijani colleagues, would serve for strengthening the cooperation between the border guards of both countries.

In the course of the ensuing conversation between the deputy director of the Federal Border Service and the Azeri head of state, which was attended by Minister of National Security of Azerbaijan Namig Abbasov and ambassador of Russia to Azerbaijan Aleksandr Blokhin, it has become clear that amongst other places, Kozhevnikov visited a number of military air fields. Although it was not mentioned directly, but the visit of the Russian general to the air fields was connected with rechecking the allegations by some Russian mass media that "Azerbaijan is rendering assistance to the Chechen separatists by receiving at its air fields weapons from Pakistan and Afghanistan".

Azerbaijan: 'Defenders of the Caucasus' Blame East, West

MM2501152396 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 25 Jan 96 p 1

[Report by correspondent Zaur Kadymbekov: "Threat of Explosions From 'Defenders of the Caucasus'"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Baku — For some time, particularly since the worsening of the situation in Chechnya, various Azerbaijani authorities and local newspapers, notably the weekly ZERKALO [Russian for "Mirror"], have been receiving mysterious letters which have no

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return address but do have an actual signature — the National Liberation Movement of the Caucasus — which according to the text unites representatives of certain North Caucasus republics. The message is headed very categorically: "Demand to the Leaders of the Countries of the East and the West."

The "Defenders of the Caucasus" claim that the countries of the West and the East have throughout history savagely exploited the mineral resources of the Caucasus, using the region's natural wealth in their own utilitarian interests. Moreover, its lands have been subjected to fire and the sword. And today's Russian military operations in Chechnya are confirmation of this.

The letter-writers conclude that the countries of the West, the East, and Russia need a Caucasus without Caucasians.

The withdrawal of Russian troops from Chechnya, an end to the fomenting of ethnic conflicts in the Caucasus, and the abandonment of military aid to Caucasus republics in their disputes are the chief demands made by the organization.

If the terms of their ultimatum are not met, the "Defenders of the Caucasus" threaten to carry out terrorists acts against the gas pipelines pumping fuel from the Caucasus to other countries. They will set off explosions on very important sections of the pipeline, including relay pumping stations.

Commenting on the National Liberation Movement of the Caucasus' message, R. Goytemirov, chairman of the Caucasus Environmental Council, confirmed that such an organization is no figment of the imagination. It does actually exist, and he has had several run-ins with representatives of it, who have even proposed participation in its activity. However, the Environmental Council has rejected all proposals because of its hostility to terrorist methods of struggle.

Russia Owes Baku $18 Million for Gabalinskaya Radar Station

LD2501224296 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1832 GMT 25 Jan 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] BAKU, Jan 25 (Interfax) — Russia owes Azerbaijan nearly $18 million for the use of the Gabalinskaya radar station, a source in the presidential headquarters told Interfax Thursday.

The source said that the future of this early rocket attack warning station was discussed by the Defense Ministers of Azerbaijan and Russia, Sefer Epiyev and Pavel Grachev, at their meeting in Moscow last week in the framework of the CIS summit.

Grachev promised that Russia will pay the debt but asked for a six month deferment of payment, the source said.

A new agreement on the station should state in no uncertain terms that the station is owned by Azerbaijan, he emphasized.

Azerbaijan's Gasanov Confers With Iranian Ambassador

LD2501134496 Tehran IRNA in English 1310 GMT 25 Jan 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Baku, Jan. 25, IRNA — Azeri Foreign Minister Gasan Gasanov in a meeting with Iranian Ambassador to Baku 'Ali Reza Bikdeli here on Wednesday [24 January], expressed satisfaction over expansion of ties between his country and the Islamic Republic of Iran.

In the meeting Bikdeli briefed the Azeri foreign minister on his recent trip to Iran and on Tehran's firm determination to expand its friendly relations with that Central Asian republic.

Bikdeli also gave a detailed report on the international conference on foreign policy and security in the Central Asian and Caucasian states, held recently in Tehran.

Gasanov, referring to his recent visit to Moscow briefed the Iranian diplomat on the outcome of the summit meeting of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS).

The two sides also discussed the date of Gasanov's visit to Tehran which is scheduled to occure in the first half of February.

Georgia

Shevardnadze, Kinkel Highly Assess CIS Summit Decisions

LD2501160696 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1127 GMT 25 Jan 96

[By Tomas Chagelishvili and Tengiz Pachkoriya]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] TBILISI, January 25 (Itar-Tass) — German Foreign Minister Klaus Kinkel and Georgian President Eduard Shevardnadze highly assessed the decisions of a recent CIS summit meeting in Moscow.

According to Kinkel, the decisions adopted in Moscow are "very important for Georgia, especially for the process of settling the conflicts in Abkhazia and the Tskhinvali region" which mean South Ossetia.

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The German government considers that all conflicts on Georgian territory should be solved with regard to the territorial integrity of the republic, he said.

Speaking about Caucasus conflicts, Kinkel said that they endanger European security, and called on the conflicting parties to use all chances to solve them peacefully.

During a two-day official visit to Tbilisi, Kinkel met Shevardnadze, State Minister Niko Lekishvili, and Georgian parliament speaker Zurab Zhvania. He also spoke with U.N. observers in Georgia.

Speaking before Georgian parliamentarians, he called on them "to go ahead with reforms in Georgia and show to the entire world that the Georgian model of reform operates indeed."

Georgia: Agreement Reached on Caspian Oil Transport Revenues

LD2501152896 Tbilisi IBERIA in Georgian 1435 GMT 25 Jan 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Tbilisi, 25 Jan — Representatives of Georgian, Azerbaijani, and Turkish oil companies have reached a final agreement on transporting Caspian off-shore oil through Georgian territory. Georgia and Azerbaijan will get $0.43 for each transported barrel, of which $0.17 will go to Georgia and $0.26 to Azerbaijan.

Putting the pipeline that runs through Georgia into operation will cost $2.31 million. The Turkish side commits itself to paying the whole sum.

Georgian Nationalists Blame Shevardnadze for Hardships

LD2501183396 Tbilisi Radio Tbilisi Network in Georgian 1300 GMT 25 Jan 96

[FBIS Translated Text] The Round Table-Free Georgia political association, in their own words the only true national force in Georgia, held a news conference for journalists, as well as their supporters at the Merab Kostava memorial house today. The latter significantly outnumbered the invited journalists. They really had good causes to invite media representatives: The ratification of the Russian-Georgian Treaty on Friendship, Cooperation, and Good- Neighborly Relations; the issue of Abkhazia; an appeal to U.S. President Bill Clinton on the genocide of the Chechen people; purges planned against the Round Table-Free Georgia, and the current political situation in Georgia.

The news conference confirmed that the Round Table will carry on fighting for Georgia's freedom to its conclusion, and that Shevardnadze's Government was fully responsible for the current situation in the country. Some 70 percent of the population boycotted the November election as a result of the Round Table's appeal.

In connection with the recent developments in Chechnya, the representatives of the Round Table said that terrorism had no excuse, but could only have a motive. No terrorism was committed in Kizlyar. They only defended themselves in Kizlyar.

It was also said that representatives of the Round Table had a meeting with Abkhaz representatives in Samegrelo. According to information they acquired, the situation in Abkhazia is not as disastrous as the Georgian authorities depict. They have electricity, bread, and even heating. The Abkhaz state structures are shaping direct links with the Russian state structures. Moreover, the office of the Abkhaz representative in Russia is situated in the building of Yeltsin's administration and Abkhaz representatives drive cars with Russian licence plates.

Our correspondent has just returned from the news conference and we will present a more comprehensive report during tomorrow's "Pikis Saati" program.

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Estonia

Estonian Foreign Minister on Relations With Russia

MM2501165496 Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 25 Jan 96 p 7

[Interview with Estonian Foreign Minister Siim Kallas by RIA NOVOSTI's Igor Klyuyev "specially for ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA," in Tallinn; date not given: "Siim Kallas: The Sky Over Our Heads Has Not Always Been Blue. Interview With the Estonian Foreign Minister on the New Chapter in the History of Relations With Its Neighbor Country, on Partnership With NATO, and on Realism in Politics"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Tartu University's Komsomol [Communist Youth League] Committee at the end of Krushchev's "thaw" was a meeting and assembly place for many of today's politicians and businessmen. Among them was Siim Kallas. He is 47. He graduated from the economics faculty of Tartu University, specializing in finances and credits. He worked in the Estonian SSR Ministry of Finance, was a USSR people's deputy and a member of the USSR Supreme Soviet, and headed Estonia's trade unions. From 1991 through 1995 he was president of the Bank of Estonia, and since fall 1995 he has been the Estonian Republic's foreign minister. S. Kallas is chairman of the most popular parliamentary party in Estonia today — the Reform Party.

[Klyuyev] Mr. Kallas, you are the sixth person to head the Estonian Ministry of Foreign Affairs since the beginning of the nineties. Is it possible to speak of continuity in the Estonian state's foreign policy course?

[Kallas] I would answer your question in the affirmative. The main tasks for us remain the support and protection of the state's independence, a clear alignment toward the West, and the recovery of the standing which we once held in the world community. True, it is possible to speak of a difference of emphasis at various times in certain areas of our foreign policy.

But alignment toward the West by no means implies confrontation with the Russian Federation. On the contrary, Estonia is committed to regulating relations with our Eastern neighbor and in the final analysis, aims at achieving good, good-neighborly relations.

[Klyuyev] And what is the current status of the resolution of these problems?

[Kallas] As regards the issue of Estonia's joining the EU, we set ourselves a simple and fairly realistic goal — to get our products onto the European market. At the same time, we realize that this imposes on us heavy obligations. In order to expect a positive decision from the EU member states, Estonia must successfully do its homework, so to speak.

But if I have a fairly clear idea of the path which we must travel to achieve full EU membership, Estonia's prospects for joining NATO look far more cloudy.

There is no euphoria over this issue in Estonia today. The path toward the North Atlantic alliance is far more complex than we thought a few years ago.

Nevertheless, the republic leadership still sees NATO as the only effective model of international security.

At the same time, we do not consider our desire to join this organization as an action with an anti-Russian tendency. No threat to the security of our Eastern neighbor emanates from our territory, nor will any such threat do so.

[Klyuyev] Minister, you are the first in such an important and senior post to replace the concept of "normalizing relations" with that of "regulating relations." What sense do you invest in this formula?

[Kallas] Our bilateral relations over the past five years have not developed in the best way. I am sure that many problems could be resolved far more efficiently. I am a pragmatist, in that I consider that we should do what is realistic. By "regulating" relations I understand the following: First, we must examine the problems which have accumulated, second, highlight the major ones, and third, map out ways to resolve them.

[Klyuyev] Please name at least the most important of these problems.

[Kallas] There are five or six main problem areas. The most important of these I would formulate as follows — regulating interstate relations, or bringing them up to a level whereby Estonians are guaranteed, fully and for all time, their independence and security. The second problem follows from this — solving the border question, which is closely connected with the Tartu Peace Treaty of 1920. Establishing close trade and economic relations is still a priority task for us. Our cooperation in the framework of international organizations in which Russia attacks us over the so-called issue of human rights violations in Estonia also remains a serious problem. But Estonia has also, it should be noted, taken a fairly tough line over, for instance, Russia's acceptance into the Council of Europe.

[Klyuyev] In what stage of preparation is the draft treaty on the border between our states?

[Kallas] Rumors that this treaty could be signed as early as 25 January in Tallinn during the next round of Estonian-Russian negotiations on the border do not have any basis.

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[Klyuyev] You once stated that Estonian-Russian relations have not been so good as they are today in the past 500 years. Why do you think so? And what did you notice that was "good" in 1995, for instance?

[Kallas] I mean the following: Since the times of Ivan the Terrible confrontation has always been observed in one form or another in relations between Estonia and Russia.

The Russian state of the new type — the Russian Federation — having recognized our independence in 1991 without exerting any military or other pressure, inaugurated a new stage in the development of interstate relations. A confirmation of this is the fact that in the past five years no direct threats to Estonian independence have emanated from Russia — I refer to state policy, not to individual politicians. And this is highly valued in Estonia.

[Klyuyev] Minister, as a result of the parliamentary elections held in Russia last December, the political landscape in the State Duma has changed somewhat. Moreover, Russia has a new foreign minister — Yevgeniy Primakov. What is your opinion: How will bilateral relations develop between our countries in the year which has just begun, 1996?

[Kallas] This is a fairly difficult question. It is possible to be mistaken here. The only thing of which I am confident is the following. The political parties which have become fairly influential in the Russian State Duma have always been strong in the past five years. You know, it is far better to have these parties in parliament than on the streets. We are sure that G. Zyuganov's Communists will not radically change Russia's foreign policy doctrine.

Kallas Stresses Importance of Border Amendment

LD2601111996 Tallinn Radio Tallinn Network in Estonian 1000 GMT 26 Jan 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Estonian politicians view the support by the Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly toward Russia's membership in the Council of Europe as something that was to be expected, but wonder if Russia's membership will encourage the development of democracy in that country.

Foreign Minister Siim Kallas stated that the voting results was to be expected, but the declaration that was adopted is more important because it ties Russia to obligations. The declaration includes, among other things, an Estonian amendment that Russia must proceed from existing international agreements when resolving border issues. As the foreign minister stated, he does not believe that Russia's Council of Europe membership will encourage democratic processes in any particular way.

According to Endel Lippmaa, the European affairs minister [without portfolio], it is not right to expect that the Council of Europe will now begin to exert pressure on Russia to end the war activity in Chechnya. Instead, Russia's pressure on the Council of Europe is likely to begin.

Estonia To Vote Against Russian Accession to CE

WS2501142696 Tallinn BNS in English 1926 GMT 24 Jan 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Tallinn, Jan 24, BNS — Estonian MPs at the Council of Europe's [CE] parliamentary assembly will vote against the admission of Russia to the council, said Kristiina Ojuland, head of the Estonian delegation.

She said the delegations of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania at a meeting on Wednesday [23 January] had come to the conclusion that it was impossible to support Russia's membership bid in the present circumstances.

Ojuland said Latvia and Lithuania hadn't decided by Wednesday afternoon whether they would vote against or abstain.

The parliamentary assembly is scheduled to vote on Russia's membership application on Thursday.

Baltics say they are seeking to postpone the debate and vote on Russia.

"If the assembly doesn't support this proposal, Estonia's delegation of three will vote against Russia," Ojuland said. "Estonia cannot support the admission to the Council of Europe of a country where tens of thousands of civilians are being killed," she said.

Ojuland said support for the idea of putting off Russia's membership had come from the Christian Democratic, Liberal and Conservative groups in the assembly, but that there was no agreement on voting against.

She said also a renowned international committee of legal experts had called on the assembly to freeze Russia's application until fighting ends in Chechnya. "The Estonian delegation demands that the assembly members be made familiar with the stance of the committee before the vote," she said.

The final decision on Russia's admission has to be made by the Council of Europe's Ministers Committee, which needs to reach a consensus. Estonia has Ambassador Karin Jaani at the committee.

Ojuland said Jaani won't use her right of veto if Estonia is the only country opposed to Russia's membership.

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"Isolation is no good, particularly since the Ministers Committee can admit Russia with a simple majority some time later," she said.

Although several other countries have agreed that Russia fails to meet many of the conditions set for full membership in the council, they claim that a rejection would mean supporting anti-democratic forces in that country.

Lithuania

Brazauskas Receives Ukrainian Parliamentary Delegation

LD2501163296 Vilnius Radio Vilnius Network in Lithuanian 1000 GMT 25 Jan 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Lithuania's President Algirdas Brazauskas today met with a delegation of the Ukrainian parliament, headed by [Supreme Council] Chairman Oleksandr Moroz. The three-day visit by members of the Ukrainian parliament started yesterday.

According to the president's press service, opinions were exchanged at today's meeting on the attitude toward NATO and relations with neighboring countries. Economic experience and problems in economy, trade, industry, and agriculture of both countries were also discussed.

After the meeting with Brazauskas, Oleksandr Moroz made a speech at the Lithuanian Seimas session. Then the Ukrainian delegation, escorted by Seimas Deputy Chairman Egidijus Bickauskas, left for Visaginas township. The guests will visit the Ignalina nuclear power plant, which employs quite a few Ukrainians, the ELTA reports.

Slezevicius: Lithuania To Sign Accord With IMF

LD2501223996 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1911 GMT 25 Jan 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] VILNIUS, Jan 25 (Interfax) — The Lithuanian government, the Bank of Lithuania and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) will sign a program for surmounting the crisis in the republic's banking sector within the next days, Lithuanian Prime Minister Adolfas Slezevicius told a press conference in Vilnius Thursday.

Slezevicius warned that "the price of solving the banking problem will be rather high." However, he declined to provide further details, referring to an agreement with the above-mentioned financial institutions not to publish specific figures until the document is signed. The amount of risky loans turned out to be "considerably higher" than found by the Bank of Lithuania, according to preliminary information provided by Ernst & Young, the auditor of the suspended banks.

Slezevicius foresaw "significant difficulties" in the implementation of anti-crisis and reorganization measures. Unfavorable decisions affecting the stockholders of the suspended banks will inevitably have to be made, because their stocks completely lost their value, he added.

The government and the Bank of Lithuania published a joint address to the stockholders of the suspended banks, promising to make public a "concrete program for restructuring the banks and the procedure and deadlines for the payment of deposits by banks facing problems." The document underlined that the "security of deposits kept with the banks is guaranteed with state property."

Brazauskas: Premier's Resignation To Be Resolved by 29 Jan

LD2501192696 Vilnius Radio Vilnius Network in Lithuanian 1700 GMT 25 Jan 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Prime Minister Adolfas Slezevicius has not yet made up his mind whether he will resign himself or will wait until he is forced to do so by the president.

The prime minister also made clear that he was unpleasantly surprised by the decision of the Prosecutor General to institute criminal proceedings for abuse of power when grossly inflated interest was granted on his deposit at the Lithuanian Joint-Stock Innovation Bank.

Slezevicius said that he expected that the Prosecutor's Office will ask him to elucidate on the subject and will take it into consideration. However, according to the prime minister, the decision of the Prosecutor's Office will not influence his decision concerning his resignation.

The prime minister has not been named as an accused in the above case. The accused will be named after the initial interrogation.

When asked what he was going to do with Interior Minister Romasis Vaitiekunas's resignation letter, the prime minister restated that the question of his future should be resolved first of all.

Once again the prime minister maintained that he respected President Algirdas Brazauskas's authority and said that relations with him were normal. However, we can have a difference of opinion on certain issues and this is absolutely natural, Slezevicius remarked.

Meanwhile, Brazauskas told the journalists today that he had spoken to the prime minister concerning his resignation. Mr. Slezevicius asked him to allow him

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some time for consideration to enable him to come to a decision. It was agreed that this will be done during the week. The week has not finished yet and I expect that on Monday [29 January] everything will become clear, the president said. The interests of the state are my main concern, Brazauskas maintained.

Lithuania: Criminal Proceedings Initiated Against Prime Minister

WS2501142596 Tallinn BNS in English 1926 GMT 24 Jan 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Vilnius, Jan 24, BNS — The Lithuanian prosecutor general's office announced Wednesday [23 January] that it was beginning criminal proceedings in the case of allegedly criminal actions related to the contractual conditions and payment of exorbitant dividends from premier Adolfas Slezevicius's deposit at the Lithuanian Joint-Stock Innovative Bank (LAIB).

The excessive interest rate is written into his fixed-term deposit contract with the LAIB bank first drawn up over a year ago.

The arraigment in this case is not a formal indictment — these charges will be made more precise in the course of the investigation.

The Lithuanian prosecutor general could make this arraigment without initial inquiries at parliament. If the prosecution cares to put the premier on trial, they will have to receive parliament's consent.

In his fixed-term deposit contract, concluded with the LAIB Bank on January 4, 1995 for roughly 270 thous. litas, Slezevicius agreed to accept 30 percent annual interest, that is, more than is customary in Lithuania.

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